Left Brain Right B - the DBS Vickers Securities Equities Research

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Regional Equity Strategy 4Q 2009 Strategy Overview: Asia Equity Two points here: First, Asia’s low debt burden at present means it is well placed to handle the inflow (and implied higher debt) we expect it will see over the next decade. Second, the conventional wisdom of the past few years has been that Asia’s current account surpluses have been the result of mercantilist policies and that Asia’s “growth model” had to change. When viewed from this longer-term perspective, though, one sees that Asia was simply paying down debt acquired in the previous decade – debt which many who belong to the current CW undoubtedly argued needed to be cut 10 years ago. Consistency has never been a CW hallmark. Investment and GDP growth: The downside to paying off old debts is that you Investment and GDP growth: The downside to paying off old debts is that you can’t buy new things, like capital equipment. In the post-crisis decade, domestic investment in Asia dropped to a shadow of its former self. In the Asia-8, for example, gross fixed capital formation growth that averaged 12% per year between 1986 and 1996 dropped to 2% on average between 1997-2007. In short, it took Asia nearly a decade for investment to return to pre-crisis levels. As a percentage of GDP, investment dropped by a third or more (charts below). Asia – real investment since 97 crisis GFCF, 1997=100 120 110 100 90 80 70 Asia 8 Crisis-4 (TH, ID, MY, KR) 60 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 Asia – domestic investment then and now % of GDP, GFCF 44 40 36 32 28 1996 2006 Low investment means low growth. End of story. More than anything else, this is what kept Asia’s GDP growth sub par in the post-crisis decade. Current account surpluses went to pay down old debts and there was little saving left over to fund investment, hence growth. Dismal indeed be the facts of economic life. One constant: high savings One thing didn’t change between P1 and P2 was Asia’s high savings rate. All of Asia’s saving rates today are within a whisker of where they were 12 years ago, save for India, where in recent years higher savings have powered faster GDP growth. Singapore and China continue to top the league tables with gross domestic savings rates of about 50% of GDP, followed by Malaysia (42%) and Thailand and Korea at about 34% (chart below). India’s experience is worth noting – savings there rose by 10 percentage points of GDP between 1996 and 2008. This helped lift GDP growth to 9% on average between 2003 and 2008 from 5.5% in the first half of the 1990’s. Once again, Asia speaks to the conventional wisdom running through the markets of late. One fear is that the US consumption / savings balance needs to shift mightily toward savings. And, it is said, higher savings will be bad for growth there and, by extension, for Asia too. High savings bad for growth? Come again? Not in India. Not in China, either. Nor anywhere in Asia for that matter. On the contrary, if there is any conventional wisdom that does stand up to scrutiny, it is that high savings go hand-in-hand with stronger growth. If it’s true in Asia, why would it be any different in the US? The next time someone tells you the US needs to save more and this will be bad for growth, ask them “What about Asia?” Asia savings rates – then and now Gross dom saving (GFC + Net X) as % of GDP 50 40 30 20 10 1996 2008 24 20 16 0 Spore China Malay Thai Korea HK Indon Taiwan India Phils 12 TH MY KR SG HK ID PH TW CH Page 23

