19.11.2014 Views

Download a PDF of this issue - Field Exchange - Emergency ...

Download a PDF of this issue - Field Exchange - Emergency ...

Download a PDF of this issue - Field Exchange - Emergency ...

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

<strong>Field</strong> Article<br />

team, comprised <strong>of</strong> (Outpatient Therapeutic<br />

Programme (OTP) Officers and Community<br />

Volunteer mentors attached to each SDU, to<br />

complement and support SDU staff during OTP<br />

days. In addition, a medical doctor was<br />

recruited to supervise the Stabilisation Centres<br />

(SC) and two M&E Officers to follow-up on<br />

overall programme performance. ACF opted<br />

not to place any staff at health facility level for<br />

fear <strong>of</strong> jeopardising the sustainability <strong>of</strong> the<br />

programme. Instead, they relied on the process<br />

<strong>of</strong> SDU selection to delineate, from the start, the<br />

terms <strong>of</strong> the support that facilities would (and<br />

would not) receive as part <strong>of</strong> ACF’s involvement.<br />

From then on, much <strong>of</strong> the emphasis was<br />

placed on formal and on-the-job training 11 .<br />

The actual involvement <strong>of</strong> both organisations<br />

was ultimately shaped by the realities <strong>of</strong><br />

the emerging programmes. In both states,<br />

admissions into the programme increased<br />

rapidly. Between September 2010 and<br />

September 2011, the pilots admitted a combined<br />

total <strong>of</strong> 26,621 SAM cases (see Figure 3). In<br />

many cases, health facilities and their staff were<br />

overwhelmed by the number <strong>of</strong> admissions,<br />

leading to more active involvement <strong>of</strong> NGO<br />

teams in the running <strong>of</strong> daily activities. Both <strong>of</strong><br />

these factors also had an impact on the inpatient<br />

component <strong>of</strong> the programme, as the high<br />

caseload affected the motivation <strong>of</strong> inpatient<br />

staff, many <strong>of</strong> whom were ‘volunteers’ without<br />

the qualifications necessary to manage the scale<br />

and complexity <strong>of</strong> the programme. Faced with a<br />

growing number <strong>of</strong> admissions, the health<br />

authorities opted to introduce complementary<br />

responses. In Katsina, the LGA created an OTP<br />

mobile team (10 people per LGA) responsible<br />

for supporting health facilities during OTP<br />

days. Although allowances were initially<br />

<strong>of</strong>fered by the authorities, <strong>this</strong> never materialised,<br />

