June 2009 - Alabama State Port Authority

Comprising less than two percent of U.S. Naval forces in the Pacific, the submarine
service accounted for 54 percent of enemy tonnage sunk during World War II.
rank of vice admiral) and named Commander in Chief, U.S.
Pacific Fleet later that month, had spent his formative years in
command of and overseeing the design of submarines.
A 1905 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, Nimitz had
been assigned to submarine duty with the First Submarine
Flotilla in 1907, following a court-martial and letter of reprimand
for grounding the destroyer USS DECATUR (DD-5). In
May 1909, Ensign Nimitz took command of the flotilla, as well
as the submarine USS PLUNGER (A-1). As a newly promoted
lieutenant, he took command of the submarine SNAPPER
(C-5) in February 1910 and was given command of the sub
NARWAL that October, when he also became Commander,
Third Submarine Division, Atlantic Torpedo Fleet. In November
of the following year, Lt. Nimitz received orders to report
to the Boston Navy Yard to oversee the fitting out of the USS
SKIPJACK (E-1) as her prospective commanding officer. The
boat was commissioned February 14, 1912. A month later,
Nimitz personally rescued a sailor who had been washed
overboard and was being swept away from the sub. Lt. Nimitz
dove into the water and kept Fireman Second Class W.J.
Walsh, who could not swim, afloat until a boat could pull both
men from the water. For his heroics, Nimitz later received the
Life-Saving Service’s (one of the forerunners of the Coast
Guard) Silver Lifesaving Medal.
Nimitz was gaining a reputation as an expert in the relatively
new arena of undersea warfare. In 1913, he went to Germany
and Belgium where he studied diesel engines. After serving
as the executive officer on a tanker, Nimitz returned to subs,
reporting to Commander, Submarine Force, U.S. Atlantic
Fleet, first as flag aide and later as chief of staff. In September
1918, Commander Nimitz reported to the Office of the Chief
of Naval Operations and became the senior member of the
Board of Submarine Design.
After a tour as executive officer in the battleship SOUTH
CAROLINA, Nimitz turned once more to the submarine service
at Pearl Harbor, serving as commanding officer of USS
CHICAGO and Commander, Submarine Division 14. Nimitz
next reported to the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode
Island, where he wrote a plan for naval warfare in the Pacific,
which relied heavily on the use of submarines. Nimitz went on
to hold a variety of commands over the next two decades, including
commanding Submarine Division 20, Cruiser Division
Two and Battleship Division One, among others, but it is fair
to say that he knew better than most flag officers the potential
offered by America’s submarine force.
Nevertheless, the 21 submarines in the U.S. fleet on December
7, 1941, were little prepared and ill-equipped for the type
of duty that lay ahead of them. Unlike that of Germany, U.S.
submarine doctrine called for torpedo attacks from depths
well below periscope depth and using sonar bearings. Surface
attacks, so skillfully employed by U-boats in the Atlantic
and Caribbean, were considered far too risky. Pre-war guidance
had also specified that submarines were not to surface
within 500 miles of an enemy airfield, further hobbling subs’
abilities to operate aggressively. In addition, the men commanding
the boats typically were older, regular Navy men
who were cautious in their approach to warfare.
Further hampering the effectiveness of submarines in the early
days of the war was the torpedo that the boats were supplied.
Fleet subs were armed with the MK XIV torpedo, fitted with
the MK VI “influence exploder,” which had seen limited field
testing. From the outset, submarine commanders reported dismal
results in the use of these torpedoes. The Navy, in typical
bureaucratic fashion, responded that there was nothing wrong
with the ordnance and that the problem most likely lay in human
error.
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28 Alabama Seaport • june 2009 Alabama Seaport • May 2009
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