Regional Equity Strategy 4Q 2009 Strategy Overview: Asia Equity China: Fine-tuning (Chris Leung, chrisleung@dbs.com, extracted from “Economics – Markets – Strategy, 4Q09” dated 17 September 2009) • The availability of new credit for the remainder of the year will probably equate to around one-third of the CNY7.3trn made in the first half of 2009. Growth should remain intact as new loans in 1H09 were equivalent to 25% of GDP. It will take time for this to filter into the economy. We have upgraded our GDP forecast for 2009 and 2010 to 8% and 9% • Heavy reliance on credit expansion to drive fixed asset investment, and hence, GDP growth has yielded almost instantaneous results. The worry is that this has created overcapacity. Fine-tuning the pace and intensity of new credit creation should be expected • Such a move should not be read as a prelude to a full-fledged tightening because overcapacity also reflects weak external demand. Although the US economy is on the mend, policymakers will want to see a stronger export recovery before making significant policy changes • Retail sales show widening asymmetries amongst provinces. GDP growth of inner provinces is clearly higher than in coastal provinces due to less exports dependence • Near-term monetary tightening seems unlikely. Higher rates could jeopardize long-term fiscal projects. We do not expect increases in interest rates or in the reserve requirement ratio for the remainder of the year. • The CNY should remain stable and trade in a tight range in 4Q09 Credit growth deceleration is unlikely to derail growth momentum Seeing that rampant lending growth has helped restore market confidence and reinstate stability in the region, it is not difficult to understand why investors' are concerned about possible credit growth deceleration in the near future. By the second quarter of this year, the real economy has rebounded strongly to 7.9% YoY from the trough of 6.1% in the first quarter. Growth was primarily driven by fixed asset investments, which has contributed to 87.4% of GDP growth in the first half of the year (Chart 1). China's investment frenzy has also lifted demand for imports from the rest of Asia. Unrestrained credit expansion may produce instantaneous results, but the flip side is it can create long-term damages to the economy. Numerous think-tanks have repeatedly warned about inflationary risks that may come with a lax credit policy. However, many have chosen to brush aside inflation concerns amid a still falling CPI, and focus on the problems of overcapacity. Rapid credit expansion has artificially driven up the supply of products such as steel, cement and coal. Steel prices, for instance, plunged 8.6% MoM in August in response to the staggering increase in supply. Either way, there is a need to fine tune the pace and intensity of credit expansion before problems run deeper. However, investors should not be too worried about this development. There is a wealth of economic literature in China which shows that credit growth will not create more real output in the longrun. Similarly, deceleration of credit growth will not take substantial tolls on economic growth. The most recent empirical evidence was the episode in 2004-05 where loan growth fell from 24% YoY in Aug03 to a low of 12.4% in May05. Fixed asset investment growth only fell slightly to 26.8% in 2004 from 27.7% in 2003. Yet, real GDP growth rose slightly from 10.0% in 2003 to 10.1% in 2004 and 10.4% in 2005. Chinese authorities will probably focus on curbing short-term loans with tenor of less than a year. The availability of shortterm loans at low interest rates encourages individuals and corporate to take speculative risks in both the equity and property markets. The sharp 28% YoY jump in corporate deposits alongside 27% fall in SOE's profit in the first half of the year imply that the surge of funds at corporate accounts most likely originated from bank credit. We are confident the authority will not slow down medium-tolong term loans (tenors ranging from 3yrs-5yrs) too much as 52% of outstanding loans in the state banking sector were used for financing long-term fiscal projects. Sudden withdrawal of credit support will jeopardize the progress of these projects and create enormous amounts of economic wastage. In fact, projects like railway constructions will not start to yield economic value-added until they are completed and fully functional. Page 24 “This report has been re-printed with permission from DBS Group Research (Regional Equity Strategy) of DBS Bank Limited” disclosures on page 37 of this report

Regional Equity Strategy 4Q 2009<br />

Strategy Overview: Asia Equity<br />

China: Fine-tuning (Chris Leung, chrisleung@dbs.com, extracted from “Economics – Markets – Strategy, 4Q09” dated<br />

17 September 2009)<br />

• The availability of new credit for <strong>the</strong> remainder of<br />

<strong>the</strong> year will probably equate to around one-third of<br />

<strong>the</strong> CNY7.3trn made in <strong>the</strong> first half of 2009.<br />

Growth should remain intact as new loans in 1H09<br />

were equivalent to 25% of GDP. It will take time for<br />

this to filter into <strong>the</strong> economy. We have upgraded<br />

our GDP forecast for 2009 and 2010 to 8% and 9%<br />

• Heavy reliance on credit expansion to drive fixed<br />

asset investment, and hence, GDP growth has<br />

yielded almost instantaneous results. The worry is<br />

that this has created overcapacity. Fine-tuning <strong>the</strong><br />

pace and intensity of new credit creation should be<br />

expected<br />

• Such a move should not be read as a prelude to a<br />

full-fledged tightening because overcapacity also<br />

reflects weak external demand. Although <strong>the</strong> US<br />

economy is on <strong>the</strong> mend, policymakers will want to<br />

see a stronger export recovery before making<br />

significant policy changes<br />

• Retail sales show widening asymmetries amongst<br />

provinces. GDP growth of inner provinces is clearly<br />

higher than in coastal provinces due to less exports<br />

dependence<br />

• Near-term monetary tightening seems unlikely.<br />

Higher rates could jeopardize long-term fiscal<br />

projects. We do not expect increases in interest<br />

rates or in <strong>the</strong> reserve requirement ratio for <strong>the</strong><br />

