L. Fituni, I. Abramova Resource Potential of Africa and Russia's ...
L. Fituni, I. Abramova Resource Potential of Africa and Russia's ... L. Fituni, I. Abramova Resource Potential of Africa and Russia's ...
CHAPTER 2 Natural Resource Potentials of Russia and Africa: a Comparative Analysis 2.1. Structural Analysis of the Two Natural Resource Potentials BASIC FEATURES OF RUSSIA’s and Africa’s resource potentials possess significant similarities but also demonstrate numerous differences. The key uniting characteristics are the diversity, extraordinary comprehensiveness and largely unexhausted capacity of the two resource bases. Taken together these three features speak about the uniqueness of Russia’s and Africa resource potentials. Being already well known and quite developed mining megaspaces of global importance, both are believed to be able to offer much higher level of involvement into integrated productive chains of the world. As mentioned in the first chapter, besides smaller (and consequently less important) geographic regions of our Planet, Russia and Africa remain the only vast geographic spaces that preserve hugely “unexhausted” potentials of natural resources. There is still another uniting trait: namely, the role of the natural resource potentials in the economic development strategies of Africa and Russia, respectively. Despite all the differences, the developmental conceptual premises existing there preclude that revenues from the exploitation of their natural resources may with the government’s guidance be turned into a foundation for accelerated development of sound diversified modern national economies. And, 59
still one more uniting feature – both failed (at least as yet), to translate this conceptual assumption into life. In the view of the others, there are lots of cultural and psychological similarities between the peoples of both areas in relation to their natural wealth. But these subjective subjects lie beyond the scope of this research. Speaking about dissimilarities, the first and most obvious one that comes to minds is, of course, the disparity in the levels of socioeconomic development of the former second global superpower and the world’s poorest region. That would include differences in dozens of specific areas: incomes, health, education, cultural environment, history etc. Acknowledging all that, we still believe that the comparative analysis undertaken below is not only legitimate methodologically but useful practically. From the point of view of political economy and geopolitics, the fundamental similarity of the African and Russian developmental paradigms lies with the fact that their natural resources are primarily used as sources of financial revenues. The proceeds from exploitation thereof are crucial for sustaining national statehoods, livelihoods, and to a certain extent for their economic progress. The domestic productive employment of the produce of their extractive industries for final consumption is very limited. Gone are the days, when the Soviet Union enjoyed the status of a self-sufficient economic giant, capable not only of extracting various mineral products from its soil, but also efficiently processing them to construct state of the art machinery, spacecrafts, and high-tech equipment. The winners in the Cold War assigned Russia a distinct subordinated place in the global division of labor. Already heavily dependent on the oil and gas exports, having lost its superpower status, the democratized Russian Federation had to surrender its traditional markets (former Soviet republics and socialist states of Eastern Europe and Asia and the Third World) of its manufacturing industries to competitions. Moscow was stripped of its geopolitical zones of interests (which were its guaranteed markets), and with them separated from many buyers of its military hardware and high tech produce. Since 1991 Russia if confined nearly exclusively to the role of a supplier of raw materials, primarily oil and gas. This is the posi- 60
- Page 10 and 11: tives. The authors are not describi
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- Page 20 and 21: Table 1.1.2. World chromium product
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- Page 30 and 31: long been obsolete, do exist and te
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- Page 46 and 47: ing Angola’s large oil resources
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- Page 50 and 51: the continent. To help African coun
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- Page 56 and 57: 100,000 students from almost every
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- Page 62 and 63: tion in the global division of labo
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- Page 66 and 67: The mineral resource base (MRB) of
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- Page 70 and 71: ite production at Komi to reach 6.5
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- Page 76 and 77: Country 75 Cost Ranges Namibia 0 20
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still one more uniting feature – both failed (at least as yet), to translate<br />
this conceptual assumption into life. In the view <strong>of</strong> the others,<br />
there are lots <strong>of</strong> cultural <strong>and</strong> psychological similarities between the<br />
peoples <strong>of</strong> both areas in relation to their natural wealth. But these<br />
subjective subjects lie beyond the scope <strong>of</strong> this research.<br />
Speaking about dissimilarities, the first <strong>and</strong> most obvious one<br />
that comes to minds is, <strong>of</strong> course, the disparity in the levels <strong>of</strong> socioeconomic<br />
development <strong>of</strong> the former second global superpower <strong>and</strong><br />
the world’s poorest region. That would include differences in dozens<br />
<strong>of</strong> specific areas: incomes, health, education, cultural environment,<br />
history etc. Acknowledging all that, we still believe that the comparative<br />
analysis undertaken below is not only legitimate methodologically<br />
but useful practically.<br />
From the point <strong>of</strong> view <strong>of</strong> political economy <strong>and</strong> geopolitics, the<br />
fundamental similarity <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Africa</strong>n <strong>and</strong> Russian developmental<br />
paradigms lies with the fact that their natural resources are primarily<br />
used as sources <strong>of</strong> financial revenues. The proceeds from exploitation<br />
there<strong>of</strong> are crucial for sustaining national statehoods, livelihoods,<br />
<strong>and</strong> to a certain extent for their economic progress. The domestic<br />
productive employment <strong>of</strong> the produce <strong>of</strong> their extractive<br />
industries for final consumption is very limited. Gone are the days,<br />
when the Soviet Union enjoyed the status <strong>of</strong> a self-sufficient economic<br />
giant, capable not only <strong>of</strong> extracting various mineral products<br />
from its soil, but also efficiently processing them to construct state<br />
<strong>of</strong> the art machinery, spacecrafts, <strong>and</strong> high-tech equipment.<br />
The winners in the Cold War assigned Russia a distinct subordinated<br />
place in the global division <strong>of</strong> labor. Already heavily dependent<br />
on the oil <strong>and</strong> gas exports, having lost its superpower status, the<br />
democratized Russian Federation had to surrender its traditional<br />
markets (former Soviet republics <strong>and</strong> socialist states <strong>of</strong> Eastern<br />
Europe <strong>and</strong> Asia <strong>and</strong> the Third World) <strong>of</strong> its manufacturing industries<br />
to competitions. Moscow was stripped <strong>of</strong> its geopolitical zones<br />
<strong>of</strong> interests (which were its guaranteed markets), <strong>and</strong> with them<br />
separated from many buyers <strong>of</strong> its military hardware <strong>and</strong> high tech<br />
produce. Since 1991 Russia if confined nearly exclusively to the role<br />
<strong>of</strong> a supplier <strong>of</strong> raw materials, primarily oil <strong>and</strong> gas. This is the posi-<br />
60