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Authors Iain Begg | Gabriel Glöckler | Anke Hassel ... - The Europaeum

Authors Iain Begg | Gabriel Glöckler | Anke Hassel ... - The Europaeum

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Target financial stability<br />

<strong>The</strong> EMU architecture was designed with the objective of safeguarding<br />

price stability in the Eurozone, leaving financial stability aside. After a<br />

long period of excess financial liquidity flowing in and out of European<br />

financial markets, asset price inflation, imprudent accumulation of<br />

financial risks and over reliance of financial institutions on leverage, this<br />

omission invites renewed interest.<br />

While the euro has crucially contributed to economic and financial<br />

stability, 1 financial stability as such has been absent from the<br />

macroeconomic models used by the ESCB, and EU central banks in<br />

general. Several economists and institutions, including the Bank for<br />

International Settlements, have long proposed the need for central banks<br />

to target asset price inflation as well, with an eye on preventing asset price<br />

bubbles. Moreover, as Paul de Grauwe suggests, since financial stability<br />

today also depends on avoiding deep recessions, stabilising the business<br />

cycle should also be of concern to the central bank. 2 This might be<br />

departing from the Maastricht-prescribed exclusive ECB focus on<br />

monetary stability, a field where the ECB has so far demonstrated success.<br />

Recent financial developments, however, have shown that a narrow<br />

definition of central bank success as confined to price stability is not<br />

enough. <strong>The</strong>re is a case to be made for the ECB and other central banks to<br />

follow financial sector asset price movements more closely.<br />

<strong>The</strong> “regulatory philosophy” applied on the eve of the crisis has been<br />

shown to be wrong: a systemic crisis can still occur even if bank supervisors<br />

ensured individual banks were safe. <strong>The</strong>re is now a shift in emphasis from<br />

micro to macro-prudential regulation, focusing on systemic stability. 3 <strong>The</strong><br />

de Larosière Group 4 has recommended setting up a European Systemic<br />

Risk Council (ESRC), under the ECB, comprising EU-level committees of<br />

financial and banking supervisors and the Commission, with the task of<br />

gathering information on all macro-prudential risks in the EU, and<br />

working closely with the IMF, the Financial Stability Forum and G20 at a<br />

global level. In late September 2009 the Commission proposed the<br />

creation of a European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) along the lines<br />

recommended by de Larosière.<br />

Some believe it is time to revise the Treaty of the EU, to grant supervisory<br />

authority and formal lender of last resort capability to the ECB, the only<br />

institution in the Eurozone able to issue unlimited amounts of a global<br />

reserve currency. Article 105.6 of the EU Treaty provides the possibility of<br />

transferring Eurozone financial supervision (except for the insurance<br />

32<br />

After the crisis: A new socio-economic settlement for the EU

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