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168 MANITOBA LAW JOURNAL |VOLUME 35 NUMBER 1<br />
McLachlin J (as she then was) for four <strong>of</strong> nine justices in Creighton held that<br />
“considerations <strong>of</strong> principle and policy dictate the maintenance <strong>of</strong> a single,<br />
uniform legal standard <strong>of</strong> care…subject to one exception: incapacity to appreciate<br />
the nature <strong>of</strong> the risk which the activity in question entails.” 93<br />
As I have posited earlier, assuming that the person with a mental disorder is<br />
lucid while medicated and below the NCR threshold, then they necessarily have<br />
legal capacity to appreciate the risks <strong>of</strong> non-medication adherence; therefore they<br />
are subject to the same objective standard as anyone else would be. Failing to take<br />
anti-psychotic medication which might cause a violent break down would clearly<br />
run counter to the conduct <strong>of</strong> the reasonable person.<br />
On the other hand, Lamer, CJ (as he then was), for another four <strong>of</strong> nine<br />
justices in the same case, held that “the reasonable person will be invested with<br />
any enhanced foresight the accused may have enjoyed by virtue <strong>of</strong> his or her<br />
membership in a group with special experience or knowledge related to the<br />
conduct giving rise to the <strong>of</strong>fence.” 94<br />
Although this technical distinction from McLachlin J’s judgment is generally<br />
significant, I do not think it is <strong>of</strong> critical import to the instance <strong>of</strong> medication<br />
adherence. Where one has a mental disorder and has been both medicated and<br />
informed <strong>of</strong> the consequences <strong>of</strong> failing to adhere to the medication, then such a<br />
person indeed possesses such special foresight and knowledge, raising his standard<br />
<strong>of</strong> care. Thus, even on the account <strong>of</strong> a reasonable person set out by Lamer CJ,<br />
the standard <strong>of</strong> care is still fairly high, albeit perhaps not quite as high as the pure<br />
objective standard advocated by McLachlin J. Lamer CJ made special reference to<br />
“frailties” while enunciating the “checklist” for criminal negligence. Such frailties<br />
would reasonably include those caused or instanced by mental disorders; however,<br />
such frailties are not necessarily exculpatory, as:<br />
A key element <strong>of</strong> the objective test is that <strong>of</strong> the control an accused could have exercised<br />
over the frailty which rendered him or her incapable <strong>of</strong> acting as the reasonable person<br />
would in the same circumstances. The notion <strong>of</strong> control is related to that <strong>of</strong> moral<br />
responsibility; if one is able to act prudently and not endanger the life <strong>of</strong> others, one will be<br />
held liable for failing to do so. One must be morally – and criminally – responsible to act<br />
according to his or her capacities not to inflict harm, even unintentional harm. 95<br />
It was further held that the frailties or traits which might serve as contextual<br />
considerations must be things which “the accused could not control or otherwise<br />
manage in the circumstances.” 96 From this, it is clear that one who fails to take his<br />
anti-psychotic medication has failed to act prudentially in a manner which would<br />
have otherwise mitigated his own frailties. While it is true that the side effects<br />
from the medication may have induced yet more frailties, they could not be said<br />
93<br />
94<br />
95<br />
96<br />
Ibid at paras 119-120.<br />
Ibid at para 37.<br />
Ibid at para 39.<br />
Ibid at para 44.