Plantations, poverty and power - Critical Information Collective

More documents

Recommendations

Info

97 Nepal In Nepal, the target area for tree planting under the Bank’s Sagarnath Forestry Development Project was reduced from 10,000 hectares to 4,140 hectares. Among the problems were “Shortage of staff, inadequate delegation of authority and responsibility, lack of flexibility in administration and overcentralization of decision-making”, according to the Bank’s 1994 overview of its lending to the forestry sector. 494 Another ADB project in Nepal, titled “The hill forest development project,” initially aimed to plant 30,000 hectares. This was subsequently reduced to 10,000 hectares, but at project completion, “plantations and/or improved management practices” had been established on about 7,000 hectares. A third project aimed to establish fuelwood plantations on two project sites. On one project site, at Nepalganj, 1,737 hectares was planted (compared to a target of 5,000 hectares) “primarily because of encroachment by squatters”. 495 Rather than describing local people as “squatters”, it would be more appropriate to describe the Bank’s plantations as squatting on the land of local people. Indonesia A series of ADB loans have supported the expansion of the pulp and paper industry in Indonesia, the result of which has been massive deforestation and destruction of local livelihoods. In 1988, the ADB awarded a contract to Jaakko Pöyry, to identify sites for the development of the pulp industry in Indonesia. Pöyry went on to win further contracts with Asia Pulp and Paper (APP) and Asia Pacific Resources International (APRIL) to design some of the biggest pulp mills in the world. The resulting demand for timber has led to the destruction of hundreds of thousands of hectares of forest. (See section on Pöyry, above.) In 1990, the ADB agreed a US$33.3 million loan to Indonesia for a Timber Plantation Project. The project ran into several problems. In the end, only US$17.33 million was disbursed. Of the target area of 51,000 hectares to be planted with fast-growing tree plantations, 26,920 hectares was established under the project. It turned out that the “unproductive shrubs and grasslands” that the ADB’s experts planned to plant with trees were already in use; some areas by local communities, others were allocated for hydropower and irrigation dams. In West Kalimantan, the company carrying out the planting, Inhutani III, clashed with Indigenous People. An Indonesian NGO, the Institute of Dayakology Research and Development, accused Inhutani III of using force in taking over lands from indigenous communities. The Bank hired a consultant for a few weeks and rejected the allegations, although the project area was reduced to exclude “areas where potential land tenure claims could rise”. 496 The ADB’s Project Completion Report describes the damage to the plantations by fires and failing species as “staggering”. The tree species selected for the project “were not based on proven field trials, and were not sufficiently reassessed during site planning and preparation of plantation site designs.” 497 494 “Sector synthesis of post-evaluation findings in the forestry sector”, Asian Development Bank, Post-Evaluation Office, August 1994. 495 “Sector synthesis of post-evaluation findings in the forestry sector”, Asian Development Bank, Post-Evaluation Office, August 1994. 496 “Project Completion Report Timber Plantation Project (Indonesia) (Loan No. 1000-INO)”, Asian Development Bank, 11 December 1998. 497 “Project Completion Report Timber Plantation Project (Indonesia) (Loan No. 1000-INO)”, Asian Development
98 The Project Completion Report points out an important failure of the ADB’s project – the failure to deal with land rights and Indigenous Peoples’ rights: “In securing lands for development, issues concerning land tenure, human settlements, and indigenous peoples and their legal implications should be seriously considered. State-owned lands are not necessarily free from land tenure claims by indigenous inhabitants.” 498 Laos The Bank’s Industrial Tree Plantations Project in Laos was a spectacular failure. The project created and increased poverty, according to the Bank’s Project Completion Report. 499 Loans were given to farmers to plant trees which then failed, leaving the farmers with no means of repaying the loans. According to a report by the ADB’s Operations Evaluation Department, “Thousands of inexperienced farmers and individuals were misled by prospects of unattainable gains, leaving the majority of farmers with onerous debts, with no prospect of repaying their loans, and with failing plantations.” 500 The project also supported commercial tree plantations. One of the companies involved, BGA Lao Plantation Forestry (now owned by Japan’s Oji Paper) used the ADB’s loans to bulldoze commons, forest and villager’s farmlands to make way for monoculture eucalyptus plantations. 501 As in other ADB-funded plantation projects, Bank monitoring of the project in Laos was weak. The OED reports that Bank missions included few trips outside Vientiane. Between 1996 and 2003 there was no forestry specialist on any of the Bank’s project review missions. Between July 2000 and February 2002 there were no ADB review missions at all. 502 Despite these problems, shortly after the Project Completion Report was released, the Bank approved a second plantations project which looked set to repeat the mistakes of the first. In its appraisal of the second project, the Bank ignored the findings of its own consultants, who reported that “discussions with farmers (women and men) in the 6 villages revealed that their priorities in livelihood improvement do not include tree plantations of the kind offered by the proposed project.” 