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<strong>Field</strong> Article<br />
six mobile teams were mobilised. Each vehicle<br />
visited a village once a week and followed up the<br />
same on next week... The mobile team included a<br />
group <strong>of</strong> people who <strong>of</strong>fered services <strong>of</strong> WASH,<br />
PHC and nutrition jointly at the spot. Screening<br />
was done there and then. EPI, ANC, safe drinking<br />
water, de-worming etc. all services were made<br />
available at the door step... We requested to with<br />
hold wheat and soya bean combination (FBF) to<br />
WFP because that needs water for preparation,<br />
which was not readily available. Instead newly<br />
introduced supplementary plumpy was distributed.<br />
High energy biscuits were distributed<br />
uniformly to all families with children under five.”<br />
Manager <strong>of</strong> an INGO<br />
2010 floods: the challenges<br />
There were a number <strong>of</strong> challenges to the scaleup.<br />
One problem was that the UN agencies had<br />
limited communication between each other and<br />
at times appeared to be in competition.<br />
Pressure from the DoH highlighted and encouraged<br />
the need for better coordination.<br />
Coordination was made more difficult because<br />
<strong>of</strong> the complications experienced by partners<br />
having to sign separate MoUs with UNICEF,<br />
WHO and WFP (who were responsible for<br />
training and supplies <strong>of</strong> OTP, SC and SFP,<br />
respectively). Linkages between the three<br />
components <strong>of</strong> CMAM were <strong>of</strong>ten sub-optimal,<br />
as described below:<br />
“What happened is that, say one agency started<br />
OTP but the other didn’t establish an SC as a<br />
referral facility or vice versa. It could result in<br />
the child being referred to SC and not receiving<br />
treatment, or a child treated at SC when returned<br />
to community could not be taken care <strong>of</strong> by SFP.<br />
The missing components <strong>of</strong> CMAM were compromising<br />
the quality <strong>of</strong> care.”<br />
Provincial level manager from Department <strong>of</strong><br />
Health<br />
The DoH also became frustrated with programming<br />
that they were not informed or aware <strong>of</strong>:<br />
“The donors were awarding contracts for service<br />
delivery to the local NGOs without even informing<br />
the health authorities. We had no idea who is<br />
doing what and where and for how long the local<br />
NGO is intending to serve and what is its exit<br />
strategy”.<br />
Provincial level manager from Department <strong>of</strong><br />
Health<br />
CMAM successes in KPK<br />
Particular successes were noted for the<br />
programme in KPK:<br />
KPK had a functional nutrition cluster in place,<br />
which had already sensitised the provincial<br />
government for the urgent need for nutrition<br />
activities. Importantly, agencies and government<br />
staff working in KPK were able to share<br />
their skills and experience with other<br />
provinces, enabling a more rapid response in<br />
other provinces. Although, as mentioned<br />
above, there were still challenges to coordination<br />
arising from inter-agency mandates.<br />
The response was better in KPK due to good<br />
collaboration from the start between the PPHI,<br />
DoH and NGOs. A tripartite agreement<br />
between the three partners paved the way for<br />
coordinated efforts, which were noticeably<br />
lacking in other provinces (especially in terms<br />
<strong>of</strong> coordination with the PPHI).<br />
Much higher acceptability for the nutrition<br />
programme was seen when compared to EPI.<br />
This is likely due to the fact that the programme<br />
provided treatment, rather than being a preventative<br />
programme. The community can <strong>of</strong>ten be<br />
more willing to seek out treatment options for<br />
their sick children.<br />
The SCs function well in KPK. They are well<br />
equipped, have trained staff and reports indicate<br />
that high quality services are being<br />
provided.<br />
Winter supplies were planned and a 2-<br />
month stock <strong>of</strong> blanket food for the targeted<br />
population was pre-positioned. This helped to<br />
ensure uninterrupted supplies during the<br />
winter months in the inaccessible mountainous<br />
areas.<br />
The future for CMAM in KPK<br />
The 18th constitutional amendment continues<br />
to confuse health managers. There is a lack <strong>of</strong><br />
clarity regarding new roles and the nutrition<br />
programme. At present, nutrition does not<br />
enjoy the status <strong>of</strong> a fully-fledged entity but is<br />
being run on an ad-hoc arrangement.<br />
Additionally, the future <strong>of</strong> the Nutrition Cell in<br />
the DoH KPK is not clear as the provincial<br />
authorities are occupied with internalising and<br />
responding to the challenges <strong>of</strong> the 18th<br />
amendment. There is little understanding about<br />
IYCF and CMAM as programmatic measures at<br />
provincial level. Meanwhile, the longer-term<br />
nutrition program (the World Bank supported<br />
PC1) to support the nutrition in KPK is awaiting<br />
approval from provincial authorities.<br />
Sindh: A Late Wakeup Call<br />
While Sindh province had some well-established<br />
vertical programmes such as EPI, there<br />
were no institutional nutrition programmes,<br />
and there seemed to be little commitment<br />
