View - ResearchGate
View - ResearchGate View - ResearchGate
Why the West should Discourage Japanese Military Expansion and goals [Sata, 2001, p2198]. Pyle writes that Japanese cooperation, is not so much the result of shared values as it is of the realist appraisal of the value of the alliance. … Japan will seek maximum autonomy for its own purposes … It will not wish to be hostage to the global strategy of the United States or to its relations with China and Korea [Pyle, 2007, p368]. Inoguichi and Bacon hypothesize that the new relationship might conform to patterns such as the ‘British Model’ of a special relationship, a ‘German Model’ of ‘regional embeddedness’ and institutionalism, or a ‘French Model’ of strong autonomy [Inoguichi, 2006, pp4-5]. But these limited scenarios echo the sentiment of George Friedman that, “Conventional political analysis suffers from a profound failure of imagination” [Friedman, 2009, p3]. While Japanese political moderates may maintain the current relationship with America, more nationalistic elements could, shift Japanese doctrine from a tethered, defensive realism to an untethered, offensive realism, in which strategists would be ever alert to exploit opportunities to expand Japan’s power. … It would join the other great powers in a permanent struggle to maximize national strength and influence [Samuels, 2007, p193]. American domination of Japanese foreign policy helped to stabilise Asia during the Cold War. Détente with China, founded on having a common Soviet enemy, would have been complicated by an independent Japan; and removing any Japanese threat to Southeast Asia helped to focus their efforts on combating Communist influence. It is possible that a newly-militarised Japan may either pose a renewed threat to other Asian states, and thus generate instability, or alternatively enhance its relationship with regional powers like China, potentially to the detriment of US regional influence. 316
Dr. David Robinson, Edith Cowan University (Australia) Japan’s Self-Defense Force is already considered a powerful regional force, and Japan’s previous decisions not to acquire nuclear weapons have been, “on purely strategic grounds, unrelated to antimilitarism or pacifism” [Bukh, 2010, pp7-8]. As Japan has a stockpile of plutonium and extremely sophisticated rocket technology, the possibility remains that Japan could become a major nuclear power within a decade if sufficiently provoked by regional competitors like North Korea [Matthews, 2003, p78], and neo-realist Kenneth Waltz has argued that Asia’s security environment will eventually compel Japan to nuclearise [Mirashita, 2001, p5]. China and Japan are each dominant in the others’ strategic thinking regarding economic, political and military issues, and the enhancement of Japanese military power must influence China’s own strategic vision [Pyle, 2007, p312-315]. China and Korea also remain “convinced that Japanese militarism, supported by an invigorated nationalist right wing, lurks just beneath the surface” [Samuels, 2007, p2]. At the very least Japan’s new foreign policy could escalate into a regional arms race, with the potential for both Japan and South Korea to nuclearise. Issues like control of the Senkaku Islands, the division of Korea, and Chinese claims on Taiwan provide continuing fault-lines around which conflict might develop [Matthews, 2003, p81]. China also has the potential for internal instability, as its social and political tensions threaten economic slump and social unrest, perhaps even leading to territorial disintegration. In a situation of political factionalism or civil conflict in China, Japan would be unlikely to remain a neutral onlooker, and might become a ‘king-maker’ on the mainland [Pyle, 2007, p337]. Japan’s willingness to influence smaller Asia-Pacific nations, in opposition to Western goals, manifests today in forums dealing with whaling and endangered species protection [Phillips, 2010]. Meanwhile, issues of biased histories in Japanese schoolbooks, and high-profile ceremonies at Japan’s Yasukuni Shrine prompt observers to fear that new generations of Japanese may forget the horrors of war, and how easily nationalism may turn into imperialism [Matthews, 2003, pp79-80]. On the other hand, hostility between China and Japan is not predestined, and they are two economies that already engage 317
- Page 173 and 174: Gulf States and the Conflict betwee
- Page 175 and 176: Gulf States and the Conflict betwee
- Page 177 and 178: Gulf States and the Conflict betwee
- Page 179 and 180: Gulf States and the Conflict betwee
- Page 181 and 182: Gulf States and the Conflict betwee
