11. The decline in exports to the preferential-giving destination suggests that producers would choose to export under most favored nation status. In the illustrative simulations reported here, with constant elasticity throughout and smooth substitution possibilities across the origin for intermediate good purchases and export destination sales, producers pass on cost increases to consumers. 12. The authors of this article are aware of concerns voiced by the private sector in the course of the EU review about the practical difficulty of a value content criterion for small firms and, if based on costs, its potential to force unwanted disclosure of strategic information to powerful EU buyers that would enhance their ability to squeeze rents from developing country producers. References Anson, J., O. Cadot, C. Carrere, A. Estevadeordal, J. de Melo, and B. Tumurchudur. 2005. “Rules of Origin in North-South Preferential Trading Arrangements with an Application to NAFTA.” Review of Internationa} Economics 13(3):501-17, Augier, P. M. Gasiorek, and C. Tang. 2005. “The Impact of Rules of Origin on Trade Flows.” Economic Policy 20(43}:567-24. The Case of Africa.” World Bank, Washington, D.C. Cadot. 0., C. Carrere, and V Strauss-Kahn. 2007. “Export Diversification: What’s Behind the Hump?” University of Lausanne. Switzerland. Cadot, O., J. de Melo, and A. Portugal-Perez. 2005. “Market Access and Welfare under Free Trade Agreements: the Case of Textiles under NAFTA.” World Bank Economic Review 19(3):379-405. ————. (forthcoming). “Rules of Origin for Preferential Trading Arrangements: Implications for the ASEAN FTA of EU and US Experience.” Journal of Economic Integration. Cadot, 0., J, de Melo, and E. Pondard. 2006. “Evaluating the Consequences of a Shift to a Value-added Method for Determining Origin in the European Union’s GSP Preferential Scheme.” Report prepared for the European Commission, Brussels. Cadot. 0., A. Estevadeordal. and A, Suwa-Eisenmann. 2006. “Rules of Origin as Export Subsidies.” In 0. Cadot eds.. The Origin of Goods: Rules of Origin in Regional Trade Agreements. London: Oxford University Press. 17 Trade & Industry <strong>Monitor</strong> Baldwin, R. 2006. “Managing the Noodle Bowl: The Fragility of East Asian Regionalism.” CEPR Discussion Paper 5561. Centre for Economic Policy Research, London. Cadot, 0., C. Carrere, J. de Melo, and B. Tumurchudur. 2006. “Product Specific Rules of Origin in EU and US Preferential Trading Arrangements: an Assessment.” World Trade Review 5(2): 199-224. Brenton. P. 2006. “Notes on Rules of Origin with Implications for Regional Integration in South East Asia.” World Bank, Washington, D.C. Brenton. P., and H. Imagawa. 2004. “Rules of Origin, Trade and Customs.” In L. de Sokol, and J. Wulf eds., Customs Modernization Handbook. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. Brenton, P, and M. Manchin. 2003. “Making EU Trade Agreements Work: the Role of Rules of Origin.” The World Economy 26{5):755-69. Cadot, 0.. A. Estevadeordal. A. Suwa-Eisenmann, and T. Verdier eds. 2006. The Origin of Goods: Rules of Origin in Regional Trade Agreements. London: Oxford University Press. Carrere, C.. and J. de Melo. 2006. ‘Are Different Rules of Origin Equally Costly? Estimates from NAFTA.” In 0. Cadot eds., The Origin of Goods: Rules of Origin in Regional Trade Agreements. London: Oxford University Press. Estevadeordal. A. 2000. “Negotiating Preferential Market Access: the Case of NAFTA.” Journal of World Trade Wl):141-6(>. Brenton. P. and C. Ozden. 2005. “Trade Preferences for Apparel and the Role of Rules of Origin: Estevadeordal. A., and K. Suominen. 2006. “Mapping Rules of Origin Around the World.” In Why OECD countries should reform Rules of Origin
Trade Policy O. Cadot eds.. The Origin of Goods: Rules of Origin in Regional Trade Agreements. London: Oxford University Press. Francois, J., B. Hoekman, and M. Manchin. 2006. “Preference Erosion and Multilateral Trade 18 Trade & Industry <strong>Monitor</strong> Liberalization.” World Bank Economic Review 20(2): 197-216. Hansen, B. 2000. “Sample Splitting and Threshold Estimation.” Econometrica 6S(3):575-603.
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Table 3: Fossil fuel production and
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