forcing Save the Children to step in to fill<br />

in the gaps and avert total disruption to<br />

programme activities 12 .<br />

Supporting existing logistics systems<br />

In order to maximise the impact <strong>of</strong> the pilot<br />

programmes, robust logistical support was<br />

provided to LGAs covered by the pilot.<br />

The <strong>issue</strong> <strong>of</strong> RUTF supplies was addressed<br />

by each programme from a different perspective.<br />

Save the Children, in the initial stages,<br />

included Ready-to-Use Therapeutic Food<br />

(RUTF) as part <strong>of</strong> the support package and was<br />

therefore involved in its procurement and<br />

distribution. Yet, delays in both the arrival <strong>of</strong><br />

RUTF in country and its release by Customs<br />

meant that the programme relied on loans from<br />

other organisations using RUTF in-country (e.g.<br />

MSF & Catholic Relief Services (CRS)), as well<br />

as requests for ad-hoc donations (Clinton<br />

Foundation (CHAI)). The high caseload and<br />

continuing delays in RUTF deliveries (for Save<br />

the Children and other organisations in-country)<br />

meant that by the time RUTF finally arrived<br />

on-site, it was quickly depleted through use<br />

and repayment. In spite <strong>of</strong> the early challenges,<br />

a more robust system was soon put in place.<br />

RUTF was provided by UNICEF through the<br />

State Primary Health Care Development<br />

Agency (SPHCDA), stored in Save the<br />

Children’s central stock in Katsina and then<br />

delivered to the SDUs across the LGAs, where it<br />

fell under the supervision and management <strong>of</strong><br />

the facilities’ in-charges.<br />

By the time ACF started operations in<br />

Nigeria, RUTF supplies into the country were<br />

Lucia Zoro, Northern Nigeria, 2011<br />

stabilising, enabling them to work directly with<br />

UNICEF for the procurement and supply <strong>of</strong><br />

RUTF for Yobe State. Thus, only a buffer stock<br />

was included as part <strong>of</strong> the support package to<br />

enable the programme to respond to unanticipated<br />

shortages and stock-outs. Following the<br />

lead <strong>of</strong> UNICEF’s approach in Nigeria, Yobe<br />

State authorities collected RUTF from<br />

UNICEF’s regional <strong>of</strong>fice, LGA authorities<br />

collected from the State’s central stock, and<br />

ACF supported the LGAs in the final delivery<br />

to the SDUs. In both programme areas, further<br />

efforts are planned to ensure a more comprehensive<br />

handover <strong>of</strong> responsibility to the local<br />

authorities for the procurement and management<br />

<strong>of</strong> RUTF. Save the Children<br />

complemented the transport provided by the<br />

SPHCDA by renting and buying other vehicles,<br />

whilst ACF donated motorcycles to the<br />

supported LGAs to support regular supervision.<br />

In terms <strong>of</strong> essential drugs, both<br />

programmes relied on health structures for the<br />

supply <strong>of</strong> most essential drugs associated with<br />

the programme. This was recommended by<br />

UNICEF as a good mechanism to strengthen<br />

LGA ownership <strong>of</strong> CMAM. Nonetheless, drugs<br />

were also purchased to cover gaps as the LGA<br />

had challenges in providing the drugs for<br />

CMAM activities.<br />

These experiences have had two significant<br />

implications on the scale-up <strong>of</strong> activities. The<br />

first is the delegation <strong>of</strong> all responsibilities for<br />

the procurement <strong>of</strong> RUTF at a national level to<br />

UNICEF. They will be responsible for the distribution<br />

to their zonal <strong>of</strong>fices, or directly to states<br />

to minimise storage costs. From then on, each<br />

LGA will be expected to request from the State<br />

and make necessary arrangements for its collection.<br />

Save the Children and ACF will support<br />

<strong>this</strong> process by working with LGAs in calculating<br />

and forecasting needs, and accounting for<br />

11<br />

ACF did not provide any stipend to health staff or<br />

Community Volunteer working on CMAM activities, though<br />

per diems were provided during formal trainings in line<br />

with PRRINN/MCH’s standards in the state.<br />

12<br />

For <strong>this</strong>, Save the Children signed an MOU with the LGA<br />

authorities in which it was stated that the first six months<br />

<strong>of</strong> allowances would be provided by the organisation and<br />

subsequently the LGA would take over <strong>this</strong> responsibility,<br />

<strong>this</strong> was done to provide some time for the LGA to allocate<br />

budget to <strong>this</strong> effect.<br />

Figure 1: SAM & GAM prevalence rates in Nigeria,<br />

2008 (by regions)<br />

NORTH WEST<br />

53%<br />

20% NORTH EAST<br />

49%<br />

22%<br />

NORTH CENTRAL<br />

44%<br />

SOUTH WEST 9%<br />

31%<br />

9%<br />

SOUTH<br />

SOUTH<br />

31%<br />

7.5%<br />

Source: NDHS, 2008<br />

SOUTH<br />

EAST<br />

22%<br />

8.6%<br />

% STUNTING<br />

% WASTING<br />

Figure 2: CMAM programme (pilot and scale-up<br />

areas)<br />

No. SAM Children Admitted<br />

12000<br />

10000<br />

8000<br />

6000<br />

4000<br />

2000<br />

0<br />

KATSINA STATE<br />

ABUJA<br />

YOBE<br />

STATE<br />

PILOT LGAs<br />

Figure 3: Pilot programme admissions Katsina & Yobe<br />

states (number <strong>of</strong> SAM children, September<br />

2010-September 2011)<br />

5461<br />

939<br />

2129<br />

2523<br />

3823<br />

4418<br />

7328<br />

Sept - Dec 10 Jan - Mar 11 Apr - Jun 11 July - Sept 11<br />

Months<br />

Katsina state<br />

Yobe State<br />

A mother at an OTP in<br />

Northern Nigeria<br />

92

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!