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7 This idea is not new. The 1970 Werner Report said that in a European monetary union the margins within which fiscal policy should move each year should be decided at the community level. The McDougall Report (1977) also advocated a partial centralisation of the budget, suggesting that a monetary union would need a common budget that would cover at least 5% of the European GDP. In spite of these initial references, the Delors Report (1989) –on which the Maastricht Treaty was finally based– abandoned these ideas and embraced what is known as the Brussels-Frankfurt consensus. See Mulas-Granados (2009) for a deeper discussion on the underlying economic theories on which this consensus was based, and how alternative theories are questioning the validity of this approach in current times. 8 See for example the joint statement made by Zapatero and Sarkozy at the end of the summit held on April 24, 2009. (http://euobserver.com/9/28030) 9 See Tabellini and Wyplosz (2006) for a series of proposals to improve supply-side policy coordination. They argue in favour of the creation of independent agencies that can be isolated from lobbies to move forward in the integration of financial markets, services, public utilities and energy. Nevertheless, they think that for labour market reform, the Commission should take a stronger coordination role to push national authorities forward, but reject the possibility of creating a European Employment Agency, as suggested by Saint-Paul and Wasmer (1999). 10 Murray, A. (2006), “Closing the Delivery Deficit: the Future of Economic Governance in Europe”, Centre for European Reform (mimeo). 11 Mulas-Granados, C. (2009), “Improving Economic Governance in the EU”, Real Instituto Elcano, ARI 12/2009. 12 For a new proposal of ranking to evaluate the performance of different countries in different Lisbon reforms, see Ioannou et al (2008). 13 To do this, the following resolution has been added: “Where it is established, … that the economic policies of a Member State are not consistent with the broad guidelines…or that they risk jeopardising the proper functioning of economic and monetary union, the Commission may address a warning to the Member State concerned.” 14 (Pisani-Ferry and Sapir, 2009) 15 Pagoulatos (in an earlier version of his chapter in this volume) proposed the introduction of a European Financial Supervisory Agency under a new European Systems of Financial Supervision (ESFS). According to his proposal, and similar to the DeLarosiere Report: “The ESFS would supervise the pan-European financial groups, smaller financial institutions remaining under the jurisdiction of national supervisory authorities.” 16 De LaRosiere, J. (2009), The High Level Group on Financial Supervision. Report released on February 25th, 2009. http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf 17 Three new European authorities would be set up to replace the existing three pan-EU committees of banking, insurance and securities supervisors known as CEBS, CEIOPS and CESR. Colleges of supervisors would be set up for all major cross-border institutions. 18 The Turner Review stated in its 27th point that: “a new European institution should be created which will be an independent authority with regulatory powers, a standard setter and overseer in the area of supervision, and will be significantly involved in macro-prudential analysis”. See TURNER, L. (2009), The Turner Review: a Regulatory Response to the Global Banking Crisis. www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf Chapter 6 1 This is a revised, much shortened and fully updated version of a paper entitled “Ambitious, but not (very) much needed and poorly equipped: The Lisbon strategy reconsidered”, which was presented at a high-level roundtable discussion on the future of the European Union, organized by the Policy Network in association with the European Institute of the London School of Economics and ELIAMEP and held on October 17th and 18th, 2008, in the island of Hydra in Greece. That paper is available at http://www.eliamep.gr/en/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/policynetwork-hydra.pdf. 2 See van Ark, Bart, Mary O’ Mahony and Marcel P. Timmer (2008) “The Productivity Gap between Europe and the United States: Trends and Causes”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 22 (1), 25-44; and also Crafts, Nicholas and Gianni Toniolo (2008) “European Economic Growth 1950-2005: An Overview”, CEPR Discussion Paper No 6863; and Daveri, Francesco (2004) “Why is there a productivity problem in the EU?”, CEPS Working Document No 205. 3 Commission EC – DG ECFIN (2009a) “Impact of the current economic and financial crisis on potential output”, European Economy/ Occasional Paper No 49. 