L. Fituni, I. Abramova Resource Potential of Africa and Russia's ...
L. Fituni, I. Abramova Resource Potential of Africa and Russia's ... L. Fituni, I. Abramova Resource Potential of Africa and Russia's ...
Force. At the request of the UN Secretary-General, we are also escorting UN chartered vessels in support of the African Union Mission in Somalia.” 27 The review of NATO’s positions about the alliance’s role on the continent was a natural continuation of individual policies of the leading members of the alliance, especially of the United States and those countries, which during the 19 th and 20 th centuries were colonial masters in Africa. Up till the break-up of the Soviet Union, direct involvement of African states into military cooperation with the superpowers was always bilateral. NATO and its twin alliance in the East – The Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) – neither included African member countries, nor had their bases or formal missions on the continent. Despite continued confrontation, neither NATO, nor WTO ever had special head-quarters or military commands exclusively in charge of the African theatre of war. The situation changed after the disappearance of the bi-polar construction of the military balance in the world. The United Stated took the path of aggressive implantation of Washington-designed democracies in the global periphery, which might be used as handy front-screens for perpetuating American exploitation of countries’ resources. On February 6, 2007, the Bush Administration announced the creation of a new unified combatant command – U.S. Africa Command or AFRICOM – to promote U.S. national security objectives in Africa and its surrounding waters. Prior to AFRICOM’s establishment, U.S. military involvement on the continent was divided among three commands: U.S. European Command (EUCOM), U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). The command’s area of responsibility (AOR) includes all African countries except Egypt. AFRICOM was officially launched as a sub-unified command under EUCOM on October 1, 2007, and became a stand-alone command on October 1, 2008. As envisioned by the Department of Defense (DOD), AFRICOM aims to promote U.S. strategic objectives by working with African states and regional organizations to help strengthen 35
egional stability and security through improved security capability and military professionalization. If directed by national command authorities, its military operations would aim to deter aggression and respond to crises. 28 DOD signaled its intention to locate AFRICOM’s headquarters on the continent early in the planning process, but such a move is unlikely to take place for several years, if at all. Currently, the command operates from Stuttgart, Germany. Though DOD has stressed that there are no plans to have a significant troop presence on the continent, a creeping infiltration of American military is, in reality, taking place. The U.S. have already established enduring infrastructure in Africa. At present, DOD’s Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF – HOA) has a semipermanent troop presence at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti with more than 1,500 U.S. military and civilian personnel in residence. The U.S. military has signed a five year lease with the Djiboutian government for Lemonier, with the option to extend the lease for two more five– year terms. The command authority for CJTF – HOA, formerly under CENTCOM, has been transferred to AFRICOM, and it will continue to be used as a Forward Operating Site. The U.S. military has access to a number of foreign air bases and ports in Africa and has established “barebones” facilities maintained by local troops in several locations. The U.S. military used facilities in Kenya in the 1990s to support its intervention in Somalia and continues to use them today to support counterterrorism activities. DOD refers to these facilities as “lily pads,” or Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs), and currently has access to locations in Algeria, Botswana, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Namibia, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zambia. In the case of Camp Lemonier in Djibouti, a key military outpost and strategically important piece of real-estate in the Horn of Africa, precisely where the Red Sea meets the Gulf of Aden, the United States government entered into an agreement 29 with the government of Djibouti that has several striking features: – U.S. military personnel have diplomatic immunity. 36
- Page 1 and 2: ABOUT THE AUTHORS: Dr. IRINA ABRAMO
- Page 3 and 4: 330.324.22 330.123.72 351.823.003 3
- Page 6 and 7: INTRODUCTION IN THE GLOBALIZED WORL
- Page 8 and 9: At certain stages of their history,
- Page 10 and 11: tives. The authors are not describi
- Page 12 and 13: cations, including monographs 1 and
- Page 14 and 15: arena by the loftiest goals and ide
- Page 16 and 17: quence, their role in the world eco
