L. Fituni, I. Abramova Resource Potential of Africa and Russia's ...

– The United States has sole jurisdiction over the criminal acts
of its personnel.
– U.S. personnel may carry arms in the Republic of Djibouti.
– The U.S. may import any materials and equipment it requires
into the Republic of Djibouti.
– No claims may be brought against the U.S. for damage to
property or loss of life.
– Aircraft, vessels, and vehicles may enter, exit, and move
freely throughout the Republic of Djibouti. 30
Such an agreement, whose above mentioned clauses are reminiscent
of the conditions, imposed by the colonial powers upon
China after the Opium wars, allows the U.S. to maintain a small
permanent presence in Djibouti, but staff and stock up with as many
military personnel and weapons as it deems fit for any particular
operation inside or outside of Africa as needed. Additionally, the
agreement gives the U.S. the flexibility it wants to operate freely
without interference from or liability to the people and government
of Djibouti.
DOD officials have stressed that the location in question would
be a staff headquarters rather than a troop headquarters, and have
suggested that they may consider a dispersed regional headquarters
model, with several small locations spread across the continent to
lessen the U.S. presence and burden in any one country. DOD may
eventually try to co-locate those facilities with the headquarters of
the continent’s regional and subregional organizations to link
AFRICOM with the AU’s nascent regional security architecture.
AFRICOM already has military liaison officers (LNOs) at the African
Union headquarters in Ethiopia and with ECOWAS in Nigeria,
as well as at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training
Center in Ghana. Those presences are likely to expand, and additional
liaison offices may be attached to other regional organizations.
31 Unconfirmed reports from diplomatic sources alleged, that
U.S. AFRICOM liaison officers took active part in assisting, consulting
and coordinating ECOWAS tough response to the Coted’Ivoire
post election crisis in late 2010. No independent confirmation
of that information was available later, since the developments
37