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New policy mechanisms to mitigate<br />
wildlife-livestock conflicts<br />
Performance payments are a novel approach to provide<br />
incentives for conservation. In this project, we investigate<br />
performance payments as a policy tool to alleviate wildlife-livestock<br />
conflicts. Often, such conflicts are especially<br />
severe in tropical countries, which host many of the world’s<br />
remaining endangered carnivores but, at the same time,<br />
face high levels of rural poverty. In many cases, poor subsistence<br />
farmers are hostile toward carnivore conservation<br />
as these animals kill their livestock and, therefore, are a<br />
threat to their livelihood. The performance payment approach<br />
seeks to generate pro-conservation incentives by<br />
offering in-kind or monetary payments to farmers based on<br />
indicators of conservation outcomes. At a large scale, this<br />
approach so far has only been implemented in Sweden,<br />
where livestock herders receive payments based on the<br />
number of carnivore offspring on their land.<br />
In our project, we developed a framework of issues that<br />
should be considered when planning a performance payment<br />
scheme. Furthermore, we developed an outline for<br />
a scheme that could be implemented at Bandhavgarh<br />
National Park (BNP), a tiger reserve in India. The proposed<br />
pilot scheme is based on a policy workshop co-organised<br />
with Anil Gupta, an interview with the director of BNP, and<br />
structured interviews with 305 households in 20 villages in<br />
the buffer zone of BNP.<br />
Furthermore, we investigated whether poorer village members<br />
are more vulnerable to carnivore attacks than others.<br />
Our data reveals that there are economies of scale in livestock<br />
protection. Households with larger herds may spend<br />
more effort in guarding their livestock and, thus, incur fewer<br />
losses. Currently, the park authorities offer a compensation<br />
for predation incidents. The data indicates a self-selection<br />
process in which only households with higher per capita<br />
income apply for compensation. Furthermore, households<br />
that apply and receive compensation have higher per capita<br />
incomes than those who apply but do not receive compensation.<br />
Based on these findings we suggest that the scheme<br />
bears room for improvement in its outreach to economically<br />
weaker households. Initiatives to increase awareness of<br />
the scheme and efforts to assure its transparency may be<br />
especially useful for poorer households.<br />
Project leader<br />
Stefanie Engel<br />
37<br />
Contact person<br />
Astrid Zabel<br />
Collaborators<br />
Göran Bostedt, SLU, Sweden;<br />
Anil Gupta, IIM, India;<br />
Michael Kreuzer, <strong>ETH</strong> Zurich, Switzerland;<br />
Robin Reid and Mohammed Said, ILRI, Kenya;<br />
Pooja Sawhney,<br />
Asian Development Bank, India;<br />
Jeff Sayer, WWF International, Switzerland;<br />
Thomas Sterner, HGU, Sweden<br />
Duration<br />
April 2007 – March 2010<br />
Thematic cluster<br />
Livestock and environment<br />
Research collaboration<br />
Livestock systems research<br />
Male tiger in the Bandhavgarh National Park