Brand Failures
Brand Failures Brand Failures
100 Brand failures During the 1980s, Xerox tried to reposition itself as a provider of all technology-based office products. At the start of the decade, the company launched a personal computer, or (as Xerox preferred to term it) an ‘information processor’. Again, there was nothing fundamentally wrong with the product, at least for the time. But again, the product failed. Similar failures occurred when Xerox tried to launch office networks such as the XTEN network and the Ethernet office network, which were designed to compete with IBM’s Satellite Business network. Both the Xerox networks failed to make an impression. Despite its best efforts to be associated with office technology, the public remained stubbornly unwilling to think of Xerox in any terms other than office copier technology. Although the company had invested fortunes in creating office information systems, this was an area steadfastly linked to another technology brand – IBM. So why, then, did Xerox persist in trying to reposition its brand during the 1980s Part of the answer may lie in the company’s admiration for Japanese models of business. It had close links with Fuji, and had a unique insight into the Japanese management style. In Japan, brand extension was, and indeed remains, the norm, especially for technology companies. For instance, there are few areas of home entertainment where the Sony brand doesn’t dominate. Yamaha is another example of successful brand extension. Although the company started producing pianos in the 19th century, it has not been tied down to musical instruments. After 60 years of piano-making, the Japanese company moved into various other product categories with very little difficulty. Think Yamaha and what do you think Pianos Organs Motorbikes It is most likely that you think of all three. Other Western companies have also been influenced by the Japanese approach to branding. Take Virgin, for example. Richard Branson has been famous for criticizing brands such as Mars, which refuse to attach the name to other types of products. What I call ‘Mars Syndrome’ infects every marketing department and advertising agency in the country. They think that brands only relate to products and that there is a limited amount of stretch that is possible. They seem to have forgotten that no-one has a problem playing a Yamaha piano, having ridden a Yamaha motorbike that day, or listening to a Mitsubishi stereo in a Mitsubishi car, driving past a Mitsubishi bank.
Extension failures 101 However, among Western companies Xerox remains more typical than Virgin. Unlike Xerox, Virgin doesn’t risk brand dilution. As John Murphy, chairman of the international branding consultancy Interbrand once observed: ‘Unless they poison someone or start applying the brand to inappropriate products such as pension funds or photocopiers, I doubt whether the Virgin brand will ever be diluted.’ In 1996 Murphy had to eat his words when Virgin did start to move into pension funds. However, there is little sign that Virgin is about to compete with Xerox in the photocopier market. Even Richard Branson might have a problem reversing the intrinsic association the Xerox name has with the product it invented. The simple fact is that most large brands are associated with one product or service offering. With Coca-Cola, it’s cola. With Levi’s, it’s blue jeans. With McDonald’s, it’s fast food. And with Xerox, it’s copiers. Xerox was never going to be a Virgin or a Yamaha, but it still kept trying. Recognizing this fact, brand expert Jack Trout, president of Trout and Partners, advised Xerox to concentrate on what it did best. Trout realized that Xerox could remain within the copier market and still be at the forefront of technology. The solution Laser technology. As Trout has since written about the experience: There I was, facing a room full of technical and marketing people who were dutifully executing the office automation strategy that had been in force for years. I was the designated outside messenger bringing the bad news that all their past efforts were in vain and they should focus on the lowly laser printer instead of their glorious office machines. This was not a popular message. Indeed, Trout soon realized that Xerox believed the future lay in another direction: To this day, 15 years later, I have a vivid memory of an interchange that ended this meeting. After listening to my impassioned plea about laser printing, an engineer in the back of the room stood up and said that laser printing was ‘old hat’. Xerox had seen the future and it was about to be ‘ion deposition’. I asked what that was. The reply was that it was a little hard to explain to a layperson, but it was going to be fast and cheap. My response went something like this, ‘When that happens, we
- Page 58 and 59: 50 Brand failures 9 Earring Magic K
- Page 60 and 61: 52 Brand failures Lesson from Earri
- Page 62 and 63: 54 Brand failures on it,’ wrote B