remainder of <strong>the</strong> year.<br />

• The CNY should remain stable and trade in a tight<br />

range in 4Q09<br />

Credit growth deceleration is unlikely to derail growth<br />

momentum<br />

Seeing that rampant lending growth has helped restore market<br />

confidence and reinstate stability in <strong>the</strong> region, it is not difficult<br />

to understand why investors' are concerned about possible<br />

credit growth deceleration in <strong>the</strong> near future. By <strong>the</strong> second<br />

quarter of this year, <strong>the</strong> real economy has rebounded strongly<br />

to 7.9% YoY from <strong>the</strong> trough of 6.1% in <strong>the</strong> first quarter.<br />

Growth was primarily driven by fixed asset investments, which<br />

has contributed to 87.4% of GDP growth in <strong>the</strong> first half of<br />

<strong>the</strong> year (Chart 1). China's investment frenzy has also lifted<br />

demand for imports from <strong>the</strong> rest of Asia. Unrestrained credit<br />

expansion may produce instantaneous results, but <strong>the</strong> flip side<br />

is it can create long-term damages to <strong>the</strong> economy.<br />

Numerous think-tanks have repeatedly warned about<br />

inflationary risks that may come with a lax credit policy.<br />

However, many have chosen to brush aside inflation concerns<br />

amid a still falling CPI, and focus on <strong>the</strong> problems of<br />

overcapacity. Rapid credit expansion has artificially driven up<br />

<strong>the</strong> supply of products such as steel, cement and coal. Steel<br />

prices, for instance, plunged 8.6% MoM in August in response<br />

to <strong>the</strong> staggering increase in supply.<br />

Ei<strong>the</strong>r way, <strong>the</strong>re is a need to fine tune <strong>the</strong> pace and intensity<br />

of credit expansion before problems run deeper. However,<br />

investors should not be too worried about this development.<br />

There is a wealth of economic literature in China which shows<br />

that credit growth will not create more real output in <strong>the</strong> longrun.<br />

Similarly, deceleration of credit growth will not take<br />

substantial tolls on economic growth. The most recent<br />

empirical evidence was <strong>the</strong> episode in 2004-05 where loan<br />

growth fell from 24% YoY in Aug03 to a low of 12.4% in<br />

May05. Fixed asset investment growth only fell slightly to<br />

26.8% in 2004 from 27.7% in 2003. Yet, real GDP growth<br />

rose slightly from 10.0% in 2003 to 10.1% in 2004 and<br />

10.4% in 2005.<br />

Chinese authorities will probably focus on curbing short-term<br />

loans with tenor of less than a year. The availability of shortterm<br />

loans at low interest rates encourages individuals and<br />

corporate to take speculative risks in both <strong>the</strong> equity and<br />

property markets. The sharp 28% YoY jump in corporate<br />

deposits alongside 27% fall in SOE's profit in <strong>the</strong> first half of<br />

<strong>the</strong> year imply that <strong>the</strong> surge of funds at corporate accounts<br />

most likely originated from bank credit.<br />

We are confident <strong>the</strong> authority will not slow down medium-tolong<br />

term loans (tenors ranging from 3yrs-5yrs) too much as<br />

52% of outstanding loans in <strong>the</strong> state banking sector were<br />

used for financing long-term fiscal projects. Sudden withdrawal<br />

of credit support will jeopardize <strong>the</strong> progress of <strong>the</strong>se projects<br />

and create enormous amounts of economic wastage. In fact,<br />

projects like railway constructions will not start to yield<br />

economic value-added until <strong>the</strong>y are completed and fully<br />

functional.<br />

Page 24<br />

“This report has been re-printed with permission from <strong>DBS</strong> Group <strong>Research</strong><br />

(Regional Equity Strategy) of <strong>DBS</strong> Bank Limited” disclosures on page 37 of this report

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