L. Fituni, I. Abramova Resource Potential of Africa and Russia's ...
L. Fituni, I. Abramova Resource Potential of Africa and Russia's ... L. Fituni, I. Abramova Resource Potential of Africa and Russia's ...
long been obsolete, do exist and tend to exacerbate. As Paul C. Write put it, “The United States’ intervention in Africa is driven by America’s desire to secure valuable natural resources and political influence that will ensure the longevity of America’s capitalist system, military industrial complex, and global economic superiority – achieved through the financial and physical control of raw material exports”. 19 The current scramble for African resources between America and Europe is, in fact, a long-standing rivalry between the transnational corporations on Africa's markets of goods and capital. We, however, cannot write off the political component of the rivalry. Late in the 20th century and early 21st century, a number flare-ups of internal unrest and armed conflicts of various intensity occurred consecutively or simultaneously in Burundi (1993–2005), Rwanda (1990–1994), Zaire/DRC (1998–2002), Chad (2006, 2008), Togo (2005), Cote d’Ivoire (1999, 2002, 2010). Since those countries were countries always regarded as zones of French influence, some analysts tend to regard the unrests as a covert form of the U.S. offensive against the positions of the EU (above all those of France) in Africa. Although outwardly these protests of "democratic forces" were never anti- rench, yet they were objectively directed against the pro-French regimes in these countries and pro– American forces were increasingly replacing them. In effect, those were African versions of "color revolutions." It turns out, on closer inspection, that even the humanitarian catastrophe in Rwanda was a byproduct of an outside support of the leaders of opposing ethnic groups struggling for power. Nearly all the above mentioned protest actions created problems for France. France responded by heightening "anti-American activities among African businesses and on the intergovernmental level both on the bilateral basis and as part of the joint efforts of EU members. In 2008, a EU – Africa summit took place. France led the EU's efforts to set up a Mediterranean alliance of strategic importance above all to France. France began to steer a more active policy with regard to Africa, even more vigorous than the joint efforts within the framework of the EU. After all, the strategic interests of France in 29
Africa are much wider than the priorities of the European Union which makes no secret of prioritizing the questions of raw material and energy cooperation. Regularly regretting the absence of a unified energy policy of the member countries, the EU is very consistently and rigorously shaping its own external resources strategy where Africa features prominently. The strategy's fundamental documents covering its principal areas, like The Green Book – the central strategy document in this area – recognize that, despite the active territorial expansion in recent decades, the main energy sources for meeting the European Union's demand (50 percent in 2006 and 70 percent in the next 20 to 30 years) continue to stay outside the European Union. 20 The strategy emphasizes the dependence on three countries – Norway, Russia and Algeria – and says that energy security is its prime objective. The documents and practical activities aim at reducing the reliance on energy supplies from the above countries. Thus, the officially approved strategy aims at minimizing the role of the traditional partners instead of stressing wider cooperation and integration. This fact points to the thinly disguised opposition from the EU to Russia which is trying to expand its cooperation with African countries in the area of raw materials. For example, despite all the public denials, diplomatic “eyes-widening” and “shouldershrugging” the EU on the practical level opposes the energy projects between Russia and Algeria, Russia and Nigeria, and tries to block Russia's participation in the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline project. Moreover, the corner stone of the EU’s economic cooperation policy with Algeria is the view that this Arab country is an alternative source of natural gas as far as Russia goes. This is mentioned in plain terms in the Brussels strategy papers. 21 In 2006– 2008, Algeria and the EU exchanged a series of visits by high– profile delegations culminating in agreement on a strategic energy partnership and "convergence of the energy systems." In July 2007, the European Commission decided to lift restrictions on reselling Algerian gas in the markets of EU countries and voiced readiness to participate in the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline project to carry Nigerian gas to Algeria. In 2007 again, Berlin hosted 30
- Page 1 and 2: ABOUT THE AUTHORS: Dr. IRINA ABRAMO
- Page 3 and 4: 330.324.22 330.123.72 351.823.003 3
- Page 6 and 7: INTRODUCTION IN THE GLOBALIZED WORL
- Page 8 and 9: At certain stages of their history,