503 The ADB eventually cancelled its Bank, 11 December 1998. 498 “Project Completion Report Timber Plantation Project (Indonesia) (Loan No. 1000-INO)”, Asian Development Bank, 11 December 1998. 499 “Project Completion Report, LAO: Industrial Tree Plantation Project, Project Number: 20067, Loan Number: 1295”, Asian Development Bank, November 2005. http://www.adb.org/Documents/PCRs/LAO/20067-LAO-PCR.pdf 500 “Sector Assistance Program Evaluation for the Agriculture and Natural Resources Sector in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, SAP: LAO 2005-17", Operations Evaluation Department Asian Development Bank, December 2005. http://www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/SAPE/LAO/2005-17-LAO-SAP.pdf 501 Chris Lang and Bruce Shoemaker (2006) “Creating Poverty in Laos. The Asian Development Bank and industrial tree plantations”, World Rainforest Movement, April 2006. http://chrislang.org/2006/04/25/creating-poverty-in-laos-theasian-development-bank-and-industrial-tree-plantations/ 502 “Sector Assistance Program Evaluation for the Agriculture and Natural Resources Sector in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, SAP: LAO 2005-17", Operations Evaluation Department Asian Development Bank, December 2005. http://www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/SAPE/LAO/2005-17-LAO-SAP.pdf 503 Eva Lindskog and Chansamone Phengkhay (2003) “Livelihood Conditions Report”, Appendix I, page 143 in “Tree Plantation for Livelihood Improvement Project: Appendices - Final Report Volume I”, TA No. 3794-LAO, MIDAS Agronomics, Champa Lao Consulting, Scandiaconsult Natura, CIRAD Foret, October 2003.
Page 2 and 3:
1 Plantations, poverty and power: E
Page 4 and 5:
3 CONTENTS Introduction 1. Plantati
Page 6 and 7:
5 New investors have emerged recent
Page 8 and 9:
7 1. Plantations do not plant thems
Page 10 and 11:
9 plantations established on grassl
Page 12 and 13:
11 Nations Food and Agriculture Org
Page 14 and 15:
13 Another reason for the move to t
Page 16 and 17:
15 In his book, “Khor Jor Kor, Fo
Page 18 and 19:
17 Between 1991 and 2006, the numbe
Page 20 and 21:
19 are asking for”, notes WWF. 60
Page 22 and 23:
21 consume fewer goods. Less advert
Page 24 and 25:
23 credit crunch, unstable oil pric
Page 26 and 27:
25 Investment in plantations in the
Page 28 and 29:
27 possible price. Subsidies, linke
Page 30 and 31:
29 2. The anatomy of five pulp proj
Page 32 and 33:
31 However, while the Bank confirme
Page 34 and 35:
33 make way for its tree plantation
Page 36 and 37:
35 In April 2004, about 2,000 famil
Page 38 and 39:
37 Sappi, Swaziland: 50 years of in
Page 40 and 41:
39 after an assessment by the Soil
Page 42 and 43:
41 impact of the plantations on wat
Page 44 and 45:
43 Advance Agro, Thailand: Deforest
Page 46 and 47:
45 confiscation and liquidation of
Page 48 and 49: 47 management was facing a bankrupt
Page 50 and 51: 49 Indah Kiat, Asia Pulp and Paper,
Page 52 and 53: 51 company owners want profits to b
Page 54 and 55: 53 • US$4.5 billion owed by APP i
Page 56 and 57: 55 explained that “association wi
Page 58 and 59: 57 Indah Kiat faces a series of lan
Page 60 and 61: 59 logging. While the investigation
Page 62 and 63: 61 experimental areas and not from
Page 64 and 65: 63 Staples and Office Depot in the
Page 66 and 67: 65 “the exhaustive studies have c
Page 68 and 69: 67 CEDHA has also filed complaints
Page 70 and 71: 69 of converting grasslands to indu
Page 72 and 73: 71 3. Pulp Inc. Profiles of seven p
Page 74 and 75: 73 Thailand, a power plant for a Ne
Page 76 and 77: 75 Management’s experts the possi
Page 78 and 79: 77 A year after Aracruz’s third p
Page 80 and 81: 79 In January 2003, Pöyry announce
Page 82 and 83: 81 Bank in the early 1990s. Groome
Page 84 and 85: 83 Pöyry’s role in the Baikal Pu
Page 86 and 87: 85 Under carbon financing, Pöyry o
Page 88 and 89: 87 Pöyry is working on second gene
Page 90 and 91: 89 The Confederation of European Pa
Page 92 and 93: 91 CEPI Eurokraft states that “it
Page 94 and 95: 93 sectors need to reduce by 21% co
Page 96 and 97: 95 The ADB’s report notes that th
Page 100 and 101: 99 loan for the second plantations
Page 102 and 103: 101 International Finance Corporati
Page 104 and 105: 103 •In December 2000, IFC approv
Page 106 and 107: 105 firm’s activities. After his
Page 108 and 109: 107 safeguards are in practice.
Page 110 and 111: 109 Bank projects are approved by a
Page 112 and 113: 111 •€80 million to Portucel to
Page 114 and 115: 113 The Food and Agriculture Organi
Page 116 and 117: 115 Nevertheless, Poore and Fries n
Page 118 and 119: 117 failure to define industrial tr
Page 120 and 121: 119 FAO’s guidelines recommend th
Page 122 and 123: 121 Rosengren did not reply to my e
Page 124 and 125: 123 Forest Stewardship Council: Mis
Page 126 and 127: 125 body that rubber stamps operati
Page 128 and 129: 127 Criterion 1.6, for example, sta
Page 130 and 131: 129 fast wood plantations have take
Page 132 and 133: 131 Principle 10.8 should prevent t
Page 134 and 135: 133 By April 2004, FSC had, at last
Page 136 and 137: 135 plantations, because it creates
Page 138 and 139: 137 integrated set of common Princi
Page 140 and 141: 139 for clearing areas of Atlantic
Page 142 and 143: 141 Colombia were certified by SGS.
Page 144 and 145: 143 The dissociation became necessa
Page 146 and 147: 145 4. Future planned pulp mills As
Page 148 and 149:
147 Planned pulp projects: 698 Comp
Page 150 and 151:
149 UPM and Sveza Group Vologda Rus
Page 152:
151 paper industry along ecological
show all

Plantations, poverty and power - Critical Information Collective

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?