CHICAGO - University of Chicago Department of Economics

Francesco Nava
franava@uchicago.edu
5631 S. Kenwood Ave
home.uchicago.edu/~franava Chicago, IL 60637
Cell: 773-209-3671
[US Green Card]
EDUCATION PhD in Economics, University of Chicago Now
MA in Economics, University of Chicago 2005
Laurea in Economics, Università Bocconi, Milan, Italy 2002
FIELDS
Economic Theory, Contract Theory, Political Economy, IO, Money and Banking & Computational Economics
JOB MAKET Quantity Competition in Networked Markets: Outflow & Inflow Competition 2008
PAPER This analysis investigates how economies in which trades can occur only amongst individuals that know each other
operate. Two general equilibrium models of oligopolistic Cournot competition are discussed. In the first individuals
choose outflows to neighbors and net-demands determine prices to clear each local markets. While in the second inflows
are chosen and net-supplies clear each local market. Sufficient conditions for the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium
in the flow competition models are provided. In such economies changes in flows, affect both inflow and outflow prices.
Moreover price distortions do not disappear as the changes in flows vanish. Suppliers price discriminate across buyers
connected to them, but compete in each local market. Flows and prices in the economy are characterized. Equilibrium
retrade with positive markups occurs even if the economy is fully connected. But neighbors with different marginal rates
of substitution do not necessarily trade. Adding trading relationship in such environments can reduce social welfare.
Moreover increasing the set of trading partners of an individual may cause him to suffer a loss. Sufficient conditions on
the connectedness of the network are provided for the networked economy to converge to a competitive outcome as it
grows large. In this simple setup it is proven that resale must vanish for an economy to become competitive as it grows
large, since the gross margin of retail never vanishes. Prices and flows of the limiting economy are fully characterized.
SECONDARY Joint Commitment: Implementation without Public Randomization 2007
PAPER This paper investigates how the ability to jointly rule out actions affects behavior in a game. If players can voluntarily
sign contracts that commit them to jointly rule out some of their actions, mutually beneficial bargains can often be found.
The set of allocations implemented if players have a single opportunity to sign contracts that deterministically rule out
some actions is characterized. Because players are not allowed to sign random contracts, it may appear that such subset
of contracts does not in general implement all efficient allocations. The analysis however shows that if players have
sufficiently many opportunities in which to sign such deterministic contracts, any individually rational allocation is
approximately implementable. Therefore the implementation of any efficient and individually rational allocation does
not require any randomness in the mechanism used if players have several opportunities in which to reach an agreement.
WORKING Strategic Voting in Quorum Rules with Information Disclosure: Theory & Evidence 2007
PAPERS Games of Independent Commitment 2007
When to Produce? Optimal Timing of Production for Durable Goods 2006
Sequential Equilibria in Infinite Games 2004
Public Finance and Tax Evasion: the Dynamic Effect of Public Expenditure on Evasion 2004
TEACHING Auction Theory Lecturer BA 2008 & 2009
EXPERIENCE Price Theory III TA PhD Myerson, Sonnenschein & Reny 2005 & 2007
Price Theory TA MBA Topel 2006
Price Theory II TA PhD Sonnenschein 2005
Game Theory TA BA Sonnenschein 2004 & 2005
SELECTED Workshop in Economic Theory, University of Chicago 2007 & 2008
PRESENTATIONS Econometric Society European Summer Meeting, Università Bocconi 2008
Econometric Society North American Summer Meeting, Carnegie Mellon 2008
Working Group in Economic Theory, University of Chicago 2006 & 2007
FELLOWSHIPS Henry Morgenthau Jr. Memorial Fund Dissertation Fellowship 2007
Irwin Rosen Fellowship, University of Chicago 2006
University of Chicago Scholarship 2005
REFEREE Journal of Public Economics 2008
LANGUAGES
COMPUTER
English (fluent), Italian (native), French (fluent), German (fluent), Spanish (fair)
Matlab, Stata, Maple, SWP, WinEdt, Spss, LaTex, Office, Matematica (basic), Fortran (basic)
REFERENCES Roger Myerson 773- 702-6576 myerson@uchicago.edu
Hugo Sonnenschein 773- 834-5960 h-sonnenschein@uchicago.edu
Balazs Szentes 773- 702- 9127 szentes@uchicago.edu
Phil Reny 773- 702-8192 preny@uchicago.edu