Authors Iain Begg | Gabriel Glöckler | Anke Hassel ... - The Europaeum

areas such as research and innovation; mobility within higher education;
cross-border energy infrastructure necessary for energy security and
low-carbon transition, alongside flagship social policy initiatives. One
further possibility is that if the crisis is prolonged, demand may grow for a
Europe-wide recovery plan based on investment in low-carbon transition,
research and skills. This might be financed by the issuing of Europe- or
Euro-wide bonds.
A new EU political economy?
At one level, the discourse on the future of Europe will take the shape of
a reversion to a familiar pro- or anti-European debate. Lining up on one
side are those who feel that in some way the EU offers a shield against
the disruptive forces of global capitalism, potentially far wider and thicker
than the diminished role that the nation state can now offer: the logic that
persuaded the Irish to vote a second time in favour of the Lisbon Treaty and
Iceland to apply for EU membership. Ranged against this position are the
populists on both the right and left, who see European integration as part
of the problem, not the solution. They will almost certainly see a stronger
nation-state as a consequence of the crisis, whether in protecting jobs at
home, controlling migrant labour, or supporting national businesses in
trouble. In addition, there is the possibility that some of the newer member
states may feel “let down” by the EU – if they are left to themselves and
denied the possibility of early entry to the Euro. This could strengthen
anti-EU feeling in some member states unless the EU acts with greater
boldness and vision, though this remains highly uncertain.
Among pro-Europeans, the lessons of the crisis may be interpreted quite
differently. For ease of understanding these pro-European reactions can
be placed into four distinct camps, which to an extent overlap.
n First, “integrationist interventionists” will see the crisis as an
opportunity and find support for their instincts in the argument,
popular on the left, that the crisis brings back the case for a wide
range of public intervention in the economy, not just a need for
tighter financial regulation but Euro-Keynesianism and more
interventionist industrial policies.
n In contrast, “economic liberals” who regard the Single Market
as a central EU achievement, will only be “market-conditional
integrationists”. They will want to consider whether and how EU
institutions need to be strengthened as an agency of liberalisation,
both internally and in the wider world, in order to better defend,
Chapter 1 – Roger Liddle 25