- Page 64 and 65: 56 Brand failures Clearly if Corfam
- Page 66 and 67: 58 Brand failures been officially r
- Page 68 and 69: 60 Brand failures ‘There are risk
- Page 70 and 71: 62 Brand failures 13 Oranjolt The d
- Page 72 and 73: 64 Brand failures 14 La Femme Where
- Page 74 and 75: 66 Brand failures patronizing. This
- Page 76 and 77: 16 Clairol’s ‘Touch of Yoghurt
- Page 78 and 79: 18 Maxwell House ready-to-drink cof
- Page 80 and 81: 20 Thirsty Cat! and Thirsty Dog! Bo
- Page 83 and 84: Barron’s Dictionary of Business T
- Page 85 and 86: Extension failures 77 21 Harley Dav
- Page 87 and 88: Extension failures 79 making up the
- Page 89 and 90: Extension failures 81 Keep it tigh
- Page 91 and 92: 23 Crest Stretching a brand to its
- Page 93 and 94: Extension failures 85 ‘No toothpa
- Page 95 and 96: Extension failures 87 24 Heinz All
- Page 97 and 98: Extension failures 89 Lessons from
- Page 99 and 100: Extension failures 91 the no-nonsen
- Page 101 and 102: Extension failures 93 Have a core
- Page 103 and 104: Extension failures 95 In the mid-19
- Page 105 and 106: Extension failures 97 every brand -
- Page 107: Extension failures 99 sales rose to
- Page 111 and 112: Extension failures 103 29 Chiquita
- Page 113 and 114: Extension failures 105 A brand is
- Page 115 and 116: 31 Ben-Gay Aspirin Ben-Gay is anoth
- Page 117 and 118: 33 Smith and Wesson mountain bikes
- Page 119 and 120: 35 Lynx barbershop Lever Fabergé,
- Page 121 and 122: 37 LifeSavers Soda Invented in 1912
- Page 123: 39 Frito-Lay Lemonade Frito-Lay is
- Page 127 and 128: It can be expected that brands will
- Page 129 and 130: PR failures 121 40 Exxon Don’t sa
- Page 131 and 132: PR failures 123 including the clean
- Page 133 and 134: PR failures 125 environmentalists,
- Page 135 and 136: PR failures 127 the public. [. . .]
- Page 137 and 138: PR failures 129 42 Perrier’s benz
- Page 139 and 140: PR failures 131 common purpose thro
- Page 141 and 142: PR failures 133 Lesson from Pan Am
- Page 143 and 144: PR failures 135 In addition, Snow B
- Page 145 and 146: PR failures 137 45 Rely tampons Pro
- Page 147 and 148: PR failures 139 Lessons from Rely
- Page 149 and 150: PR failures 141 As Gerber saw it, a
- Page 151 and 152: PR failures 143 regarding youth mar
- Page 153 and 154: PR failures 145 buying about 40 per
- Page 155 and 156: PR failures 147 Be sensitive. By s
- Page 157: PR failures 149 Remember that comp
Extension failures 101<br />
However, among Western companies Xerox remains more typical than<br />
Virgin. Unlike Xerox, Virgin doesn’t risk brand dilution. As John Murphy,<br />
chairman of the international branding consultancy Interbrand once observed:<br />
‘Unless they poison someone or start applying the brand to inappropriate<br />
products such as pension funds or photocopiers, I doubt whether the Virgin<br />
brand will ever be diluted.’<br />
In 1996 Murphy had to eat his words when Virgin did start to move into<br />
pension funds. However, there is little sign that Virgin is about to compete<br />
with Xerox in the photocopier market. Even Richard Branson might have a<br />
problem reversing the intrinsic association the Xerox name has with the<br />
product it invented.<br />
The simple fact is that most large brands are associated with one product<br />
or service offering. With Coca-Cola, it’s cola. With Levi’s, it’s blue jeans. With<br />
McDonald’s, it’s fast food. And with Xerox, it’s copiers.<br />
Xerox was never going to be a Virgin or a Yamaha, but it still kept trying.<br />
Recognizing this fact, brand expert Jack Trout, president of Trout and<br />
Partners, advised Xerox to concentrate on what it did best. Trout realized that<br />
Xerox could remain within the copier market and still be at the forefront of<br />
technology. The solution Laser technology. As Trout has since written about<br />
the experience:<br />
There I was, facing a room full of technical and marketing people who<br />
were dutifully executing the office automation strategy that had been<br />
in force for years. I was the designated outside messenger bringing the<br />
bad news that all their past efforts were in vain and they should focus<br />
on the lowly laser printer instead of their glorious office machines. This<br />
was not a popular message.<br />
Indeed, Trout soon realized that Xerox believed the future lay in another<br />
direction:<br />
To this day, 15 years later, I have a vivid memory of an interchange that<br />
ended this meeting. After listening to my impassioned plea about laser<br />
printing, an engineer in the back of the room stood up and said that<br />
laser printing was ‘old hat’. Xerox had seen the future and it was about<br />
to be ‘ion deposition’. I asked what that was. The reply was that it was<br />
a little hard to explain to a layperson, but it was going to be fast and<br />
cheap. My response went something like this, ‘When that happens, we
Change language