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What can be done to address any
continuing imbalance in market
power in the GHTS?
Despite their increased sophistication and scale of
operation, farmers still operate in a marketplace
where the real power rests with the railways and the
grain handlers. Over the last 100 years, the federal
government has made various forays into the
regulation of the GHTS to address that imbalance.
The CWB was simply one of the most significant and
long-standing of these; its removal will not remove
the imbalance. There are remedies available under
the Canada Transportation Act and the Competition
Act, but they have proven to be expensive,
cumbersome and not always effective.
If the imbalance remains a significant problem,
some sort of further regulatory response may well
be required.
Are their implications for the short-line
railways operating in western Canada?
In response to the consolidation of the primary
elevator system resulting in a 95 percent reduction
in the number of elevators on the Prairies over the
past fifteen to twenty years about a dozen shortline
railways have begun operating on track that
would otherwise have been abandoned by either
of the major railways (CN or CP). “Producer cars”
(railcars loaded directly by farmers rather than at
primary elevators) comprise the vast majority of
traffic on short-lines. By bypassing the primary
elevator system shippers can save significantly in
handling, elevation and other charges that they
would otherwise pay to a grain company (some
estimates are of as much as $1,400 or more per
car). Producer cars undermine grain-handlers’
revenue. Over the past decade almost all producer
car shipments (in the range of 10,000 to 14,000
cars per year) have been of “Board grains” (wheat
or barley).
To put it bluntly, traffic on short-lines is at risk of
drying up unless they find a new business model or
another way of securing producer car movement.
Are there implications for the grain quality
assurance system created under
the Canada Grain Act?
U.S. farmers perceive themselves to be at a
disadvantage in accessing the GHTS because of
Canada’s system for regulating the high quality of
grains produced on the Prairies. Spokesmen for
U.S. interest groups have stated that the CWB was
a “symbol” for the entire Canadian grain-marketing
regime, including Canada’s quality assurance
system. The system has already been attacked at
the WTO and pressure to abandon or modify the
system will likely continue.
Should Canada continue to have the same interest in
resisting that pressure, particularly if it comes to pass
that the companies marketing Canadian wheat are
the same ones marketing U.S. wheat?
Are there implications for
supply management?
For over 40 years, government-regulated supply
management has been a cornerstone of the dairy,
poultry and egg businesses in Canada. Just as
was the case with the CWB, Canada has defended
repeated attacks on the system in trade negotiations
and before the domestic and international
courts. Canada is currently pursuing free trade
arrangements with the EU and more recently the
Trans-Pacific Partnership or “TPP” (among others).
In both cases supply management is a significant
target for the other side. Dismantling the CWB
was also a significant issue in both negotiations;
with it gone the pressure on supply management
necessarily mounts.
Can, or should, Canada resist that pressure,
particularly if to do so could threaten its ability
to secure a deal?
What are the implications for the
Port of Churchill?
Churchill, Manitoba is Canada’s only deep-water
northern port. It is almost entirely reliant on
the CWB for its business. Each year more than
90 percent (in some cases 100 percent) of the
traffic has been Board grains. Absent this traffic,
107 ROBSON HALL ALUMNI REPORT