National Early Recovery and Reconstruction Plan for Gaza 2014-2017_FINAL...
National Early Recovery and Reconstruction Plan for Gaza 2014-2017_FINAL...
National Early Recovery and Reconstruction Plan for Gaza 2014-2017_FINAL...
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16<br />
The <strong>National</strong> <strong>Early</strong> <strong>Recovery</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Reconstruction</strong> <strong>Plan</strong> <strong>for</strong> <strong>Gaza</strong> <strong>2014</strong><br />
SECTION 1: Setting the Context<br />
between the West Bank <strong>and</strong> <strong>Gaza</strong> <strong>and</strong> all but eliminated <strong>Gaza</strong>’s export focused private sector. Today, only small shipments of<br />
selected products are permitted to other markets through donor-supported projects.<br />
The result is that real GDP per capita in <strong>Gaza</strong> has stayed largely stagnant since 1994, whilst real GDP per capita in the West Bank<br />
has more than doubled. <strong>Gaza</strong>’s contribution to Palestine’s total GDP has shrunk, from over a third in the mid-1990s to a quarter<br />
now. Pre-assault unemployment hit a staggering 45 percent, as compared to 16 percent in the West Bank, <strong>and</strong> was high as 70<br />
percent amongst <strong>Gaza</strong>’s youth. Be<strong>for</strong>e the latest assault, poverty stood at 38 percent, close to double the level of the West Bank.<br />
A further 30,000 households are estimated to have fallen into poverty as a result of the latest assault.<br />
In this context, <strong>Gaza</strong>’s recovery <strong>and</strong> reconstruction must address not only the immediate economic impact of the assault but also<br />
the preexisting structural challenges inhibiting <strong>Gaza</strong>’s development.<br />
Yet, the Government’s room <strong>for</strong> maneuver to address these issues directly is limited. Despite fiscal re<strong>for</strong>ms <strong>and</strong> improvements,<br />
the Government remains reliant on donor support to meet the budget deficit <strong>and</strong> fund development projects. Additional<br />
spending <strong>for</strong> recovery <strong>and</strong> reconstruction will put significant fiscal pressure on the budget, at a time when donor flows have<br />
been steadily declining, falling by 30 percent since 2008. However, since revenues from <strong>Gaza</strong> in the short term will not be able<br />
to meet more than a small fraction of the additional expenditure – in 2013, only 3 percent of total Government revenues were<br />
collected in <strong>Gaza</strong>, as compared to 43 percent of budget expenditures there - the Government has no option but to look to its<br />
partners to support the recovery <strong>and</strong> reconstruction ef<strong>for</strong>t.<br />
FIGURE 1: GDP <strong>and</strong> Real GDP Growth (USD m, %)<br />
FIGURE 1: GDP <strong>and</strong> Real GDP Growth (USD m, %) <br />
Figure 2: Real GDP per Capita (USD) <br />
Figure 2: Real GDP per Capita (USD)<br />
14000 <br />
20.0 <br />
4000 <br />
12000 <br />
15.0 <br />
3500 <br />
10000 <br />
10.0 <br />
3000 <br />
8000 <br />
6000 <br />
4000 <br />
2000 <br />
0 <br />
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 <br />
West Bank GDP <strong>Gaza</strong> GDP Real GDP Growth rate in WB&G <br />
5.0 <br />
0.0 <br />
-‐5.0 <br />
-‐10.0 <br />
-‐15.0 <br />
2500 <br />
2000 <br />
1500 <br />
1000 <br />
500 <br />
0 <br />
1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 <br />
Per Capita GDP in West Bank Per Capita GDP in <strong>Gaza</strong> <br />
SOURCE: World Bank Analysis