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Elektronika 2009-11.pdf - Instytut Systemów Elektronicznych

Elektronika 2009-11.pdf - Instytut Systemów Elektronicznych

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Ontology-based approach to scada systems<br />

vulnerabilities representation for CIP<br />

(Podejście ontologiczne do reprezentacji podatności systemów scada<br />

dla ochrony infrastruktur krytycznych)<br />

dr inż. MICHAŁ CHORAŚ 1,3 , mgr inż. ANNA STACHOWICZ 1 , mgr inż. RAFAŁ KOZIK 1,3 ,<br />

mgr inż. ADAM FLIZIKOWSKI 1,3 , mgr inż. RAFAŁ RENK 1,2<br />

1 ITTI Sp. z o.o.<br />

2 Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań<br />

3 Institute of Telecommunications, UT&LS, Bydgoszcz<br />

Critical Infrastructures are the organizations delivering goods<br />

and services in an economy that are fundamental to the functioning<br />

of society and the economy [1]. As for types of critical<br />

infrastructures, there are some domains within an economy<br />

that are considered crucial and most important. The loss of or<br />

disaster within a CI will affect a part or all society. Some of<br />

critical sectors described in [2] are agriculture and food, water,<br />

public health and defence.<br />

The INSPIRE Project focuses on telecommunication, energy<br />

and transportation sectors. CI are now identified and protected<br />

by national and international law and regulations<br />

(nationally in e.g. Poland by Ministry of Infrastructure in Crisis<br />

Management regulations [3]; internationally e.g. by NATO and<br />

by EU) [4-6]. Most of them are also intuitively recognized as<br />

critical by societies. Unfortunately, not all phenomenon and<br />

aspects within CI are well recognized. It is not possible to create<br />

mathematical equations fully describing CI - their functioning<br />

and dependencies. CI are nonlinear and chaotic: it<br />

means that small change may cause enormous effects (as in<br />

the butterfly effect). Even if we had equations describing CI,<br />

small increase or decrease of non-important tiny factors, could<br />

cause enormous change in the overall result [1].<br />

Complexity and wide range of critical infrastructures implies<br />

huge problems in their reliability and security. In dispersed<br />

critical infrastructures like electric power, water, railway<br />

or telecommunication sectors SCADA (Supervisory Control<br />

and Data Acquisition) systems are commonly used. SCADA is<br />

a monitoring, supervisory and controlling system with data acquisition<br />

from remote data fields. On the contrary to other control<br />

systems like for e.g. Distributed Control Systems (DCS),<br />

SCADA is intended especially to geographical dispersed systems.<br />

Control, measure and monitoring remote field data elements<br />

are provided by Remote Terminal Units (RTUs).<br />

Communication of RTUs with other SCADA components like<br />

Master Terminal Units, Operation Control Centres is provided<br />

by telecommunication network.<br />

Three generations of SCADA systems can be distinguished<br />

according to [7]:<br />

• 1 st generation - SCADA systems are monolithic and performed<br />

all computing functions themselves without connectivity<br />

with other systems;<br />

• 2 nd generation - SCADA systems are distributed, taking advantages<br />

of LocalArea Network, which connected multiple stations<br />

with different functions shared information in real-time;<br />

• 3 rd generation - it is extension of 2 nd generation in a way<br />

that system architecture became open, utilized open standards<br />

and protocols and connectivity of SCADA station and<br />

functions was moved from LAN to WAN.<br />

Nowadays most of SCADA development comply with 3 rd<br />

generation SCADA systems. SCADA systems have been designed<br />

without security considerations for many years. Nowadays,<br />

more and more SCADA systems have connections with<br />

business systems, corporate networks, which showed a risk,<br />

that unauthorized, unintended entities may have access to<br />

critical SCADA data information. The great benefit of integration,<br />

the communication between SCADA systems and corporate<br />

networks or Internet, which increase efficiency of<br />

business processes became a great risk and source of vulnerabilities.<br />

Therefore, there is an emerging need of identifying<br />

SCADA vulnerabilities and understanding interdependencies<br />

between them, especially these implied by SCADA systems<br />

interconnection with telecommunication infrastructures. In this<br />

paper we present an ontology-based approach to tackle this<br />

difficult task.<br />

Motivation to ontology-based approach<br />

Interoperation with different network technologies and various<br />

applications causes SCADA systems inherit typical network<br />

and application vulnerabilities. That is why security aspects in<br />

SCADA systems are not so different than in network security.<br />

One of the most important aspects in security are vulnerabilities.<br />

Vulnerabilities are the weak points in (SCADA) system<br />

components, which can be exploited by an attack. Definitions<br />

of vulnerability and threat according to ISO/IEC 13335-1:2004<br />

standard are as follows [8]:<br />

• vulnerability: “includes a weakness of an asset or group of<br />

assets which can be exploited by a threat”;<br />

• threat: “a potential cause of an unwanted incident which<br />

may result in harm to a system or organization”.<br />

Threats and attacks exploit vulnerabilities, so identification<br />

of vulnerabilities is a key aspect of security consideration and<br />

risk assessment. Known vulnerabilities can be fixed and potential<br />

attack can be prevented. There are several sources of<br />

vulnerabilities, for e.g. vulnerability repositories such as National<br />

Vulnerability Database (NVD) [9] or Open Source Vulnerability<br />

Database (OSVDB) [10]. However they do not<br />

express all security issues, their properties and relations. That<br />

is why we find ontology as a suitable tool for showing identified<br />

vulnerabilities as a classification and their connections<br />

with other security aspects like threats, attacks, SCADA resources<br />

and communication infrastructure [11]. Ontology is a<br />

form of knowledge representation in a form of data model that<br />

provides a decryption of domain and relations between domain<br />

concepts.<br />

ELEKTRONIKA 11/<strong>2009</strong> 35

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