Pitfalls and Pipelines - Philippine Indigenous Peoples Links
Pitfalls and Pipelines - Philippine Indigenous Peoples Links Pitfalls and Pipelines - Philippine Indigenous Peoples Links
40 Pitfalls and Pipelines: Indigenous Peoples and Extractive Industries Is Mining Coming to an End—As We Once Knew It? In 2008 it seemed that global mining prospects might have been fatally wounded as a result of the gargantuan credit meltdown, triggered by the downfall of U.S. investment bank, Lehman Brothers, in September of that year. As that annus horribilis ended, the minerals industry was saddled with the most significant reduction in equity (share) values in living memory. Extractive companies performed worse that year than those in any other industrial sector represented on the London Stock Exchange (LSE)—the single most important source of big mining capital. 2 Virtually every mining enterprise listed on other stock exchanges also experienced falls in their market capitalization, while mineral commodities traded at lower prices or volumes than at any time for 10 (and in some cases 20) years. The only exceptions were gold and silver—the former apparently sustaining its historical role as a “store of value” and “safe haven” in hard times or during dramatic fluctuations in dollar exchange rates. 3 During 2010, some measure of market stability appeared to have returned. Even so, at the beginning of 2011, virtually every major mining company on the planet was still suffering the fallout from what Warren Buffet, then the world’s richest man, had provocatively dubbed “the financial nuclear winter.” The market value of Chinese extractive companies had fallen the most: China’s huge Shenhua Coal and Chalco dived in worth by around a third, while that of India’s NMDC (formerly the National Mineral Development Corporation) collapsed by just over 50 percent. Even those most diversified of global mineral producers, Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton, saw their share prices dip by 2.9 percent and 3.6 percent, respectively. A raft of smaller enterprises (so-called “Juniors”) and numerous mining projects, in the meantime, hit the dust. 4
Chapter 1.2: Financial Innovations and the Extractive Industries 41 Nonetheless, it was distinctly naïve to expect the minerals sector as a whole to meekly roll over and die, just because many of its investors had received the fright of their business lives. Mining is a notoriously cyclical industry; and precisely for this reason, its biggest players have devised means of coping with dramatic falls in demand for their output. Because it can take 10 years or more to bring a major project on-stream, such timelines are factored into the “bankable feasibility studies” companies present to investors. So long as banks, private funds, and multilateral investors (such as the World Bank and its private arm, the International Finance Corporation), are persuaded that an improvement in global economic growth is inevitable—if not exactly “around the corner”—they are prepared to wait-out some delays. But for how long are they prepared to wait? New restraints are continue being imposed on the industry’s expansion— whether through domestic legislation, international treaties, or civil society movements. Inevitably there will be increasing costs of extraction, and many companies are already having to meet higher bars on waste disposal and ambient pollution. Pressures on them to pay a far greater proportion of their profits to state, regional, or local governments have markedly mounted in recent years—and will grow further. I will argue here that, in reality, the minerals industry has done little more than survive since late 2008—though survive it has. Expectations that innovative methods of financing would come to replace the disreputable tools of the recent past have largely not been fulfilled. Nonetheless, some of those quasi-criminal financial instruments (which engendered the massive illusion of our wealth being secure, when the opposite was true) have emerged under different guises. Newer stratagems have been devised to take even more cash out of our unsuspecting pockets. And behind these are some of the very financial institutions which were responsible for that “financial nuclear winter” (see Box 1 and Box 2). Above all, those most vital of expectations on which the industry has pinned its fortunes over the past decade, are on the
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Chapter 1.2: Financial Innovations <strong>and</strong> the Extractive Industries<br />
41<br />
Nonetheless, it was distinctly naïve to expect the minerals<br />
sector as a whole to meekly roll over <strong>and</strong> die, just because many<br />
of its investors had received the fright of their business lives.<br />
Mining is a notoriously cyclical industry; <strong>and</strong> precisely for this<br />
reason, its biggest players have devised means of coping with<br />
dramatic falls in dem<strong>and</strong> for their output. Because it can take<br />
10 years or more to bring a major project on-stream, such<br />
timelines are factored into the “bankable feasibility studies”<br />
companies present to investors. So long as banks, private<br />
funds, <strong>and</strong> multilateral investors (such as the World Bank <strong>and</strong><br />
its private arm, the International Finance Corporation), are<br />
persuaded that an improvement in global economic growth<br />
is inevitable—if not exactly “around the corner”—they are<br />
prepared to wait-out some delays.<br />
But for how long are they prepared to wait? New restraints<br />
are continue being imposed on the industry’s expansion—<br />
whether through domestic legislation, international treaties,<br />
or civil society movements. Inevitably there will be increasing<br />
costs of extraction, <strong>and</strong> many companies are already having<br />
to meet higher bars on waste disposal <strong>and</strong> ambient pollution.<br />
Pressures on them to pay a far greater proportion of their<br />
profits to state, regional, or local governments have markedly<br />
mounted in recent years—<strong>and</strong> will grow further.<br />
I will argue here that, in reality, the minerals industry has<br />
done little more than survive since late 2008—though survive<br />
it has. Expectations that innovative methods of financing<br />
would come to replace the disreputable tools of the recent past<br />
have largely not been fulfilled.<br />
Nonetheless, some of those quasi-criminal financial instruments<br />
(which engendered the massive illusion of our wealth<br />
being secure, when the opposite was true) have emerged<br />
under different guises. Newer stratagems have been devised<br />
to take even more cash out of our unsuspecting pockets. And<br />
behind these are some of the very financial institutions which<br />
were responsible for that “financial nuclear winter” (see Box<br />
1 <strong>and</strong> Box 2).<br />
Above all, those most vital of expectations on which the industry<br />
has pinned its fortunes over the past decade, are on the