- Page 18 and 19: thus the last seller of the commodi
- Page 20 and 21: Table 1.1.2. World chromium product
- Page 22 and 23: Table 1.1.3. World cobalt productio
- Page 24 and 25: shore in many parts of the world. L
- Page 26 and 27: Though US totally depends on import
- Page 28 and 29: isk of supply shortage in the next
- Page 30 and 31: long been obsolete, do exist and te
- Page 32 and 33: a European-African energy forum; th
- Page 34 and 35: upon the same ideology: the new roa
- Page 38 and 39: - The United States has sole jurisd
- Page 40 and 41: uses to track terrorists. Algerian
- Page 42 and 43: sum, in exchange for terminating th
- Page 44 and 45: UK, Greece, Italy and Spain during
- Page 46 and 47: ing Angola’s large oil resources
- Page 48 and 49: China concluded two major M&A deals
- Page 50 and 51: the continent. To help African coun
- Page 52 and 53: egy with regard to Sudan and Zimbab
- Page 54 and 55: some price-related difficulties for
- Page 56 and 57: 100,000 students from almost every
- Page 58 and 59: 15 U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral
- Page 60 and 61: CHAPTER 2 Natural Resource Potentia
- Page 62 and 63: tion in the global division of labo
- Page 64 and 65: of other nations (manifest in an ex
- Page 66 and 67: The mineral resource base (MRB) of
- Page 68 and 69: In Nigeria, the smelter at Ikot Aba
- Page 70 and 71: ite production at Komi to reach 6.5
- Page 72 and 73: depletion. In South Africa, output
- Page 74 and 75: 25-26 thousand tons of copper conce
- Page 76 and 77: Country 75 Cost Ranges Namibia 0 20
- Page 78 and 79: The Elkon district, Southern Yakuti
- Page 80 and 81: ites and Miocene sediments extendin
- Page 82 and 83: South, Etango and Valencia alaskite
- Page 84 and 85: of competitiveness by similar produ
Force. At the request <strong>of</strong> the UN Secretary-General, we are also escorting<br />
UN chartered vessels in support <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Africa</strong>n Union Mission<br />
in Somalia.” 27<br />
The review <strong>of</strong> NATO’s positions about the alliance’s role on the<br />
continent was a natural continuation <strong>of</strong> individual policies <strong>of</strong> the<br />
leading members <strong>of</strong> the alliance, especially <strong>of</strong> the United States <strong>and</strong><br />
those countries, which during the 19 th <strong>and</strong> 20 th centuries were colonial<br />
masters in <strong>Africa</strong>.<br />
Up till the break-up <strong>of</strong> the Soviet Union, direct involvement <strong>of</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n states into military cooperation with the superpowers was<br />
always bilateral. NATO <strong>and</strong> its twin alliance in the East – The Warsaw<br />
Treaty Organization (WTO) – neither included <strong>Africa</strong>n member<br />
countries, nor had their bases or formal missions on the continent.<br />
Despite continued confrontation, neither NATO, nor WTO ever had<br />
special head-quarters or military comm<strong>and</strong>s exclusively in charge <strong>of</strong><br />
the <strong>Africa</strong>n theatre <strong>of</strong> war. The situation changed after the disappearance<br />
<strong>of</strong> the bi-polar construction <strong>of</strong> the military balance in the<br />
world. The United Stated took the path <strong>of</strong> aggressive implantation <strong>of</strong><br />
Washington-designed democracies in the global periphery, which<br />
might be used as h<strong>and</strong>y front-screens for perpetuating American<br />
exploitation <strong>of</strong> countries’ resources.<br />
On February 6, 2007, the Bush Administration announced the<br />
creation <strong>of</strong> a new unified combatant comm<strong>and</strong> – U.S. <strong>Africa</strong><br />
Comm<strong>and</strong> or AFRICOM – to promote U.S. national security objectives<br />
in <strong>Africa</strong> <strong>and</strong> its surrounding waters. Prior to AFRICOM’s<br />
establishment, U.S. military involvement on the continent was divided<br />
among three comm<strong>and</strong>s: U.S. European Comm<strong>and</strong><br />
(EUCOM), U.S. Central Comm<strong>and</strong> (CENTCOM), <strong>and</strong> U.S. Pacific<br />
Comm<strong>and</strong> (PACOM). The comm<strong>and</strong>’s area <strong>of</strong> responsibility<br />
(AOR) includes all <strong>Africa</strong>n countries except Egypt. AFRICOM<br />
was <strong>of</strong>ficially launched as a sub-unified comm<strong>and</strong> under EUCOM<br />
on October 1, 2007, <strong>and</strong> became a st<strong>and</strong>-alone comm<strong>and</strong> on October<br />
1, 2008.<br />
As envisioned by the Department <strong>of</strong> Defense (DOD),<br />
AFRICOM aims to promote U.S. strategic objectives by working<br />
with <strong>Africa</strong>n states <strong>and</strong> regional organizations to help strengthen<br />
35