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Dr. David Robinson, Edith Cowan University (Australia)
and diplomatic skills” [Sata, 2001, p200]. Since then the
Self-Defense Force has been authorised to use an
increasingly wide range of weaponry in their operations, and
public support for Japan’s use of force for defensive
purposes has risen [Inoguichi, 2006, pp4-5]. So far Japanese
security policy remains triangulated between its still-pacifist
constitution, the UN Charter, and the US-Japanese Security
Treaty [Singh, 2008, p314]. However, sections of the
Japanese media and political establishment increasingly call
for Japan to acquire a greater range of defence systems,
including long-range fighters, nuclear submarines, a missile
defence system, and intelligence-gathering satellites
[Inoguichi, 2006, pp13-15]. Self-Defence Force spending is
increasing dramatically, and there are calls to amend Article
9 of the constitution, and even to produce nuclear weapons
[Matthews, 2003, p76]. Eugene Matthews argues that Japan
nationalism is rising and, “This development could have an
alarming consequence: namely, the rise of a militarized,
assertive, and nuclear-armed Japan” [Matthews, 2003,
pp74-75].
Japan is slowly shifting its political attitudes and
institutional capabilities towards force projection outside of
its borders, with the encouragement of the United States.
Matthews writes that mainstream Japanese nationalists
want, “the respect, political influence, and power
commensurate with being the world’s second most important
economy and a major contributor to world affairs”
[Matthews, 2003, p85]. Meanwhile, for America there is less
motivation to carry Japan’s defence load, as technology
lessens the US Navy’s reliance on Japanese bases – which
are themselves high-value targets for enemy nations
[Samuels, 2007, p192]. Japan’s new strategy involves
contributing to the international community responsibly,
while being seen as increasingly independent from the
United States [Singh, 2008, p316]. Pyle notes that, ironically,
in the past the Yoshida Doctrine actually denied Japan the
opportunity to demonstrate its responsibility as a military
power [Pyle, 1998, p130].
Most analysts recognise that a more independent Japanese
foreign policy will lead to divergences from American policies
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