Plantations, poverty and power - Critical Information Collective

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plantations. In fact 6,100 hectares were planted. The cost of establishing the plantations was far higher
than expected, because of “the cost of settling disputes over the land for the plantations” according to
Alastair Fraser, an ADB consultant. 488
Bangladesh
A US$46.8 million afforestation project in Bangladesh resulted in the establishment of 20,000 hectares of
plantations between 1989 and 1996. The Bank’s Project Performance Audit Report notes that “Tree
planting was successful, and tree survival rates during establishment were generally high.” However, the
report points out, the project was largely a “tree planting exercise, without yielding significant benefits”.
Villagers who took part in the project, “received only minimal benefits”. The result was “impatience and
a feeling of resignation among participants” and “a potentially hostile social environment.” 489 Under the
project, the Forestry Department had “confiscated lands from the locals without giving any compensation,
destroyed standing crops and ignored protests of genuine landholders”, notes the Asian Indigenous &
Tribal Peoples Network (AITPN). Land was taken without compensation. When villagers protested in
1994, forest guards opened fire, injuring seven people. 490
An earlier ADB-financed “community forestry project” in Bangladesh included fuelwood plantations as
the largest project component. These “fell short of optimum growth” and some plantations “were
damaged by encroachment”. 491
The ADB also funded a Forestry Master Plan for Bangladesh under the Tropical Forestry Action Plan.
The Forestry Master Plan proposed an “Integrated Forest Project”, which would have resulted in vast
areas of land being planted with trees. The aim was to increase tree cover in Bangladesh from about 8 per
cent to 20 per cent. AITPN points out that had proposal been implemented it would have been a disaster,
resulting in lost agricultural land, reduced food production and serious problems for indigenous
communities. 492
The ADB also supported the Chittagong Hill Tracts Development Board which effectively allowed
increased government and Bengali control over the indigenous Jumma people. Hill people were forcibly
resettled into farms and under a scheme aimed at ending shifting cultivation. In effect, control of the
forest was taken from indigenous communities and handed over to the state. The ADB’s loans to the
project “support and sustain the conflict until today”, notes AITPN. 493
488 Alastair Fraser (2000) “The Role of Financial/Banking Institutions in Timber Plantation Development”, Proceedings
of the International Conference on Timber Plantation Development, Manila, Philippines, 7-9 November 2000.
489 “Project Performance Audit Report on the Upazila Afforestation and Nursery Development Project (Loan 956-
BAN[SF]) in Bangladesh”, Asian Development Bank, September 2001.
490 “ADB Programs in Forestry Sector in Bangladesh: Identifying Critical Issues for Changes in ADB policy”,
presentation by the Asian Indigenous & Tribal Peoples Network at the Indigenous Peoples Forum, 33rd Annual Meeting of
the Board of Governors, Asian Development Bank, Chiang Mai, Thailand, 4-8 May 2000.
491 “Sector synthesis of post-evaluation findings in the forestry sector”, Asian Development Bank, Post-Evaluation
Office, August 1994.
492 “ADB Programs in Forestry Sector in Bangladesh: Identifying Critical Issues for Changes in ADB policy”,
presentation by the Asian Indigenous & Tribal Peoples Network at the Indigenous Peoples Forum, 33rd Annual Meeting of
the Board of Governors, Asian Development Bank, Chiang Mai, Thailand, 4-8 May 2000.
493 “ADB Programs in Forestry Sector in Bangladesh: Identifying Critical Issues for Changes in ADB policy”,
presentation by the Asian Indigenous & Tribal Peoples Network at the Indigenous Peoples Forum, 33rd Annual Meeting of
the Board of Governors, Asian Development Bank, Chiang Mai, Thailand, 4-8 May 2000.