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Democratization and Military Reform in the Philippines obstacles to democratization as armed followers are often used to intimidate voters and dominate the local economy, and neither the need for these groups nor the material basis that supports them have received enough attention. Clearly, making them illegal has accomplished little as over two decades have passed and the laws have only caused a small decline in their numbers. Amnesty programs and voluntary weapons surrendering have also proved ineffective. The strategies used against private armies have failed because they do not address the reasons that the armies exist. They are made possible by the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few oligarchs (Wurfel, 1991). Inequality drives this system in which lone individuals and families can afford to employ armed supporters (Sidel, 1999). More importantly, the need for them has not gone away. Without a national armed presence in the provinces dominated by private armies some provinces have little protection against insurgents. There is also no way for politicians to protect themselves and their followers against rivals without private armies or some neutral arbitrating force. The solution to the problem of private armies must be found in improvements to the state’s capacity to protect the provinces and ensure fair elections. However, even where security forces are stationed commanders are often so corrupt that they do little to guarantee free elections or protect the local civilian population. Kahl argues that the prevalence of private armies actually increased the intensity of insurgencies. “Taken together, these non-state sources of physical insecurity had the same effect on the growth of the insurgency as those emanating from state-affiliated actors: they increased incentives for the poor to seek out the Communists for protection”(Kahl, 2006; 109). Thus, the private armies are linked to the country’s other security concerns; in order to deal with them the AFP must eliminate the guerrilla forces that justify the existence of non-state security forces. The Philippines have a long history of communist insurgency. In the years following WWII the Hukabalahaps, who were created to fight against the Japanese, waged a revolutionary war against their own government. The largely peasant army focused on winning militarily and excelled in fighting, even coming close to capturing Manila at their peak in 1951 (Kessler, 1989; 116). The Huk rebellion failed, but it 326
Marcus Schulzke, State University of New York at Albany (USA) was replaced by the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the New People’s Army (NPA). These insurgents became powerful during the period of martial law in the late 1970s and early 1980s when mass discontent with Marcos’ rule and the absence of moderate alternatives drove many to support armed resistance. Since María Corazón Aquino’s reestablishment of democratic rule the communists’ power has declined, but massive economic inequalities are enough to ensure that they have enough popular support to fight the government to a stalemate. The communists continue to be the state’s greatest threat (Wiencek, 2005). The Huks’ made the mistake of fighting a revolutionary war focused on military victory. Like many other failed revolutionary movements, they prioritized combat effectiveness over all else and this did little to make them seem like a viable alternative for governing. The CPP wisely changed course. Their strategy is primarily oriented toward cultivating mass support rather than fighting (Jones, 1989) and this helps to explain the organization’s longevity. Members are far more interested in building infrastructure in the villages they control and establishing themselves as a credible alternative to the state than in beating the AFP. By contrast, the state still focuses on beating the insurgents militarily. This not only attacks the problem without addressing its root causes but is also a fight that the AFP seems poorly suited for, judging from its past performance. The country’s autonomous bases of power serve as justifications for strengthening the central government, thereby harming democracy, and must therefore be eliminated. Yet, simply disarming these groups would leave the government unchallenged and the country open to the dominance of another strong executive. More importantly, the country’s security forces do not yet have the ability to defeat any of these movements, but this is largely the consequence of its own mismanagement. For decades, the country’s military and police forces have been as threatening to the well-being of ordinary citizens as the non-state militant factions. 327
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Marcus Schulzke, State University of New York at Albany (USA)<br />
was replaced by the Communist Party of the Philippines<br />
(CPP) and the New People’s Army (NPA). These insurgents<br />
became powerful during the period of martial law in the late<br />
1970s and early 1980s when mass discontent with Marcos’<br />
rule and the absence of moderate alternatives drove many to<br />
support armed resistance. Since María Corazón Aquino’s<br />
reestablishment of democratic rule the communists’ power<br />
has declined, but massive economic inequalities are enough<br />
to ensure that they have enough popular support to fight the<br />
government to a stalemate. The communists continue to be<br />
the state’s greatest threat (Wiencek, 2005).<br />
The Huks’ made the mistake of fighting a revolutionary<br />
war focused on military victory. Like many other failed<br />
revolutionary movements, they prioritized combat<br />
effectiveness over all else and this did little to make them<br />
seem like a viable alternative for governing. The CPP wisely<br />
changed course. Their strategy is primarily oriented toward<br />
cultivating mass support rather than fighting (Jones, 1989)<br />
and this helps to explain the organization’s longevity.<br />
Members are far more interested in building infrastructure<br />
in the villages they control and establishing themselves as a<br />
credible alternative to the state than in beating the AFP. By<br />
contrast, the state still focuses on beating the insurgents<br />
militarily. This not only attacks the problem without<br />
addressing its root causes but is also a fight that the AFP<br />
seems poorly suited for, judging from its past performance.<br />
The country’s autonomous bases of power serve as<br />
justifications for strengthening the central government,<br />
thereby harming democracy, and must therefore be<br />
eliminated. Yet, simply disarming these groups would leave<br />
the government unchallenged and the country open to the<br />
dominance of another strong executive. More importantly,<br />
the country’s security forces do not yet have the ability to<br />
defeat any of these movements, but this is largely the<br />
consequence of its own mismanagement. For decades, the<br />
country’s military and police forces have been as threatening<br />
to the well-being of ordinary citizens as the non-state<br />
militant factions.<br />
327
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