Pitfalls and Pipelines - Philippine Indigenous Peoples Links
Pitfalls and Pipelines - Philippine Indigenous Peoples Links Pitfalls and Pipelines - Philippine Indigenous Peoples Links
190 Pitfalls and Pipelines: Indigenous Peoples and Extractive Industries The forced evictions of people to make way for the refinery and the threatened evictions over the proposed mine resulted in a massive mobilization of local indigenous peoples. There were protest rallies and demonstrations, including a 17 km-long “human wall.” The campaign also reached out to national and international partners, and resulted in a number of legal actions.58 In September 2005, an inquiry by a leading advisory committee to India’s Supreme Court (the Central Empowered Committee, or CEC) concluded that inter alia Vedanta had “falsified information” to obtain environmental clearances for the alumina refinery under construction on plains below the mountain. The company had also destroyed more than 10 hectares of forest land. The CEC urged the mining venture be rejected on environmental grounds, and also because it would violate the constitutional rights of the Kondh people. 59 Despite the CEC’s forthright recommendation, during the succeeding five years, Vedanta continued battling to clear the mining project. Meanwhile many Khonds rose up in vociferous opposition to what they perceived as an unprecedented threat to their land and livelihoods. The strength of their campaign attracted the backing of leading Indian human rights and environmental NGOs and of international organizations such as Amnesty International and ActionAid. 60 The UK-based tribal peoples’ campaign group, Survival International, submitted in September 2009 a complaint about Vedanta’s activities around Lanjigarh to the UK Government’s National Contact Point (NCP) for a ruling under guidelines set by the OECD for the conduct of multinational corporations. 61 The NCP ruled that Vedanta “did not respect the rights of the Dongria Kondh”; did not “consider the impact of the construction of the mine on the [tribe’s] rights”; and “failed to put in place an adequate and timely consultation mechanism.” The UK government body concluded that a “change in the company’s behavior” was “essential.” Moreover, it criticized Vedanta for “fail[ing] to provide any evidence during the examination”—despite repeated requests. According to Survival International, this was “the only time a [UK] company has refused to participate in an OECD investigation.” 62 In February 2010, Amnesty International published detailed allegations of the company’s social and environmental violations in the Lanjigarh area, which Vedanta has neglected to answer. 63
Chapter 2.3: International Advocacy with Companies and Their Investors 191 In August 2010, a high-level independent report, commissioned by India’s Ministry of Environment and Forests, unequivocally rejected the Niyamgiri mining project and also urged a halt to Vedanta’s planned sixfold expansion of its Lanjigarh refinery. The report’s authors concluded: “The Vedanta Company has consistently violated the FCA, FRA, EPA 64 and the Orissa Forest Act in active collusion with the state officials. Perhaps the most blatant example of it is their act of illegally enclosing and occupying at least 26.123 ha of Village Forest Lands within its refinery, depriving tribal, dalits [lowest-caste] and other rural poor of their rights.” 65 Shortly afterwards, the Ministry of Environment and Forests minister, Jairam Ramesh, went on record to criticize India’s Supreme Court for permitting construction of the Lanjigarh refinery in the first place; and he placed a ban on expansion of the refinery. 66 At the time of writing, Vedanta and its partner, the state-owned Orissa Mining Company, are still trying to overturn this ruling. In 2011, however, further evidence of mismanagement at the refinery has emerged, specifically relating to involuntary and illegal on-site releases of highly alkaline toxic solid wastes, commonly known as “red mud.” On several occasions between 2007 and 2009, the Orissa State Pollution Control Board had criticized Vedanta for the poor construction of its red mud pond, issuing three “show cause” notices to the company and ordering that it prevent these wastes entering into the adjacent Vamsadhara river. 67 On 5 April 2011, part of the pond wall burst open, causing many tons of these wastes to cascade into the river for around three hours. Although a video clearly showing evidence of the violation was swiftly posted on YouTube, 68 the Chief Executive Officer of Vedanta Aluminium denied that there had been any breach of the wall, even suggesting the footage (whose veracity is not in doubt) was part of a “dirty tricks” campaign by those opposed to the mining. Just six weeks later, on 16 May 2011, the pond wall broke once again, prompting Amnesty International on 1 June to issue a statement drawing attention to what it called a “toxic sludge leak” that “threatens rural communities.” Amnesty estimated that “four to five thousand people in twelve villages are threatened by the leaks, which could worsen during heavy monsoon rains.” It maintained that “Local people have protested that they have not been given any information by Vedanta Aluminium or the government about efforts to prevent further leaks… Vedanta Aluminium denies that there were any spills from the red mud pond and has reportedly not repaired
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Chapter 2.3: International Advocacy with Companies <strong>and</strong> Their Investors<br />
191<br />
In August 2010, a high-level independent report, commissioned by India’s<br />
Ministry of Environment <strong>and</strong> Forests, unequivocally rejected the Niyamgiri<br />
mining project <strong>and</strong> also urged a halt to Vedanta’s planned sixfold<br />
expansion of its Lanjigarh refinery. The report’s authors concluded: “The<br />
Vedanta Company has consistently violated the FCA, FRA, EPA 64 <strong>and</strong> the<br />
Orissa Forest Act in active collusion with the state officials. Perhaps the<br />
most blatant example of it is their act of illegally enclosing <strong>and</strong> occupying<br />
at least 26.123 ha of Village Forest L<strong>and</strong>s within its refinery, depriving<br />
tribal, dalits [lowest-caste] <strong>and</strong> other rural poor of their rights.” 65<br />
Shortly afterwards, the Ministry of Environment <strong>and</strong> Forests minister,<br />
Jairam Ramesh, went on record to criticize India’s Supreme Court for<br />
permitting construction of the Lanjigarh refinery in the first place; <strong>and</strong> he<br />
placed a ban on expansion of the refinery. 66<br />
At the time of writing, Vedanta <strong>and</strong> its partner, the state-owned Orissa<br />
Mining Company, are still trying to overturn this ruling. In 2011, however,<br />
further evidence of mismanagement at the refinery has emerged,<br />
specifically relating to involuntary <strong>and</strong> illegal on-site releases of highly<br />
alkaline toxic solid wastes, commonly known as “red mud.” On several<br />
occasions between 2007 <strong>and</strong> 2009, the Orissa State Pollution Control<br />
Board had criticized Vedanta for the poor construction of its red mud pond,<br />
issuing three “show cause” notices to the company <strong>and</strong> ordering that it<br />
prevent these wastes entering into the adjacent Vamsadhara river. 67<br />
On 5 April 2011, part of the pond wall burst open, causing many tons of<br />
these wastes to cascade into the river for around three hours. Although<br />
a video clearly showing evidence of the violation was swiftly posted on<br />
YouTube, 68 the Chief Executive Officer of Vedanta Aluminium denied<br />
that there had been any breach of the wall, even suggesting the footage<br />
(whose veracity is not in doubt) was part of a “dirty tricks” campaign by<br />
those opposed to the mining.<br />
Just six weeks later, on 16 May 2011, the pond wall broke once again,<br />
prompting Amnesty International on 1 June to issue a statement drawing<br />
attention to what it called a “toxic sludge leak” that “threatens rural<br />
communities.” Amnesty estimated that “four to five thous<strong>and</strong> people in<br />
twelve villages are threatened by the leaks, which could worsen during<br />
heavy monsoon rains.”<br />
It maintained that “Local people have protested that they have not been<br />
given any information by Vedanta Aluminium or the government about<br />
efforts to prevent further leaks… Vedanta Aluminium denies that there<br />
were any spills from the red mud pond <strong>and</strong> has reportedly not repaired