Pitfalls and Pipelines - Philippine Indigenous Peoples Links
Pitfalls and Pipelines - Philippine Indigenous Peoples Links Pitfalls and Pipelines - Philippine Indigenous Peoples Links
64 Pitfalls and Pipelines: Indigenous Peoples and Extractive Industries copper and aluminium prices rose sharply despite large surpluses and rising stocks: July 2005 to March 2006; and August 2009 to February 2010 [my italics].” Thus, “it looks as if there really may have been introduced a new determinant of prices.” Since 2004, “over one million tons of long-only copper futures have been bought and held by investors in CIFs.” So, asks Holland: “[H]ow can this not have moved prices?” The shift appeared to defy classic market theory that, when people want something and it’s in short supply, it will become more valuable and thus stimulate production. But, when the commodity is in surplus, the opposite should occur. Holland went on: Old-school commodity market analysts used to think in terms of a market balance, which they defined as production minus consumption, with resulting physical stock change and stock levels. In that system of belief, physical stocks were taken to be almost a passive dull burden which weighed down on prices—the more the physical stock sitting on the market’s back, the lower stooped the resulting price. However: Brokers saw things a little differently: balancing took place in the futures market not the physical market. If stocks were below the ‘pinch point’ and prices were backwardated, 53 exchange stocks did not depress prices at all. If stocks were above the “pinch point” and prices were in contango, 54 it was the contango-earning hedge sales of exchange stock owners that depressed prices. In contango markets, exchange stocks were a dynamic, not a passive, force. This discussion may well seem obscure to the layperson, and it’s not necessarily very educative to probe it further. The key point is that such trading—effectively betting on a price that is almost entirely removed from the real movement of supply and demand—is increasingly distorting public—and government—perceptions of our requirements for new supplies of metals, and therefore new mines.
Chapter 1.2: Financial Innovations and the Extractive Industries 65 Endnotes 1 The paper had the original title Extractive Outcomes. It is an expanded version of a presentation made at the 2009 Manila Conference, which was last updated in July 2012. Following the brief for the talk in 2009, it restricts itself to mining rather than including oil and gas. 2 R. Mould, ed. 2009, “Shares Magazine, in a presentation to LSE seminar.” London, 17 February. 3 L. Williams, 2009, “Is gold the only salvation from this financial Armageddon?” Mineweb. 16 February, http://mineweb.com/mineweb/ view/mineweb/en/page33?oid=78495&sn=Detail; B. Sergeant, 2009, “Warm bullion, hot stocks.” Mineweb. 21 January, http://www.mineweb. net/mineweb/view/mineweb/en/page34?oid=77120&sn=Detail. 4 B. Sergeant, 2011, “World’s Top 100 Miners: 2010 was a breeze: now what?” Mineweb. 12 January, http://www.mineweb.com/mineweb/view/ mineweb/en/page67?oid=117757&sn=Detail&pid=92730. 5 Ernst & Young 2010. 6 See: http://moneytometal.org/index.php/Tables#Table_2:_Value_of_ mining_M.26A.E2.80.99s. 7 Ernst & Young, 2010, “2009: the year of survival and revival: Mergers, acquisitions and capital raising in the mining and metals sector.” London. 8 AIM is the Alternative Investment Market on the London Stock Exchange on which junior mining companies were, at that time, heavily represented. 9 Mining Journal 12 March 2010. 10 Financial Times, 15 May 2012; Mines & Communities, 2012, “Should PLUS Go MINUS?” 29 May, http://www.minesandcommunities.org/ article.php?a=11726. 11 Bloomberg 2010. 12 Mines & Communities, 2011, “Glencore: the monster has landed!” 24 May, http://www.minesandcommunities.org/article.php?a=10916. 13 M. Carnegie, 2010, “Mark-2-Market: The coming storm.” Business Spectator, 9 April. 14 ICEM, Brussels 12 January 2010. 15 Mineweb, 2012, “Mining Executive Outlook, Mining Recruitment Group.” 22 June. 16 Ernst & Young, 2010, “2009: the year of survival and revival: Mergers, acquisitions and capital raising in the mining and metals sector.” London.
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64 <strong>Pitfalls</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Pipelines</strong>: <strong>Indigenous</strong> <strong>Peoples</strong> <strong>and</strong> Extractive Industries<br />
copper <strong>and</strong> aluminium prices rose sharply despite large surpluses <strong>and</strong><br />
rising stocks: July 2005 to March 2006; <strong>and</strong> August 2009 to February 2010<br />
[my italics].” Thus, “it looks as if there really may have been introduced a<br />
new determinant of prices.” Since 2004, “over one million tons of long-only<br />
copper futures have been bought <strong>and</strong> held by investors in CIFs.” So, asks<br />
Holl<strong>and</strong>: “[H]ow can this not have moved prices?” The shift appeared to<br />
defy classic market theory that, when people want something <strong>and</strong> it’s in<br />
short supply, it will become more valuable <strong>and</strong> thus stimulate production.<br />
But, when the commodity is in surplus, the opposite should occur.<br />
Holl<strong>and</strong> went on:<br />
Old-school commodity market analysts used to think in terms<br />
of a market balance, which they defined as production minus<br />
consumption, with resulting physical stock change <strong>and</strong> stock levels.<br />
In that system of belief, physical stocks were taken to be almost a<br />
passive dull burden which weighed down on prices—the more the<br />
physical stock sitting on the market’s back, the lower stooped the<br />
resulting price.<br />
However:<br />
Brokers saw things a little differently: balancing took place in the<br />
futures market not the physical market. If stocks were below the<br />
‘pinch point’ <strong>and</strong> prices were backwardated, 53 exchange stocks did<br />
not depress prices at all. If stocks were above the “pinch point”<br />
<strong>and</strong> prices were in contango, 54 it was the contango-earning hedge<br />
sales of exchange stock owners that depressed prices. In contango<br />
markets, exchange stocks were a dynamic, not a passive, force.<br />
This discussion may well seem obscure to the layperson, <strong>and</strong> it’s not<br />
necessarily very educative to probe it further. The key point is that such<br />
trading—effectively betting on a price that is almost entirely removed<br />
from the real movement of supply <strong>and</strong> dem<strong>and</strong>—is increasingly distorting<br />
public—<strong>and</strong> government—perceptions of our requirements for new<br />
supplies of metals, <strong>and</strong> therefore new mines.