- Page 183 and 184: Gulf States and the Conflict betwee
- Page 185 and 186: Gulf States and the Conflict betwee
- Page 187 and 188: Gulf States and the Conflict betwee
- Page 189 and 190: Gulf States and the Conflict betwee
- Page 191 and 192: Gulf States and the Conflict betwee
- Page 193 and 194: Gulf States and the Conflict betwee
- Page 195 and 196: Gulf States and the Conflict betwee
- Page 197 and 198: Gulf States and the Conflict betwee
- Page 199 and 200: Gulf States and the Conflict betwee
- Page 201 and 202: Otto F. von Feigenblatt, Vannapond
- Page 203 and 204: Otto F. von Feigenblatt, Vannapond
- Page 205 and 206: Otto F. von Feigenblatt, Vannapond
- Page 207 and 208: Otto F. von Feigenblatt, Vannapond
- Page 209 and 210: Otto F. von Feigenblatt, Vannapond
- Page 211 and 212: Otto F. von Feigenblatt, Vannapond
- Page 213 and 214: Otto F. von Feigenblatt, Vannapond
- Page 215 and 216: Otto F. von Feigenblatt, Vannapond
- Page 217 and 218: Otto F. von Feigenblatt, Vannapond
- Page 219 and 220: Otto F. von Feigenblatt, Vannapond
- Page 221 and 222: Dr. David Robinson, Edith Cowan Uni
- Page 223: Dr. David Robinson, Edith Cowan Uni
- Page 227 and 228: Dr. David Robinson, Edith Cowan Uni
- Page 229 and 230: Marcus Schulzke, State University o
- Page 231 and 232: Marcus Schulzke, State University o
- Page 233 and 234: Marcus Schulzke, State University o
- Page 235 and 236: Marcus Schulzke, State University o
- Page 237 and 238: Marcus Schulzke, State University o
- Page 239 and 240: Marcus Schulzke, State University o
- Page 241 and 242: Marcus Schulzke, State University o
- Page 243 and 244: Marcus Schulzke, State University o
- Page 245 and 246: Marcus Schulzke, State University o
- Page 247 and 248: Kaz Ross, University of Tasmania, H
- Page 249 and 250: Kaz Ross, University of Tasmania, H
- Page 251 and 252: Kaz Ross, University of Tasmania, H
- Page 253 and 254: Kaz Ross, University of Tasmania, H
- Page 255 and 256: Kaz Ross, University of Tasmania, H
- Page 257 and 258: Kaz Ross, University of Tasmania, H
- Page 259 and 260: Kaz Ross, University of Tasmania, H
- Page 261 and 262: Kaz Ross, University of Tasmania, H
- Page 263 and 264: Kaz Ross, University of Tasmania, H
- Page 265 and 266: Kaz Ross, University of Tasmania, H
- Page 267 and 268: Kaz Ross, University of Tasmania, H
- Page 269 and 270: Kaz Ross, University of Tasmania, H
- Page 271 and 272: Kaz Ross, University of Tasmania, H
- Page 273 and 274: Maesam-T-AbdulRazak, Universiti Put
Why the West should Discourage Japanese Military Expansion<br />
and goals [Sata, 2001, p2198]. Pyle writes that Japanese<br />
cooperation,<br />
is not so much the result of shared values as it is of<br />
the realist appraisal of the value of the alliance. …<br />
Japan will seek maximum autonomy for its own<br />
purposes … It will not wish to be hostage to the<br />
global strategy of the United States or to its<br />
relations with China and Korea [Pyle, 2007, p368].<br />
Inoguichi and Bacon hypothesize that the new relationship<br />
might conform to patterns such as the ‘British Model’ of a<br />
special relationship, a ‘German Model’ of ‘regional<br />
embeddedness’ and institutionalism, or a ‘French Model’ of<br />
strong autonomy [Inoguichi, 2006, pp4-5]. But these limited<br />
scenarios echo the sentiment of George Friedman that,<br />
“Conventional political analysis suffers from a profound<br />
failure of imagination” [Friedman, 2009, p3]. While Japanese<br />
political moderates may maintain the current relationship<br />
with America, more nationalistic elements could,<br />
shift Japanese doctrine from a tethered, defensive<br />
realism to an untethered, offensive realism, in which<br />
strategists would be ever alert to exploit<br />
opportunities to expand Japan’s power. … It would<br />
join the other great powers in a permanent struggle<br />
to maximize national strength and influence<br />
[Samuels, 2007, p193].<br />
American domination of Japanese foreign policy helped to<br />
stabilise Asia during the Cold War. Détente with China,<br />
founded on having a common Soviet enemy, would have<br />
been complicated by an independent Japan; and removing<br />
any Japanese threat to Southeast Asia helped to focus their<br />
efforts on combating Communist influence. It is possible that<br />
a newly-militarised Japan may either pose a renewed threat<br />
to other Asian states, and thus generate instability, or<br />
alternatively enhance its relationship with regional powers<br />
like China, potentially to the detriment of US regional<br />
influence.<br />
316