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CHICAGO - University of Chicago Department of Economics

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FRANCESCO DECAROLIS<br />

5633 South Kenwood Ave. fdc@uchicago.edu<br />

<strong>Chicago</strong>, IL 60637<br />

http://home.uchicago.edu/~fdc<br />

Citizenship: Italy (F1 Visa) Tel. 773 - 6271075 / 6677455<br />

EDUCATION<br />

PhD in <strong>Economics</strong>, The <strong>University</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Chicago</strong> Expected June 2009<br />

Thesis advisor: Pr<strong>of</strong>essor Ali Hortacsu. Thesis title: “Essays on Public Procurement”<br />

M.A. in <strong>Economics</strong>, The <strong>University</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Chicago</strong> 2004<br />

B.A. in <strong>Economics</strong>, Università Bocconi (Italy) 2002<br />

Undergraduate thesis advisor: Pr<strong>of</strong>essor Guido Tabellini. Final grade <strong>of</strong> 110/110 summa cum laude<br />

RESEARCH AND TEACHING INTERESTS<br />

Industrial organization (Empirical and Theoretical), Economic Theory, Political Economy<br />

JOB MARKET PAPER: “When the Highest Bidder Loses the Auction: Theory and Evidence from Public Procurement”<br />

When bids do not represent binding commitments, the use <strong>of</strong> a first price sealed bid auction favours those bidders that are less<br />

penalized from reneging their bid. These bidders are the most likely to win but also to default on their bid. In this paper I analyze<br />

two methods <strong>of</strong>ten used in public procurement to deal with this problem: (1) augmenting the first price auction with an ex-post<br />

verification <strong>of</strong> the responsiveness <strong>of</strong> the bids and (2) using an average bid auction in which the winner is the bidder whose bid is<br />

the closest to the simple average <strong>of</strong> all the bids. The average bid auction is new to <strong>Economics</strong> but has been proposed by the Civil<br />

Engineering literature. I show that when bidders are asymmetric in their penalty for defaulting and their valuations have a<br />

predominant common component, the average bid auction is preferred over the standard first price by an auctioneer who bears a<br />

high enough cost due to the winner's insolvency. Depending on the cost <strong>of</strong> the ex-post verification, the average bid auction can be<br />

dominated by the augmented first price. I use a new dataset <strong>of</strong> Italian public procurement auctions, run alternately using a form <strong>of</strong><br />

the average bid auction or the augmented first price, to estimate semiparametrically the firms’ costs and use them to compute the<br />

firms’ mark up, the auctioneers’ implied verification cost and the inefficiency generated by the average bid auctions.<br />

WORKING PAPERS & RESEARCH IN PROGRESS<br />

“An Analysis <strong>of</strong> Collusion in Average Bid Auctions”<br />

(In progress)<br />

“The effects <strong>of</strong> the Emissions Trading Scheme on Electricity Price in Three European Countries”<br />

(In progress)<br />

“Homotopy Continuation Methods: An Algorithm for the Fixed Point and Newton Homotopy Methods with 2005<br />

Some Examples”. Joint with R. Mayer and M. Santamaria. Downloadable Code: http://home.uchicago.edu/~fdc/decarolis-research.htm<br />

PUBLICATIONS<br />

“Economic Effects <strong>of</strong> Democracy. An Empirical Analysis”. Rivista di Politica Economica, Dec, 2003, pp. 69 - 116.<br />

Winning paper: - Young Economist Award, European Economic Association<br />

- Angelo Costa Award, Rivista di Politica Economica (Best Italian BA thesis in <strong>Economics</strong>)<br />

FELLOWSHIPS & SCHOLARSHIPS<br />

Economic Research Fellowship, Bank <strong>of</strong> Italy 2008-2009<br />

Henry Morgenthau, Memorial Fund, <strong>University</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Chicago</strong>, <strong>Economics</strong> Dept. Dissertation Fellowship 2007-2008<br />

<strong>University</strong> Unendowed Fellowship/Scholarship, <strong>University</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>Chicago</strong> 2003-2007<br />

Felice Gianani Scholarship, Associazione Bancaria Italiana 2005-2006<br />

Post-Graduate Scholarship, Univesità Bocconi 2003-2005<br />

TEACHING & REFEREE EXPERIENCE<br />

Competitive Strategy. (<strong>Chicago</strong> GSB) Teaching assistant for Pr<strong>of</strong>essor Marianne Bertrand 2007<br />

Game Theory and Economic Applications. (College) Teaching assistant for Pr<strong>of</strong>essor Roger Myerson 2006<br />

Referee for: International Journal <strong>of</strong> Industrial Organization, Rivista di Politica Economica<br />

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE<br />

NERA Economic Consulting, Italy. Internship. 2007<br />

Italian Public Procurement Agency (Consip s.p.a), Italy. Internship. 2006<br />

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), France. Trainee. 2003<br />

PRESENTATIONS<br />

CONFERENCES: Econometric Society Summer Meeting (2008), European Economic Association Annual Congress (2004,<br />

2008), International Industrial Organization Conference (2008), European Association for Research in Industrial <strong>Economics</strong><br />

(2008). WORKSHOPS (<strong>Chicago</strong>): Applications <strong>of</strong> <strong>Economics</strong>, IO Lunch Seminar, Economic Theory Working Group<br />

SKILLS<br />

Languages: Italian (Mother Tongue). English (Excellent). French (Good Knowledge). Spanish (Basic Knowledge)<br />

Computing: Windows; Micros<strong>of</strong>t Office; Internet; HTML; EViews; STATA; MATLAB; LaTeX; Ruby<br />

THESIS COMMITTEE<br />

Pr<strong>of</strong>. Ali Hortacsu (Chair) hortacsu@uchicago.edu 773-702-8250<br />

Pr<strong>of</strong>. Roger B. Myerson myerson@uchicago.edu 773-702-6576<br />

Pr<strong>of</strong>. Philip J. Reny preny@uchicago.edu 773-702-2417<br />

Pr<strong>of</strong>. Timothy G. Conley tim.conley@chicagogsb.edu 773-702-7281

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