Authors Iain Begg | Gabriel Glöckler | Anke Hassel ... - The Europaeum
Authors Iain Begg | Gabriel Glöckler | Anke Hassel ... - The Europaeum
Authors Iain Begg | Gabriel Glöckler | Anke Hassel ... - The Europaeum
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egulatory and supervisory differences, harmonising supervisory<br />
standards and reigning on discordant national supervisors, the ESFS<br />
could gradually mature into a powerful EU-wide regulator.<br />
<strong>The</strong> ECB as macro-supervisor<br />
A second alternative would be to assign supervisory powers to the ESCB,<br />
an option compatible with EU Treaty provisions. This would also allow<br />
the ECB to better pursue the parallel task of financial stability. Article<br />
105.6 of the EU Treaty provides the possibility of transferring prudential<br />
supervision of banks and other financial institutions (except for the<br />
insurance industry) to the ECB. In such an event the ECB should be<br />
assigned full powers of macro supervision. <strong>The</strong> ECB would not become<br />
the sole supervisor of banks but act “within a single institution” with<br />
national market supervisors and central banks so that broader financial<br />
stability supervision is combined with the day-to-day oversight of<br />
individual banks. 18 <strong>The</strong> distinction between macro and micro-supervision<br />
is necessary in order to comply with the subsidiarity principle. From the<br />
ECB’s standpoint, the macro-prudential authority has to have access to<br />
micro-prudential information and vice versa; an exchange of information<br />
that can be better achieved within a single institution. 19 <strong>The</strong> ECB for its<br />
part would be willing to play a role in micro-prudential supervision as well<br />
but nobody should expect it to supervise markets.<br />
One obvious weakness with this option is that it is not very favourable for<br />
countries, like the UK, who are not in the Eurozone. An additional<br />
weakness of the solution of assigning supervisory functions to the ECB<br />
according to article 105.6 is that the Treaty explicitly delimits the ECB’s<br />
new supervisory role to “specific tasks” related to banking supervision –<br />
excluding the insurance sector. This represents an inferior arrangement<br />
when compared to a full “blanket” supervisory authority which covers the<br />
entire financial system.<br />
Regulatory interventions for<br />
promoting financial stability<br />
Regulatory and supervisory policies have a major impact on the size and<br />
nature of the information asymmetries involved in the functioning of<br />
financial markets. Disclosure requirements for securities, regulatory<br />
standards for bank capitalisation, and supervisory practices, all influence<br />
and seek to improve the risk/return characteristics of investment. 20 In<br />
principle, not only banks but any financial institution subject to systemic<br />
risk must be covered by regulation. Highly leveraged hedge funds when<br />
moving together as a herd generate systemic risks, thus requiring macro-<br />
Chapter 2 – George Pagoulatos 39