National Early Recovery and Reconstruction Plan for Gaza 2014-2017_FINAL...
National Early Recovery and Reconstruction Plan for Gaza 2014-2017_FINAL...
National Early Recovery and Reconstruction Plan for Gaza 2014-2017_FINAL...
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The <strong>National</strong> <strong>Early</strong> <strong>Recovery</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reconstruction</strong> <strong>Plan</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>Gaza</strong> <strong>2014</strong><br />
SECTION 3: GAZA RAPID ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES AND NEEDS<br />
3.4 Governance Sector<br />
A functional <strong>and</strong> unified public administration under the <strong>National</strong> Consensus Government is pivotal to the success of the<br />
recovery <strong>and</strong> reconstruction plan, to stabilizing <strong>Gaza</strong>, <strong>and</strong> to providing services to its citizens. Within the period of this <strong>Plan</strong>,<br />
the Government, in parallel to leading <strong>and</strong> implementing the recovery <strong>and</strong> reconstruction ef<strong>for</strong>t, will need to assume effective<br />
authority <strong>and</strong> sole governmental responsibilities in <strong>Gaza</strong>; consolidate authority over ministries <strong>and</strong> Government agencies <strong>and</strong><br />
reintegrate them with national institutions; harmonize <strong>and</strong> rationalize the civil service in <strong>Gaza</strong>; <strong>and</strong> gradually assume security<br />
responsibilities as part of a comprehensive security sector re<strong>for</strong>m, starting with the assumption of policing responsibilities under<br />
the authority of the Government to maintain civic law <strong>and</strong> order.<br />
The scale of destruction <strong>and</strong> massive displacement as a result of the Israeli assault could potentially lead to destabilized security,<br />
if immediate relief <strong>and</strong> early recovery are not provided adequately. Accordingly, the first objective in the short-term is to ensure<br />
the operations of central <strong>and</strong> local government institutions <strong>for</strong> relief, early recovery, <strong>and</strong> reconstruction of <strong>Gaza</strong>. Achieving this<br />
will require a temporary solution <strong>for</strong> the personnel engaged by the previous de facto authorities post-June 2007 who have not<br />
received regular payments <strong>for</strong> a prolonged period of up to one year. This temporary mechanism will be limited in time <strong>and</strong><br />
function in parallel to beginning the process of harmonization <strong>and</strong> rationalization of the civil service, aimed at determining the<br />
retention <strong>and</strong> retraining of existing civil servants who are not currently in active duty <strong>and</strong> the possible integration of personnel<br />
who were recruited over the past seven years by the previous de-facto authorities, following the determination of their status.<br />
3.4.1 Operational Capacity of Central Government Institutions<br />
The consolidation of the public administration under the authority of the <strong>National</strong> Consensus Government requires a careful<br />
examination of available modalities within the existing fiscal limitations of the budget. The civil service employees in <strong>Gaza</strong><br />
have not been able to assume their responsibilities yet <strong>and</strong> return to their work. In addition, those employed by the previous<br />
de facto authorities after June 2007 have not received regular payments <strong>for</strong> months, <strong>and</strong> their status remains undefined. These<br />
include some 10,000 personnel in the education <strong>and</strong> health sectors, who per<strong>for</strong>m vital social services <strong>for</strong> the population. This<br />
is in addition to several thous<strong>and</strong> civil police officers <strong>and</strong> members of the security apparatus. This situation is not tenable <strong>and</strong><br />
threatens the operational capacity of central government institutions to implement early recovery <strong>and</strong> reconstruction programs.<br />
The consolidation of the public administration <strong>and</strong> service provision will further be complicated by the immediate impact of the<br />
assault, which resulted in the destruction of public buildings, along with government equipment <strong>and</strong> vehicles.<br />
3.4.2 Operational Capacity of Local Government Institutions<br />
Municipalities are direct providers of essential daily services to their citizens <strong>and</strong> as such play a key role in recovery <strong>and</strong><br />
reconstruction ef<strong>for</strong>ts.<br />
Municipalities to a large degree depend on revenues <strong>for</strong> services <strong>and</strong> municipal fees <strong>and</strong> taxes. In impoverished <strong>Gaza</strong>, however,<br />
citizens are not able to pay these service fees <strong>and</strong> taxes. As a result, municipal personnel have not received regular payments<br />
<strong>for</strong> months, <strong>and</strong> currently only core personnel is reporting to work. While conditions vary slightly between municipalities, the<br />
operational capacity of municipalities has been compromised during the most critical period. Especially in the current recovery<br />
<strong>and</strong> reconstruction phase, it is vital that municipalities work at their maximum capacity.<br />
Municipalities have also suffered direct losses. Municipal facilities <strong>and</strong> equipment have been destroyed <strong>and</strong> damaged throughout<br />
<strong>Gaza</strong>, though Rafah, Beit Lahia, <strong>and</strong> <strong>Gaza</strong> City incurred most of the damages. These damages further undermine the operational<br />
capacity of the affected municipalities.