CHICAGO - University of Chicago Department of Economics

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Seong Hyeok Moon 1155 E. 60th St. Suite 225 moon@uchicago.edu Chicago, Illinois 60637 http://home.uchicago.edu/~moon Office: (773) 702 4686 / Cellular: (773) 241 4692 EDUCATION Ph.D. Economics University of Chicago Expected, June 2009 M.A. Economics University of Chicago June 2004 M.A. Economics Seoul National University August 2001 B.A. History Seoul National University February 1999 FIELDS Primary: Labor Economics, Applied Econometrics Secondary: Applied Microeconomics, Development Economics JOB MARKET PAPER “Multi-dimensional Human Skill Formation with Multi-dimensional Parental Investment” “Parental Investment” has been proposed as a key determinant of human skill. Accounting for its multidimensional nature allows more nuanced understanding of the skill formation process. Human skill itself is also multi-dimensional. This paper provides a consolidated framework to analyze a multi-dimensional skill formation process with multi-dimensional parental investment. A dynamic factor model is employed as the main workhorse and empirical results from Children of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (C-NLSY79) are presented for various demographic groups. The results suggest that different kinds of parental investment contribute to the formation of different types of skill at different developmental stages. Implications for policy design and inter-generational transmission of inequality also are discussed. OTHER PAPERS “The Rate of Return to the Perry Preschool Program,” (with J. Heckman, R. Pinto, and A. Yavitz), 2008, submitted. “Reanalysis of the Perry Preschool Program: Multiple-Hypothesis and Permutation Tests Applied to a Quasi-Randomized Experiment,” (with J. Heckman, P. Savelyev, R. Pinto, and A. Yavitz), 2008. “Sibling Interactions and Human Skill Formation,” 2007. “Reconsidering Black-White Skill Convergence,” 2006. “The Skill Wage Differential in Korea after 1980s: Effects of International Trade, Labor Supply and Demand,” 2001. RESEARCH & Research Assistant for TEACHING James J. Heckman, Economic Research Center at University of Chicago 2006-present EXPERIENCES Researcher for Korea Development Institute 2001-2002 Korea Labor Institute 1999-2001 Teaching Assistant for James J. Heckman, Empirical Labor Economics, University of Chicago Spring 2008 James J. Heckman, Longitudinal Data Analysis, University of Chicago Winter 2008 Min Sok Lee, Intermediate Microeconomics, University of Chicago 2005-2006 Dae-Il Kim, Labor Economics, Seoul National University Fall 2000 PRESENTATIONS Institute for Research on Poverty Summer Research Workshop, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI. Inaugural Conference on Non-cognitive Skills, Center for European Economic Research (ZEW), Mannheim, Germany. Workshop on Long-run Impact of Early Life Events, National Poverty Center, Ann Arbor, MI. National Conference of the Early Childhood Research Collaborative, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Minneapolis, MN. June 2008 May 2008 December 2007 December 2007 FELLOWSHIPS University of Chicago Tuition Award 2005-2007 REFERENCES James J. Heckman (Chair) jheckman@uchicago.edu 773-702-3478 University of Chicago Flavio Cunha fcunha@sas.upenn.edu 215-898-5652 University of Pennsylvania Azeem Shaikh amshaikh@uchicago.edu 773-702-3621 University of Chicago
Francesco Nava franava@uchicago.edu 5631 S. Kenwood Ave home.uchicago.edu/~franava Chicago, IL 60637 Cell: 773-209-3671 [US Green Card] EDUCATION PhD in Economics, University of Chicago Now MA in Economics, University of Chicago 2005 Laurea in Economics, Università Bocconi, Milan, Italy 2002 FIELDS Economic Theory, Contract Theory, Political Economy, IO, Money and Banking & Computational Economics JOB MAKET Quantity Competition in Networked Markets: Outflow & Inflow Competition 2008 PAPER This analysis investigates how economies in which trades can occur only amongst individuals that know each other operate. Two general equilibrium models of oligopolistic Cournot competition are discussed. In the first individuals choose outflows to neighbors and net-demands determine prices to clear each local markets. While in the second inflows are chosen and net-supplies clear each local market. Sufficient conditions for the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium in the flow competition models are provided. In such economies changes in flows, affect both inflow and outflow prices. Moreover price distortions do not disappear as the changes in flows vanish. Suppliers price discriminate across buyers connected to them, but compete in each local market. Flows and prices in the economy are characterized. Equilibrium retrade with positive markups occurs even if the economy is fully connected. But neighbors with different marginal rates of substitution do not necessarily trade. Adding trading relationship in such environments can reduce social welfare. Moreover increasing the set of trading partners of an individual may cause him to suffer a loss. Sufficient conditions on the connectedness of the network are provided for the networked economy to converge to a competitive outcome as it grows large. In this simple setup it is proven that resale must vanish for an economy to become competitive as it grows large, since the gross margin of retail never vanishes. Prices and flows of the limiting economy are fully characterized. SECONDARY Joint Commitment: Implementation without Public Randomization 2007 PAPER This paper investigates how the ability to jointly rule out actions affects behavior in a game. If players can voluntarily sign contracts that commit them to jointly rule out some of their actions, mutually beneficial bargains can often be found. The set of allocations implemented if players have a single opportunity to sign contracts that deterministically rule out some actions is characterized. Because players are not allowed to sign random contracts, it may appear that such subset of contracts does not in general implement all efficient allocations. The analysis however shows that if players have sufficiently many opportunities in which to sign such deterministic contracts, any individually rational allocation is approximately implementable. Therefore the implementation of any efficient and individually rational allocation does not require any randomness in the mechanism used if players have several opportunities in which to reach an agreement. WORKING Strategic Voting in Quorum Rules with Information Disclosure: Theory & Evidence 2007 PAPERS Games of Independent Commitment 2007 When to Produce? Optimal Timing of Production for Durable Goods 2006 Sequential Equilibria in Infinite Games 2004 Public Finance and Tax Evasion: the Dynamic Effect of Public Expenditure on Evasion 2004 TEACHING Auction Theory Lecturer BA 2008 & 2009 EXPERIENCE Price Theory III TA PhD Myerson, Sonnenschein & Reny 2005 & 2007 Price Theory TA MBA Topel 2006 Price Theory II TA PhD Sonnenschein 2005 Game Theory TA BA Sonnenschein 2004 & 2005 SELECTED Workshop in Economic Theory, University of Chicago 2007 & 2008 PRESENTATIONS Econometric Society European Summer Meeting, Università Bocconi 2008 Econometric Society North American Summer Meeting, Carnegie Mellon 2008 Working Group in Economic Theory, University of Chicago 2006 & 2007 FELLOWSHIPS Henry Morgenthau Jr. Memorial Fund Dissertation Fellowship 2007 Irwin Rosen Fellowship, University of Chicago 2006 University of Chicago Scholarship 2005 REFEREE Journal of Public Economics 2008 LANGUAGES COMPUTER English (fluent), Italian (native), French (fluent), German (fluent), Spanish (fair) Matlab, Stata, Maple, SWP, WinEdt, Spss, LaTex, Office, Matematica (basic), Fortran (basic) REFERENCES Roger Myerson 773- 702-6576 myerson@uchicago.edu Hugo Sonnenschein 773- 834-5960 h-sonnenschein@uchicago.edu Balazs Szentes 773- 702- 9127 szentes@uchicago.edu Phil Reny 773- 702-8192 preny@uchicago.edu
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