National Early Recovery and Reconstruction Plan for Gaza 2014-2017_FINAL...

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40 The National Early Recovery and Reconstruction Plan for Gaza 2014 SECTION 3: GAZA RAPID ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES AND NEEDS 3.4 Governance Sector A functional and unified public administration under the National Consensus Government is pivotal to the success of the recovery and reconstruction plan, to stabilizing Gaza, and to providing services to its citizens. Within the period of this Plan, the Government, in parallel to leading and implementing the recovery and reconstruction effort, will need to assume effective authority and sole governmental responsibilities in Gaza; consolidate authority over ministries and Government agencies and reintegrate them with national institutions; harmonize and rationalize the civil service in Gaza; and gradually assume security responsibilities as part of a comprehensive security sector reform, starting with the assumption of policing responsibilities under the authority of the Government to maintain civic law and order. The scale of destruction and massive displacement as a result of the Israeli assault could potentially lead to destabilized security, if immediate relief and early recovery are not provided adequately. Accordingly, the first objective in the short-term is to ensure the operations of central and local government institutions for relief, early recovery, and reconstruction of Gaza. Achieving this will require a temporary solution for the personnel engaged by the previous de facto authorities post-June 2007 who have not received regular payments for a prolonged period of up to one year. This temporary mechanism will be limited in time and function in parallel to beginning the process of harmonization and rationalization of the civil service, aimed at determining the retention and retraining of existing civil servants who are not currently in active duty and the possible integration of personnel who were recruited over the past seven years by the previous de-facto authorities, following the determination of their status. 3.4.1 Operational Capacity of Central Government Institutions The consolidation of the public administration under the authority of the National Consensus Government requires a careful examination of available modalities within the existing fiscal limitations of the budget. The civil service employees in Gaza have not been able to assume their responsibilities yet and return to their work. In addition, those employed by the previous de facto authorities after June 2007 have not received regular payments for months, and their status remains undefined. These include some 10,000 personnel in the education and health sectors, who perform vital social services for the population. This is in addition to several thousand civil police officers and members of the security apparatus. This situation is not tenable and threatens the operational capacity of central government institutions to implement early recovery and reconstruction programs. The consolidation of the public administration and service provision will further be complicated by the immediate impact of the assault, which resulted in the destruction of public buildings, along with government equipment and vehicles. 3.4.2 Operational Capacity of Local Government Institutions Municipalities are direct providers of essential daily services to their citizens and as such play a key role in recovery and reconstruction efforts. Municipalities to a large degree depend on revenues for services and municipal fees and taxes. In impoverished Gaza, however, citizens are not able to pay these service fees and taxes. As a result, municipal personnel have not received regular payments for months, and currently only core personnel is reporting to work. While conditions vary slightly between municipalities, the operational capacity of municipalities has been compromised during the most critical period. Especially in the current recovery and reconstruction phase, it is vital that municipalities work at their maximum capacity. Municipalities have also suffered direct losses. Municipal facilities and equipment have been destroyed and damaged throughout Gaza, though Rafah, Beit Lahia, and Gaza City incurred most of the damages. These damages further undermine the operational capacity of the affected municipalities.
41 3.4.3 Rule of Law and Human Rights The weeks of shelling and bombardment have compromised rule of law and human rights in Gaza beyond the assault. Law enforcement infrastructure, courts, prosecution departments, and family courts, as well as the only women’s shelter were also destroyed or damaged. The Palestinian Bar Association lost eight of its lawyers. While enforcement capacities have been weakened, protection needs have increased substantially, including at IDP centers. Considering the massive loss of lives and property and the corresponding need to find alternative shelter, it is expected that rule of law institutions will be confronted with a strong increase in caseloads related to land, property, and housing rights, as well as with personal status, heritage, and custody issues. The disproportional killing of civilians and the massive destruction of civilian infrastructure all point out to serious violations of International Humanitarian Law by Israel. Human rights organizations based in Gaza and the West Bank have mobilized their resources and are cooperating in documenting and investigating violations of International Humanitarian Law. These activities are vital for ensuring accountability and need to be conducted at the very early stage, at times ahead of the removal of rubble and other damages. 3.4.4 Implementation and Coordination As noted above, widespread destruction and government transitions have impacted the capacity and resources of the Government. There is a need to upgrade the operational capacity of central government institutions to implement this Plan.
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Page 9 and 10: 7 State of Palestine ACKNOWLEDGMENT
Page 11 and 12: 9 Gaza’s private sector has suffe
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Page 27 and 28: 25 2.3.3 Reconstruction Timeframe:
Page 29 and 30: 27 Beyond the right of Palestinians
Page 47 and 48: 45 Longer-term assistance projects
Page 49 and 50: 47 4.1.4 Civil Society, Community-B
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Page 53 and 54: 51 A joint program for early recove
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Page 61 and 62: 59 The work of these committees wil
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Page 71 and 72: 69 6.2 Summary of Recovery and Reco
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