L. Fituni, I. Abramova Resource Potential of Africa and Russia's ...
L. Fituni, I. Abramova Resource Potential of Africa and Russia's ... L. Fituni, I. Abramova Resource Potential of Africa and Russia's ...
For the Soviet Union, solidarity with the oppressed peoples of the Third World, the liquidation of colonial system and support of newly liberated countries were among the battlefields of this struggle. Hence, the USSR was Africa’s natural ally in the Just Cause. And it was quite a helping one. It was on the Soviet Union initiative that in 1960 the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, while some leading Western democracies refused to vote for it. 8 Today, Russia continues to support the important role of the United Nations, of which now independent African states constitute nearly a quarter of members. Moscow never turned its back to multilateral assistance and efforts, which have a goal to alleviate the more difficult problems of African development. As a permanent member of the Security Council of the UN Russia has its significant share in the peacekeeping process on the continent – working out strategies to settle armed conflicts and setting the peacekeeping missions’ mandates. Russian forces and militia men – currently, about 370 people – are taking part in the UN peace maintaining operations in Africa (DRC, West Sahara, Sierra Leone, Cote D’Ivoire, Liberia and Sudan). Russia leads the way in the process of cutting state debts of African countries. It resolved the problem of the formidable African debts to the former USSR in a most generous and altruistic way. It has simply written of the lion’s share of those multimillion debts. The calculation of the exact sum of the full African debt to the former USSR is hardly possible today. The main reason for that was the existence of multiple currency parities and of the disparities in domestic and export prices for the same types of goods and assets loaned to African states. Therefore, if the Soviet aid had been delivered in natural form (e.g. commodity loans, say, 100.000 tons of wheat), its estimated value would depend on whether the calculation had been done in domestic (low) prices or export (high) ones. Moreover, depending on the currency conversion rate the final value might deviate further from the world prices for comparable goods. The initial conversion factor of 0.60 Rubles for 1 US dollar might 147
have been recalculated on the basis of different parity, or even in accordance with the USSR State bank exchange rate for national currencies of African countries. It was not a rare case that Moscow would “make a gift” of unused military reserves (it could be armaments, tanks, trucks, etc.) whose time of warehouse conservation expired or which became morally old. Those would be fully functioning, unused items (say, cannon shells, or mortars, kept somewhere in East Germany) whose utilization or even transportation to utilization factories in Siberia would have been more costly than selling them at a huge discount and on long term credit terms, or, sometimes, as mentioned above, even offering them as a gift. Such practices were not limited to military hardware either, but would include many export items of Soviet-made machinery or means of transportation. The complex system of multiple exchange rates and parities should not create an impression that the calculations were totally subjective and had no economic foundations under them. Unfortunately, with time technical “foreign currency” specialists of the Soviet system pass away and in some cases with them disappears the true knowledge about how, why and on what basis this or that calculation had been done, or even the methodologies of such calculations. Besides this, after the demise of the Soviet Union, the new liberal authorities were not too keen on making the precise figures from Soviet ledges and account books known to outsiders. Within a number of years a significant part of former Soviet claims on the Third world countries were sold at discount, first to a number of favored intermediaries, who then resold them at premium on secondary debt markets. This was allegedly the fate of parts of Ghanaian, Ugandan, South Yemeni and other liabilities to the USSR. The sellers were companies with access to the first Ye.Gaidar government of Russian Federation. The buyers were often sham companies working in the interest of major western financial groups and transnational banks. The looted property of the former Soviet Union later became the foundation capital of newly emerging private commercial banks in democratic Russia. Some of those banks 148
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For the Soviet Union, solidarity with the oppressed peoples <strong>of</strong><br />
the Third World, the liquidation <strong>of</strong> colonial system <strong>and</strong> support <strong>of</strong><br />
newly liberated countries were among the battlefields <strong>of</strong> this<br />
struggle. Hence, the USSR was <strong>Africa</strong>’s natural ally in the Just<br />
Cause. And it was quite a helping one. It was on the Soviet Union<br />
initiative that in 1960 the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration<br />
on the Granting <strong>of</strong> Independence to Colonial Countries<br />
<strong>and</strong> Peoples, while some leading Western democracies refused to<br />
vote for it. 8<br />
Today, Russia continues to support the important role <strong>of</strong> the<br />
United Nations, <strong>of</strong> which now independent <strong>Africa</strong>n states constitute<br />
nearly a quarter <strong>of</strong> members. Moscow never turned its back to multilateral<br />
assistance <strong>and</strong> efforts, which have a goal to alleviate the more<br />
difficult problems <strong>of</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n development.<br />
As a permanent member <strong>of</strong> the Security Council <strong>of</strong> the UN Russia<br />
has its significant share in the peacekeeping process on the continent<br />
– working out strategies to settle armed conflicts <strong>and</strong> setting<br />
the peacekeeping missions’ m<strong>and</strong>ates. Russian forces <strong>and</strong> militia<br />
men – currently, about 370 people – are taking part in the UN peace<br />
maintaining operations in <strong>Africa</strong> (DRC, West Sahara, Sierra Leone,<br />
Cote D’Ivoire, Liberia <strong>and</strong> Sudan).<br />
Russia leads the way in the process <strong>of</strong> cutting state debts <strong>of</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n<br />
countries. It resolved the problem <strong>of</strong> the formidable <strong>Africa</strong>n<br />
debts to the former USSR in a most generous <strong>and</strong> altruistic way. It<br />
has simply written <strong>of</strong> the lion’s share <strong>of</strong> those multimillion debts.<br />
The calculation <strong>of</strong> the exact sum <strong>of</strong> the full <strong>Africa</strong>n debt to the<br />
former USSR is hardly possible today. The main reason for that was<br />
the existence <strong>of</strong> multiple currency parities <strong>and</strong> <strong>of</strong> the disparities in<br />
domestic <strong>and</strong> export prices for the same types <strong>of</strong> goods <strong>and</strong> assets<br />
loaned to <strong>Africa</strong>n states. Therefore, if the Soviet aid had been delivered<br />
in natural form (e.g. commodity loans, say, 100.000 tons <strong>of</strong><br />
wheat), its estimated value would depend on whether the calculation<br />
had been done in domestic (low) prices or export (high) ones. Moreover,<br />
depending on the currency conversion rate the final value<br />
might deviate further from the world prices for comparable goods.<br />
The initial conversion factor <strong>of</strong> 0.60 Rubles for 1 US dollar might<br />
147
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