14.11.2014 Views

Authors Iain Begg | Gabriel Glöckler | Anke Hassel ... - The Europaeum

Authors Iain Begg | Gabriel Glöckler | Anke Hassel ... - The Europaeum

Authors Iain Begg | Gabriel Glöckler | Anke Hassel ... - The Europaeum

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

financial institutions. More recently, the Commission’s proposal for an<br />

EU-wide fiscal stimulus has been shot down by finance ministers who<br />

insist on national measures, which, at most, should be aligned to an EU<br />

wide “menu of options.”<br />

Financial crisis was special, other policy areas<br />

are different<br />

<strong>The</strong> nature of the financial system – its increasing interconnectedness<br />

across borders, and its fundamental importance for the functioning<br />

of the modern market economy – mark it out as a special sector of the<br />

economy. Financial globalisation in general, and European financial<br />

integration in particular, created increasing vulnerabilities and mutual<br />

dependencies between financial institutions, markets and infrastructures<br />

across national borders. In addition, the contagion effects created by<br />

complex structured finance products that are capable of transferring risk<br />

across financial institutions and markets, and the immediate impact of<br />

systemic pressures across countries all implied that the fall-out of financial<br />

market pressures or the failure of a systemically important institution<br />

in one country was rapidly felt across other countries. <strong>The</strong> result was a<br />

congruence of direct and indirect pressures on policymakers to (re)act,<br />

and to do so in a coordinated manner. Incidentally, similarly common<br />

shocks in other sectors that seemingly affect all member countries equally<br />

do not inescapably engender similar pan-European responses. <strong>The</strong> debate<br />

over the EU ambitions on climate change (and, crucially, their financing)<br />

provides a case in point. Precisely because financial markets are “special”,<br />

the European cooperation experience from the ongoing crisis cannot be<br />

generalised.<br />

Crisis showed limits of European solidarity<br />

<strong>The</strong> various government and central bank actions to stem the detrimental<br />

impact of the financial crisis, while purportedly demonstrating the<br />

capacity of the euro area – and other advanced economies – to look after<br />

themselves, also revealed the limits of the willingness to extend such<br />

solidarity to other parts of the EU, notably the new Member States. <strong>The</strong><br />

slow response in extending assistance to countries in particular distress,<br />

such as Hungary, Latvia, Bulgaria, Poland, but also EEA member Iceland,<br />

and the insistence on joint actions with other international institutions<br />

(like the IMF), clearly displayed that the scope and depth of European<br />

cooperation has its limits.<br />

All these arguments relate, mainly, to the supply side of coordinated<br />

policy responses at EU or euro area level, which shows that this supply<br />

is evidently limited. It is, however, reasonable to forecast that demand<br />

Chapter 3 – <strong>Gabriel</strong> Glöckler 57

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!