L. Fituni, I. Abramova Resource Potential of Africa and Russia's ...
L. Fituni, I. Abramova Resource Potential of Africa and Russia's ... L. Fituni, I. Abramova Resource Potential of Africa and Russia's ...
of other nations (manifest in an exchange rate), resulting in the nation's other exports becoming more expensive for other countries to buy, making the manufacturing sector less competitive. In the Russian case, deindustrialization comes primarily not from the price incompetitiveness for Russian manufactured goods, but because of the steady elimination of manufacturing per se as a result of privatization and the type of market economic reforms imposed on Russia by the IMF, the World Bank and many western advisers to president Yeltsin’s government in 1990s. The African case is somewhat different, though the IMF, the World Bank and western advisers played their ambiguous roles too – through their “one-recipe-cures-all” policies of structural adjustment, “aid-for-democracy” and “Washington consensus” projects. Though the basic tenets concerning the effects of the Dutch disease are invariable, the effects in the African case may seem to be not as spectacular as in the Russian case. We do not observe significant and persistent shifts away from manufacturing on the Black continent. But this is explained in many cases by the fact that the sector itself was inexistent, in the first place. Still, macroeconomic consequences for the future are similar, if not identical. Nations are economically demotivated from diversifying and in particular from developing and/or modernizing their manufacturing sectors. However, no matter how hard-hit Africa and Russia are by the Dutch syndrome, the situation will persist for years. Existing projections predict, that inevitably for the time being and in the middle– to long-term future. Their resource bases are heavily export oriented and weakly integrated into the production cycle for domestic consumption. Though their level of dependence on external markets may somewhat change in the future, both Russia and Africa will remain among the leading global suppliers of energy and mineral raw materials for the world economy. For the purposes of the analysis we shall speak about natural resources in the narrow sense of the term. In other words, our study covers not all the resources derived from the environment (nature) but only about mineral and fuel commodities. We appreciate that a 63
significant part of biotic resources (i.e. obtained from biosphere, like forest and other flora resources, animals, fish and other marine bioresources) will thus remain beyond the scope of our analysis. In fact, we exclude a huge proportion of abiotic resources as well (land/soil, water, air, etc). In fact, except for occasional exclusions, the study deals with geological resources of Russia and Africa. In this respect, we recognize our limitations, and that our research is incomplete. However, the authors do not doubt that even the current limited scope of analysis provides a reasonably true picture of practical opportunities open for Russia and Africa. Natural resources potential of Russia is over 20% of the world’s reserves. This fact places Russia in a special position among industrialized countries. Natural resources used by the economy of Russia account for 95.7% of the national wealth. There are large deposits of fuel and energy resources: oil, natural gas, coal and uranium ore. Russia is ranked first in the world by gas reserves (32% of world’s reserves, 30% of world production), the second in oil production (10% share of world production), the third – in coal reserves (22 coal basins, 115 fields, including those in European Russia – about 15.6% in Siberia – 66.8% in the Far East – 12.9%, in the Urals – 4.3%). In terms of reserves of iron ores Russia occupies the first place, in tin – the second, lead – the third. Russia also occupies a leading position in the world in wood provision. In 2010, according to assessments of American intelligence sources, Russia was the richest country in gold reserves. In Russia, there are five major oil and gas provinces located in European part of the country and in Western Siberia in 10 regions and 11 provinces and republics: West Siberian, Volga-Urals, Timan- Pechora, the North Caucasus and the Caspian Sea area. In addition, iron, nickel, copper, aluminum, tin, polymetals, chromium, tungsten, gold, and silver ores are mined. There is a great variety of non-metallic ores: phosphates, apatites, talc, asbestos, mica, potash and salt, diamonds, amber, precious and semiprecious stones. Very common are construction materials: sand, clay, limestone, marble, granite and other materials. 64
- Page 14 and 15: arena by the loftiest goals and ide
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- Page 20 and 21: Table 1.1.2. World chromium product
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- Page 26 and 27: Though US totally depends on import
- Page 28 and 29: isk of supply shortage in the next
- Page 30 and 31: long been obsolete, do exist and te
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- Page 34 and 35: upon the same ideology: the new roa
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- Page 40 and 41: uses to track terrorists. Algerian
- Page 42 and 43: sum, in exchange for terminating th
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- Page 46 and 47: ing Angola’s large oil resources
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- Page 50 and 51: the continent. To help African coun
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- Page 62 and 63: tion in the global division of labo
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- Page 70 and 71: ite production at Komi to reach 6.5
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- Page 74 and 75: 25-26 thousand tons of copper conce
- Page 76 and 77: Country 75 Cost Ranges Namibia 0 20
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<strong>of</strong> other nations (manifest in an exchange rate), resulting in the nation's<br />
other exports becoming more expensive for other countries to<br />
buy, making the manufacturing sector less competitive. In the Russian<br />
case, deindustrialization comes primarily not from the price<br />
incompetitiveness for Russian manufactured goods, but because <strong>of</strong><br />
the steady elimination <strong>of</strong> manufacturing per se as a result <strong>of</strong> privatization<br />
<strong>and</strong> the type <strong>of</strong> market economic reforms imposed on Russia<br />
by the IMF, the World Bank <strong>and</strong> many western advisers to president<br />
Yeltsin’s government in 1990s.<br />
The <strong>Africa</strong>n case is somewhat different, though the IMF, the<br />
World Bank <strong>and</strong> western advisers played their ambiguous roles<br />
too – through their “one-recipe-cures-all” policies <strong>of</strong> structural<br />
adjustment, “aid-for-democracy” <strong>and</strong> “Washington consensus”<br />
projects.<br />
Though the basic tenets concerning the effects <strong>of</strong> the Dutch disease<br />
are invariable, the effects in the <strong>Africa</strong>n case may seem to be<br />
not as spectacular as in the Russian case. We do not observe significant<br />
<strong>and</strong> persistent shifts away from manufacturing on the Black<br />
continent. But this is explained in many cases by the fact that the<br />
sector itself was inexistent, in the first place. Still, macroeconomic<br />
consequences for the future are similar, if not identical. Nations are<br />
economically demotivated from diversifying <strong>and</strong> in particular from<br />
developing <strong>and</strong>/or modernizing their manufacturing sectors.<br />
However, no matter how hard-hit <strong>Africa</strong> <strong>and</strong> Russia are by the<br />
Dutch syndrome, the situation will persist for years. Existing projections<br />
predict, that inevitably for the time being <strong>and</strong> in the middle– to<br />
long-term future. Their resource bases are heavily export oriented<br />
<strong>and</strong> weakly integrated into the production cycle for domestic consumption.<br />
Though their level <strong>of</strong> dependence on external markets<br />
may somewhat change in the future, both Russia <strong>and</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> will<br />
remain among the leading global suppliers <strong>of</strong> energy <strong>and</strong> mineral<br />
raw materials for the world economy.<br />
For the purposes <strong>of</strong> the analysis we shall speak about natural resources<br />
in the narrow sense <strong>of</strong> the term. In other words, our study<br />
covers not all the resources derived from the environment (nature)<br />
but only about mineral <strong>and</strong> fuel commodities. We appreciate that a<br />
63