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A Tough Pill to Swallow 173<br />
down his neighbour’s house because he created a bonfire too close to it, (a<br />
foreseeably dangerous activity) there would be no reason to exclude tortious (or<br />
possibly criminal) liability merely because he has a mental illness. Why then<br />
should it be any different if instead the person went <strong>of</strong>f his medication, knowing<br />
that it might result in a violent breakdown<br />
It might be argued that, for sympathetic and compassionate reasons, the<br />
mentally ill should not be held to have a duty <strong>of</strong> care owed to others which<br />
involves them mitigating their own mental illness, primarily because it might<br />
practically be a “symptom” <strong>of</strong> the disorder that they have difficulty adhering to<br />
their medication. This is not a strong argument. In Fiala v Cechmanek 108 , a civil<br />
negligence action was brought against the defendant for his role in a motor<br />
vehicle accident. The defendant had bipolar disorder but he did not know it. It<br />
had not been diagnosed, nor had he experienced any symptoms <strong>of</strong> it. One day<br />
while out for a run he had a severe manic episode in which he ran into traffic,<br />
banged on the window <strong>of</strong> a passing car, jumped into the car through the sun ro<strong>of</strong>,<br />
and proceeded to strangle the driver, causing her to crash into another car. Firstly,<br />
it must be noted that in Fiala, the Court was discussing the appropriate standard<br />
<strong>of</strong> care owed by the defendant. Based on the fact that a discussion about standard<br />
<strong>of</strong> care was even occurring, the Court must have been satisfied that there was a<br />
duty <strong>of</strong> care owed by him to the general public. The Court held that there had<br />
been no violation <strong>of</strong> the standard <strong>of</strong> care on the part <strong>of</strong> the defendant; but it did<br />
so noting the fact that the defendant was not aware <strong>of</strong> his mental disorder and<br />
therefore could obviously not foresee the results <strong>of</strong> failing to attend to it. 109<br />
The Court set out its test for avoiding tortious liability for a defendant who<br />
was “afflicted [by a mental illness] suddenly and without warning.” The defendant<br />
would have to prove either that he had no capacity to appreciate his duty <strong>of</strong> care<br />
at the time or that he could not discharge his duty <strong>of</strong> care as a result <strong>of</strong> the mental<br />
illness. 110 The result <strong>of</strong> the application <strong>of</strong> the test is highly analogous to the NCR<br />
test itself, but importantly, the Court carefully noted that it can only be applied<br />
where the mental deterioration was sudden and without warning, which by<br />
negative inference one can interpret to mean that had the person been aware <strong>of</strong><br />
their mental disorder (if it was not sudden nor without warning) then there would<br />
be liability. Notably, the Court directed its attention toward the standard <strong>of</strong> care,<br />
simply dispensing with policy concerns over whether a duty <strong>of</strong> care was owed by<br />
the mentally ill defendant.<br />
Moreover, the “sympathy” policy argument to exclude civil liability for<br />
reckless non-adherence to anti-psychotic medication was explicitly rejected in<br />
Wenden v Trikha. 111 In that case, the defendant caused a car accident by driving<br />
108<br />
109<br />
110<br />
111<br />
2001 ABCA 169, 201 DLR (4th) 680 [Fiala].<br />
Ibid at para 49.<br />
Ibid.<br />
116 AR 81, 8 CCLT (2d) 138, affirmed 135 AR 382 (CA), at paras 140-144.