within the health department for nutrition<br />
when the floods arrived. The provincial nutrition<br />
focal person, a dedicated female doctor,<br />
had limited influence over the Executive<br />
District Officers (EDOs), partly because nutrition<br />
was not particularly embedded within the<br />
health department and partly because she was<br />
a woman.<br />
The response to the 2010 floods<br />
The massive floods came as a surprise to Sindh.<br />
Out <strong>of</strong> 16 districts, nine were severely hit. Some<br />
districts were not directly affected, but received<br />
large numbers <strong>of</strong> displaced people. There was<br />
no experience to draw upon for the response to<br />
a major emergency. There was very limited<br />
capacity for nutrition-related programming<br />
within the government and NGOs<br />
A couple <strong>of</strong> CMAM pilot projects had been<br />
implemented in food insecure areas during<br />
2009 that were not flood affected. While<br />
support was provided from these districts, and<br />
other expertise was brought in from KPK<br />
province (as they had previous experience in<br />
CMAM), it still was not sufficient for the scale<br />
<strong>of</strong> response required. No contingency plan was<br />
available in Sindh. Initial planning was undertaken<br />
on the basis <strong>of</strong> NNS 2001, the most<br />
recently available data at the time.<br />
“All assumptions for planning were made on the<br />
basis <strong>of</strong> 2001 survey [NNS]. The resultant<br />
response was therefore wholly insufficient. While<br />
operations had to start immediately, problems<br />
with planning and the delays in supplies resulted<br />
in a worryingly slow response”<br />
Provincial level programme manager <strong>of</strong> health<br />
department<br />
Involvement <strong>of</strong> LHWs and PPHI<br />
In Sindh province, the LHWs were not permitted<br />
to engage in the CMAM programme, until<br />
direction was given from the Federal level. The<br />
PPHI programme was able to <strong>of</strong>fer some space<br />
at their facilities for CMAM activities (e.g. OTP<br />
and/or SFP). However, the staff at the BHUs<br />
were not involved in programme implementation,<br />
which was undertaken by NGO staff,<br />
Pitfalls and challenges<br />
At the start <strong>of</strong> CMAM, the government faced a<br />
range <strong>of</strong> challenges. For example, the concept <strong>of</strong><br />
‘nutrition’ was regularly confused with food<br />
aid. This misunderstanding stretched also to<br />
civil society.<br />
“We received an overwhelming response from<br />
the civil society. A number <strong>of</strong> NGOs approached<br />
us and showed interest in working on nutrition.<br />
But the moment they came to know that the<br />
nutrition is not about food distribution, that<br />
interest vanished”<br />
Provincial Programme Manager<br />
These misunderstandings were compounded<br />
when blanket food support arrived causing a<br />
change in focus <strong>of</strong> the programme. Community<br />
perception was shifted from CMAM as a treatment<br />
programme to that <strong>of</strong> food distribution.<br />
There was a great deal <strong>of</strong> demand for edible oil<br />
and biscuits, but not for medicine. The change<br />
to blanket distributions caused a great deal <strong>of</strong><br />
problems in the community. Once the situation<br />
was stabilised, blanket feeding was replaced by<br />
targeted interventions. Despite conducting<br />
social mobilisation, there were serious misunderstandings<br />
regarding the targeting, with<br />
community members preferring the blanket<br />
distributions. Security was compromised at<br />
some <strong>of</strong> the distribution sites.<br />
“When the community saw the vehicles <strong>of</strong> nutrition<br />
staff, they emerged as a mob, armed with<br />
canes. They were angry because the previous staff<br />
had distributed goods to much <strong>of</strong> the vulnerable<br />
population, including their kith and kin. They<br />
thought that the nutrition people were there for<br />
the same kinds <strong>of</strong> distributions.”<br />
INGO Representative<br />
Mobile teams were introduced to cover remote<br />
rural areas, however they proved quite costly.<br />
As described above, capacity challenges<br />
were the biggest hurdle to the scale-up <strong>of</strong><br />
CMAM provision in Sindh province. Positions<br />
were not adequately filled and the high<br />
turnover <strong>of</strong> project staff compounded the problem.<br />
There were generally very limited<br />
handover processes amongst government staff<br />
when turnover occurred, affecting the continuity<br />
<strong>of</strong> programming.<br />
The government faces a lack <strong>of</strong> capacity for<br />
many reasons, with the humanitarian community<br />
sometimes contributing to the shortage <strong>of</strong><br />
skilled manpower:<br />
“Donors can help to incapacitate the government.<br />
In order to make their projects successful, they<br />
identify, attract and lure the government<br />
personnel with attractive package. This further<br />
incapacitates the government system”<br />
Provincial Manager from Health Department<br />
Punjab: Slow and Steady, and with a<br />
Vision<br />
The Government <strong>of</strong> the Punjab had already<br />
been proactively developing and implementing<br />
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