THE SCHLIEFFEN PLAN - The World War I Document Archive

THE MILITARY TESTAMENT OF
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army corps are most needed on, or behind, the right army wing." But
how to get them there in time, i.e. by rail? As we know, the Belgian
railways were completely destroyed in the Belgian retreat of 1914.
For many weeks the right army could only be reached by marching
and would have been without supplies had the Supreme Command
not given it almost the entire stock ot lorries. 40 Schlicffen was very
uncertain on this point. We saw earlier how poorly he rated the
efficiency of the French and Belgian railways during the first weeks of
war. In the earlier drafts two army corps were the most he expected to
transport from the left to the right wing. In the final version the
question of the railways' capacity is left open. Anything they cannot move
will have to be used on the Meuse, at Metz, or "right of the Moselle."
But how does this tally with the simultaneous statement that no less
than six "new army corps" are needed for the cordon west and south-
east of Paris? Schlicffcn's Nachlass provides no answer. Is it surprising
that in 1914 Moltke preferred to dispense with the western envelop-
ment ot Paris? It may also have been made easier for him by the fact
that there was no longer the immediate threat of a British flank attack
from the Channel ports, which Schlieffen, in 1905, was still expecting,
without being able to suggest an effective counter-measure. 41
But these considerations have not touched the really vital danger:
that the enemy might counter the great envelopment with the most
obvious move of all—the rapid extension of his left wing and perhaps
the envelopment of the attacker himself. The radial French railway
system with the fortress of Paris as its centre offered every opportunity.
Troops could be switched from one part of the front to another at very
great speed, while the woods surrounding Paris made it possible to
mass troops unnoticed for a counter-attack on the German right wing.
Would not the inevitable consequence be a race for the sea in which
the Germans with their inferior railway connections would ultimately
be at a disadvantage? As we know, in September 1914 the sudden
appearance of the strong French army under Maunoury on the west
flank of the German right whig-army wrecked the whole plan of
campaign, because the Supreme Command considered, rightly or
wrongly, that it had not enough reserves both to fight off this army
tactically (which was done, at great sacrifice, on the Ourcq) and also to
eliminate it strategically by further outflanking, so as permanently
to secure the German right flank.
40 Ta ppen, Bis zitr Marne 1914(1920), pp. 7,I4et. al. 41 Cf. his footnote, p. 142, below.