- Page 10 and 11: tives. The authors are not describi
- Page 12 and 13: cations, including monographs 1 and
- Page 14 and 15: arena by the loftiest goals and ide
- Page 16 and 17: quence, their role in the world eco
- Page 18 and 19: thus the last seller of the commodi
- Page 20 and 21: Table 1.1.2. World chromium product
- Page 22 and 23: Table 1.1.3. World cobalt productio
- Page 24 and 25: shore in many parts of the world. L
- Page 26 and 27: Though US totally depends on import
- Page 28 and 29: isk of supply shortage in the next
- Page 32 and 33: a European-African energy forum; th
- Page 34 and 35: upon the same ideology: the new roa
- Page 36 and 37: Force. At the request of the UN Sec
- Page 38 and 39: - The United States has sole jurisd
- Page 40 and 41: uses to track terrorists. Algerian
- Page 42 and 43: sum, in exchange for terminating th
- Page 44 and 45: UK, Greece, Italy and Spain during
- Page 46 and 47: ing Angola’s large oil resources
- Page 48 and 49: China concluded two major M&A deals
- Page 50 and 51: the continent. To help African coun
- Page 52 and 53: egy with regard to Sudan and Zimbab
- Page 54 and 55: some price-related difficulties for
- Page 56 and 57: 100,000 students from almost every
- Page 58 and 59: 15 U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral
- Page 60 and 61: CHAPTER 2 Natural Resource Potentia
- Page 62 and 63: tion in the global division of labo
- Page 64 and 65: of other nations (manifest in an ex
- Page 66 and 67: The mineral resource base (MRB) of
- Page 68 and 69: In Nigeria, the smelter at Ikot Aba
- Page 70 and 71: ite production at Komi to reach 6.5
- Page 72 and 73: depletion. In South Africa, output
- Page 74 and 75: 25-26 thousand tons of copper conce
- Page 76 and 77: Country 75 Cost Ranges Namibia 0 20
- Page 78 and 79: The Elkon district, Southern Yakuti
<strong>Africa</strong> are much wider than the priorities <strong>of</strong> the European Union<br />
which makes no secret <strong>of</strong> prioritizing the questions <strong>of</strong> raw material<br />
<strong>and</strong> energy cooperation.<br />
Regularly regretting the absence <strong>of</strong> a unified energy policy <strong>of</strong><br />
the member countries, the EU is very consistently <strong>and</strong> rigorously<br />
shaping its own external resources strategy where <strong>Africa</strong> features<br />
prominently. The strategy's fundamental documents covering its<br />
principal areas, like The Green Book – the central strategy document<br />
in this area – recognize that, despite the active territorial expansion<br />
in recent decades, the main energy sources for meeting the European<br />
Union's dem<strong>and</strong> (50 percent in 2006 <strong>and</strong> 70 percent in the next 20 to<br />
30 years) continue to stay outside the European Union. 20 The strategy<br />
emphasizes the dependence on three countries – Norway, Russia<br />
<strong>and</strong> Algeria – <strong>and</strong> says that energy security is its prime objective.<br />
The documents <strong>and</strong> practical activities aim at reducing the reliance<br />
on energy supplies from the above countries. Thus, the <strong>of</strong>ficially<br />
approved strategy aims at minimizing the role <strong>of</strong> the traditional<br />
partners instead <strong>of</strong> stressing wider cooperation <strong>and</strong> integration.<br />
This fact points to the thinly disguised opposition from the EU<br />
to Russia which is trying to exp<strong>and</strong> its cooperation with <strong>Africa</strong>n<br />
countries in the area <strong>of</strong> raw materials. For example, despite all the<br />
public denials, diplomatic “eyes-widening” <strong>and</strong> “shouldershrugging”<br />
the EU on the practical level opposes the energy projects<br />
between Russia <strong>and</strong> Algeria, Russia <strong>and</strong> Nigeria, <strong>and</strong> tries to block<br />
<strong>Russia's</strong> participation in the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline project.<br />
Moreover, the corner stone <strong>of</strong> the EU’s economic cooperation policy<br />
with Algeria is the view that this Arab country is an alternative<br />
source <strong>of</strong> natural gas as far as Russia goes. This is mentioned in<br />
plain terms in the Brussels strategy papers. 21 In 2006– 2008, Algeria<br />
<strong>and</strong> the EU exchanged a series <strong>of</strong> visits by high– pr<strong>of</strong>ile delegations<br />
culminating in agreement on a strategic energy partnership <strong>and</strong><br />
"convergence <strong>of</strong> the energy systems."<br />
In July 2007, the European Commission decided to lift restrictions<br />
on reselling Algerian gas in the markets <strong>of</strong> EU countries <strong>and</strong><br />
voiced readiness to participate in the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline<br />
project to carry Nigerian gas to Algeria. In 2007 again, Berlin hosted<br />
30