Brand Failures
Brand Failures Brand Failures
98 Brand failures 28 Xerox Data Systems More than copiers Xerox is one of the branding success stories of the 20th century. As with many other similar successes, the company didn’t just create a product, it invented a whole new category. Indeed, such is Xerox’s achievement that its brand name has become a part of everyday speech. In the United States, xerox is a verb, used when people are copying paper. Chester Carlson was the man who started it all. In 1928, he invented plainpaper copying, a process he referred to as ‘xerography’ (a term based on the Greek words for ‘dry’ and ‘writing’). But it wasn’t until 1947 that ‘xerography’ became a business, as well as a technological, venture. That was when the New York-based Haloid Company met with Carlson and acquired the licence to develop a xerographic machine. One year later the words ‘Xerox’ and ‘xerography’ had been patented. 1949 saw the launch of the first ever Xerox machine, called simply Model A. A few years later the Haloid company had changed its name to Haloid Xerox and in 1959 it introduced the product which was to put Xerox on the map. The Xerox 914 was the first automatic plain-paper copier and, as such, attracted considerable media attention. Indeed, within months of its launch Fortune magazine was writing enthusiastically about this machine, which could make over seven copies a minute, and referred to it as ‘the most successful product ever marketed in America.’ Word spread about this amazing product, and very soon it was becoming an office essential. The company, rechristened the Xerox Corporation in 1961, was now listed on the New York Stock Exchange. By 1968, company
Extension failures 99 sales rose to the US $1 billion mark. In 1969, Xerox became a majority shareholder of the European operation, Rank Xerox, and so the Xerox name was now a truly global brand. The following year, the company strengthened its reputation as a technological innovator by setting up the Xerox Palo Alto Research Center, abbreviated as Xerox PARC. However, the research centre was also a testimony to Xerox’s broader ambitions. From 1970, the company expressed its desire to stretch beyond copying into the field of computer technology and data processing. In 1975 this desire became a reality with the launch of a computer product, Xerox Data Systems, which had been researched at Xerox PARC. It failed disastrously and Xerox lost US $85 million. Four years later though, the company was still determined to extend its brand beyond the copier market, this time with an early version of a fax machine called a Telecopier. Another disastrous failure. The problem wasn’t that Xerox’s brand name was too weak. On the contrary, the problem was that Xerox was a very strong brand name, but one associated almost exclusively with copier machines. Xerox wasn’t just a company that made photocopiers – it was photocopiers. It didn’t matter if the machine was made by Canon or Kodak, people still referred to it as a Xerox machine. Indeed, this was an impression enforced through Xerox’s own marketing efforts. Through much of the 1970s and 1980s Xerox ads used to pose the question: ‘How to tell the real Xerox from a Xerox copy’ The implication was that if it wasn’t Xerox, it wasn’t the real thing. While this strategy helped to sell copiers, it meant that it was tied to that product category. After all, no one brand can claim to be the only genuine article in more than one category. For years, Xerox had competed on the superior quality of its copier products. Then, when the company’s rivals had caught up, it competed on the superior quality of its brand. And as soon as a company makes the transition from a simple product manufacturer, to a global brand, it has to live with the consequences. It can’t just create a strong perception and then undermine that perception by embarking on other categories. As Al Ries memorably put it, ‘the difference between brands is not in the products, but in the product names. Or rather the perception of the names.’ However, Xerox didn’t give up. Instead, it tried to tackle the problem head on. For instance, in a magazine ad for Xerox Computer Services, the strap line read: ‘This is not about copiers.’ But of course, this only confirmed the impression that Xerox was about copiers.
