Strategic Thought Transformation - The IIPM Think Tank

I N D U S T R I A L E S P I O N A G E
2. Operational Structures
Although there is a great deal of variety,
there are at least two fundamental structures
of today’s industrial espionage systems,
and one modification using so-called
“front” companies.
2.1 The “Classical” Model”
In the “classical” model, generally the “spy”
is the person who actually is providing the
information. “He” usually is not in direct
contract with the operational agency
in the foreign entity, usually a government
body. In fact, it is quite common for
the “spy” to either not know, or believe
wrongly, the identity of the final consumer
of their information. For example,
if you worked in a government agency,
and were approached by an intelligence
organisation with instructions to provide
confidential information, you easily
might agree to help. However, in the
classical model, you might find out later
that it was not a government intelligence
agency that you were working for, but
rather someone else. That is, you might
believe you are helping a “world peace”
organization, but find out later that the
information you are providing actually
is being supplied directly to the militaryindustrial
complex of a hostile country.
Generally, with the exception of longterm
“moles” –impostors who are trained
overseas and have taken on the identity of
a national –so-called “spies” are citizens of
the country being spied upon. The “spy” is
managed by a person who is the “recruiter”.
In the “classical”
model, generally
the “spy” is the
person who
actually is
providing the
information
In many instances, their identity actually is
different from what is revealed, and consequently,
should the “spy” get exposed, then
any information they give to authorities
if false, and even under compulsion, it is
impossible for them to provide accurate
information because they simply do not
know it. The “recruiter” many times is in
a similar situation in that their manager,
the “overseas acquisition manager” [see
Figure] also is providing inaccurate identification
information. Although often the
“recruiter” or “cutout” manager is aware
of a connection, however, faint, with the
foreign entity. Several variations on the
scheme can be used to increase security,
including the following:
Extra Cutout : The overseas acquisition
manager may be managed by another
counterpart who serves as a buffer between
them and the acquisition agency. This extra
cutout can be located either
1. in the foreign country, or
2. in a third country. Since they also generally
are using an alias, it becomes even
more difficult to trace the steps back
up the chain of control to determine
the final destination of the stolen information.
Alternative Reporting: The “spy” [located
inside the target company] might
be instructed to report the stolen information
through yet another cutout manager
[not pictured]. In this case, control and
requests for information come from one
channel, and the reporting [of the information]
is handled through a different
channel. Should the cutout manager or
overseas acquisition manager be nabbed,
then they will have zero knowledge of
what information has been compromised.
Also, if the second cutout manager [who
received the stolen information] is not
noticed, then the spying can continue,
and the chain of control simply changed,
providing of course the actual “spy” is not
compromised.
Mole: In some cases, a “mole”, e.g., a person
who is of the nationality of the foreign
entity, but who has taken on the identity
of the target company’s country is inserted
into the picture. In these cases, which evidently
are rare, the operation works more
or less the same, with the exception that
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