L. Fituni, I. Abramova Resource Potential of Africa and Russia's ...
L. Fituni, I. Abramova Resource Potential of Africa and Russia's ... L. Fituni, I. Abramova Resource Potential of Africa and Russia's ...
some price-related difficulties for China's exporters, but on the other hand, they have appreciably profited from the falling prices of raw materials and other components of their productions. Most likely, the growth rate of mutual trade will slow down but the volume of trade will continue to grow. The prices of and demand for Chinese goods in Africa are not expected to fall dramatically. The physical size of imports of African raw materials to China will depend on the extent the demand for Chinese products is going to fall around the world. In any event, the structure of imports from Africa (fuels, minerals, commercial timber, raw material for ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, diamonds, cotton, and tobacco) indicates that the demand inside China for the above commodities is not likely to change. Africa's import of products from China is not likely to decline. It mainly includes textiles, consumer industry products, low-cost electronic equipment and other consumer goods affordable to buyers of modest means. By virtue of being little involved in the global economy, incomes of this group of consumers would not be affected too much by the crisis even if the incomes of the countries of their residence fall under the impact of lower world prices for raw materials. Not to be forgotten is the fact that African oil importers would substantially benefit from lower oil pieces. The growth of influence of new players in Africa forces the old ones and particularly the United States to review there tactics and may be even strategy on the continent. One CSIS report wrote that in order to reverse the decline of U.S. Influence in Africa, the United States is to influence the development path of current producers like Angola, Chad, Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, and emerging producers such as Ghana and Madagascar, a special effort will be needed to restore a respected voice in those countries. … Traditionally the U.S. and international institutions have effectively used their financial clout as leverage to compel developing countries to implement policies … the U.S. will need a more nuanced approach to engagement, since resource rich countries now have ample funding on their own or through unconditional loans from China. 51 53
The West is suspicious and fearful of Chinese and to a lesser extent Indian or other Third world (especially Muslim) countries’ aid or other economic ties with Africa. USA and former colonial powers regards such links as useful instruments for both short- and longterm advancement of non-western interests, promoting bilateral economic ties and dependence on rival advisers and equipment. Accusations are often heard that such links also provide a cover for intelligence activities among other conducts through scholarship programs, which are regarded as a truly long-term "seeding" effort for future subversion. In addition, much of Chinese, Indian, Brazilian, Malaysian Taiwan, Korean or even Vietnamese economic aid carries tangible economic returns to the these rapidly developing countries, supplying important commodities and some hard currency, thus indirectly undermining competitive positions USA, Canada or EU countries in the global economy. In a structured form the perceived damage inflicted by the “newcomers/rivals” upon the traditional positions and influence of the First World economies in Africa may be described as follows: – obtaining sources of strategic and other commodities. As shown above, a significant share of China’s (other rival’s) requirements in fuel, strategic metals, etc. is covered by imports from Africa; – reducing possibilities of the Western alliance to command global resources of fuel, minerals and transportation routes and facilities; – increasing “newcomer’s’’ access to African governments and societies through the provision of “rival” (Chinese, Indian, etc.) advisers, doctors, and teachers in African countries. In countries, which established closer relations with the competitors of the traditional powers (e.g. Sudan, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, etc) ‘newcomers’ have achieved direct access to domestic policymakers, allowing them to influence day-to-day operations of the economy and to formulate/correct development plans; – adding “rival”-trained personnel to the ranks of African elites through academic scholarships. Since the late 1950s, more than 54
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The West is suspicious <strong>and</strong> fearful <strong>of</strong> Chinese <strong>and</strong> to a lesser extent<br />
Indian or other Third world (especially Muslim) countries’ aid<br />
or other economic ties with <strong>Africa</strong>. USA <strong>and</strong> former colonial powers<br />
regards such links as useful instruments for both short- <strong>and</strong> longterm<br />
advancement <strong>of</strong> non-western interests, promoting bilateral economic<br />
ties <strong>and</strong> dependence on rival advisers <strong>and</strong> equipment. Accusations<br />
are <strong>of</strong>ten heard that such links also provide a cover for intelligence<br />
activities among other conducts through scholarship programs,<br />
which are regarded as a truly long-term "seeding" effort for<br />
future subversion.<br />
In addition, much <strong>of</strong> Chinese, Indian, Brazilian, Malaysian Taiwan,<br />
Korean or even Vietnamese economic aid carries tangible economic<br />
returns to the these rapidly developing countries, supplying<br />
important commodities <strong>and</strong> some hard currency, thus indirectly undermining<br />
competitive positions USA, Canada or EU countries in<br />
the global economy.<br />
In a structured form the perceived damage inflicted by the<br />
“newcomers/rivals” upon the traditional positions <strong>and</strong> influence <strong>of</strong><br />
the First World economies in <strong>Africa</strong> may be described as follows:<br />
– obtaining sources <strong>of</strong> strategic <strong>and</strong> other commodities. As<br />
shown above, a significant share <strong>of</strong> China’s (other rival’s) requirements<br />
in fuel, strategic metals, etc. is covered by imports from <strong>Africa</strong>;<br />
– reducing possibilities <strong>of</strong> the Western alliance to comm<strong>and</strong><br />
global resources <strong>of</strong> fuel, minerals <strong>and</strong> transportation routes <strong>and</strong> facilities;<br />
– increasing “newcomer’s’’ access to <strong>Africa</strong>n governments <strong>and</strong><br />
societies through the provision <strong>of</strong> “rival” (Chinese, Indian, etc.) advisers,<br />
doctors, <strong>and</strong> teachers in <strong>Africa</strong>n countries. In countries,<br />
which established closer relations with the competitors <strong>of</strong> the traditional<br />
powers (e.g. Sudan, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, etc) ‘newcomers’<br />
have achieved direct access to domestic policymakers, allowing<br />
them to influence day-to-day operations <strong>of</strong> the economy <strong>and</strong><br />
to formulate/correct development plans;<br />
– adding “rival”-trained personnel to the ranks <strong>of</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n elites<br />
through academic scholarships. Since the late 1950s, more than<br />
54