- Page 56 and 57: 48 Brand failures easily, Pepsi rem
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- Page 76 and 77: 16 Clairol’s ‘Touch of Yoghurt
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- Page 80 and 81: 20 Thirsty Cat! and Thirsty Dog! Bo
- Page 83 and 84: Barron’s Dictionary of Business T
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- Page 87 and 88: Extension failures 79 making up the
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- Page 99 and 100: Extension failures 91 the no-nonsen
- Page 101 and 102: Extension failures 93 Have a core
- Page 103 and 104: Extension failures 95 In the mid-19
- Page 105: Extension failures 97 every brand -
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- Page 111 and 112: Extension failures 103 29 Chiquita
- Page 113 and 114: Extension failures 105 A brand is
- Page 115 and 116: 31 Ben-Gay Aspirin Ben-Gay is anoth
- Page 117 and 118: 33 Smith and Wesson mountain bikes
- Page 119 and 120: 35 Lynx barbershop Lever Fabergé,
- Page 121 and 122: 37 LifeSavers Soda Invented in 1912
- Page 123: 39 Frito-Lay Lemonade Frito-Lay is
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- Page 131 and 132: PR failures 123 including the clean
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- Page 135 and 136: PR failures 127 the public. [. . .]
- Page 137 and 138: PR failures 129 42 Perrier’s benz
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- Page 141 and 142: PR failures 133 Lesson from Pan Am
- Page 143 and 144: PR failures 135 In addition, Snow B
- Page 145 and 146: PR failures 137 45 Rely tampons Pro
- Page 147 and 148: PR failures 139 Lessons from Rely
- Page 149 and 150: PR failures 141 As Gerber saw it, a
- Page 151 and 152: PR failures 143 regarding youth mar
- Page 153 and 154: PR failures 145 buying about 40 per
- Page 155 and 156: PR failures 147 Be sensitive. By s
Extension failures 99<br />
sales rose to the US $1 billion mark. In 1969, Xerox became a majority<br />
shareholder of the European operation, Rank Xerox, and so the Xerox name<br />
was now a truly global brand.<br />
The following year, the company strengthened its reputation as a technological<br />
innovator by setting up the Xerox Palo Alto Research Center, abbreviated<br />
as Xerox PARC. However, the research centre was also a testimony to<br />
Xerox’s broader ambitions. From 1970, the company expressed its desire to<br />
stretch beyond copying into the field of computer technology and data<br />
processing. In 1975 this desire became a reality with the launch of a computer<br />
product, Xerox Data Systems, which had been researched at Xerox PARC. It<br />
failed disastrously and Xerox lost US $85 million. Four years later though,<br />
the company was still determined to extend its brand beyond the copier<br />
market, this time with an early version of a fax machine called a Telecopier.<br />
Another disastrous failure.<br />
The problem wasn’t that Xerox’s brand name was too weak. On the<br />
contrary, the problem was that Xerox was a very strong brand name, but one<br />
associated almost exclusively with copier machines. Xerox wasn’t just a<br />
company that made photocopiers – it was photocopiers. It didn’t matter if<br />
the machine was made by Canon or Kodak, people still referred to it as a<br />
Xerox machine. Indeed, this was an impression enforced through Xerox’s<br />
own marketing efforts. Through much of the 1970s and 1980s Xerox ads<br />
used to pose the question: ‘How to tell the real Xerox from a Xerox copy’<br />
The implication was that if it wasn’t Xerox, it wasn’t the real thing. While this<br />
strategy helped to sell copiers, it meant that it was tied to that product<br />
category. After all, no one brand can claim to be the only genuine article in<br />
more than one category.<br />
For years, Xerox had competed on the superior quality of its copier<br />
products. Then, when the company’s rivals had caught up, it competed on<br />
the superior quality of its brand. And as soon as a company makes the<br />
transition from a simple product manufacturer, to a global brand, it has to<br />
live with the consequences. It can’t just create a strong perception and then<br />
undermine that perception by embarking on other categories. As Al Ries<br />
memorably put it, ‘the difference between brands is not in the products, but<br />
in the product names. Or rather the perception of the names.’<br />
However, Xerox didn’t give up. Instead, it tried to tackle the problem head<br />
on. For instance, in a magazine ad for Xerox Computer Services, the strap<br />
line read: ‘This is not about copiers.’ But of course, this only confirmed the<br />
impression that Xerox was about copiers.