4 See Nicoletti, Giuseppe and Stefano Scarpetta (2005) “Regulation and Economic Performance: Product Market Reforms and Productivity in the OECD”, OECD Economics Department Working Paper No 460; and Scarpetta, Stefano, Philip Hemmings, Thierry Tressel and Jaejoon Woo (2002) “The Role of Policy and Institutions for Productivity and Firm Dynamics: Evidence from Micro and Industry Data”, OECD Working Paper No 329. 5 Prescott, Edward (2004) “Why Do Americans Work So Much More than Europeans?”, Federal Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, 28 (1), 2-13. 6 Alesina, Alberto, Edward Glaeser and Bruce Sacerdote (2005) “Work and Leisure in the US and Europe: Why So Different”, NBER Macroeconomic Annual, 1-64. 7 Blanchard, Olivier (2004) “The Economic Future of Europe”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 18(4), 3-26. 166 After the crisis: A new socio-economic settlement for the EU
8 Alesina, Alberto and Francesco Giavazzi (2006) The Future of Europe: Reform or Decline. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 9 Eichengreen, Barry (2007) The European Economy Since 1945: Coordinated Capitalism and Beyond. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. 10 Alesina, Alberto, Edward Glaeser and Bruce Sacerdote (2001), “Why Doesn’t the US Have a European- Style Welfare System?”, NBER Working Paper No 8524; and Alesina, Alberto and Elianna La Ferrara (2002), “Preferences for Redistribution in the Land of Opportunities”, CEPR Discussion Paper No 3155. 11 Ferrera, Maurizio (2008) “The European Welfare State: Golden Achievements, Silver Prospects”, West European Politics, 31 (1-2), 82-107. 12 Weyerstrass, Klaus, Johannes Jaenicke, Reinhard Neck, Gottfried Haber, Ban van Aarle, Koen Schoors, Niko Gobbin, Peter Claeys (2006) “Economic spillover and policy coordination in the Euro Area”, European Economy/ Economic Paper No 246; and Commission EC (2007) “Commission Staff Working Document accompanying COM (2007) 666 final ‘Raising productivity growth: key messages from the European Competitiveness Report 2007’”, SEC (2007) 1444. 13 Debrun, Xavier and Jean Pisani-Ferry (2006) “Economic reforms in the Euro Area: Is There a Common Agenda?”, BRUEGEL Policy Contribution, Issue 5, November. 14 Begg, Iain (2008) “Is There a Convincing Rationale for the Lisbon Strategy?”, in Kenneth Armstrong, Iain Begg and Jonathan Zeitlin, “JCMS Symposium: EU Governance After Lisbon”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 46 (2), 427-435. 15 Debrun, Xavier and Jean Pisani-Ferry (2006) “Economic reforms in the Euro Area: Is There a Common Agenda?”, BRUEGEL Policy Contribution, Issue 5, November. 16 For example see Immergut, Ellen, Karen Anderson and Isabelle Schulze (2007) The Handbook of West European Pension Politics. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press; and Armingeon, Klaus and Nathalie Giger (2008) “Conditional Punishment: A Comparative Analysis of the Electoral Consequences of Welfare State Retrenchment in OECD Nations, 1980-2003”, West European Politics, 31 (3), 558-580. 17 See Weaver, Kent (1986) “The Politics of Blame Avoidance”, Journal of Public Policy, 6 (4), 371-398; and Pierson, Paul (1996) “The New Politics of the Welfare State”, World Politics, 48 (January), 143-179. 18 Deeg, Richard (2007) “Complementarity and institutional change in capitalist systems”, Journal of European Public Policy, 14 (4), 611-630. 19 Hall, Peter and David Soskice (eds.), (2001) Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. 20 Deeg, Richard (2007) “Complementarity and institutional change in capitalist systems”, Journal of European Public Policy, 14 (4), 611-630. 21 See Schmidt, Vivien (2008) “European Political Economy: Labour Out, State Back In, Firm to the Fore”, West European Politics, 31 (1-2), 302-320. 22 Blanchard, Olivier and Francesco Giavazzi (2003) “Macroeconomic Effects of Regulation and Deregulation in Goods and Labor Markets”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118 (3), 879-909. 23 Heidenreich, Martin and Gabriele Bischoff (2008) “The Open Method of Co-ordination: A Way to the Europeanization of Social and Employment Policies”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 46 (3), 497-532. 24 Meseguer, Covadonga (2003) “Learning and Economic Policy Choices: a Bayesian approach”, EUI/ RSCAS Working Paper No 5. 25 McNamara, Kathleen (2002) “Rational Fictions: Central Bank Independence and the Social Logic of Delegation”, West European Politics, 25(1), 47-76. 26 Algan, Yann and Pierre Cahuc (2006) “Civic Attitudes and the Design of Labour Market Institutions: Which Countries Can Implement the Danish Flexicurity Model?”, ΙΖA Discussion Paper No 1928; and Bovenberg, A. Lans and Coen Teulings (2008) “Rhineland Exit?”, CEPR Discussion Paper No 6036. 27 Rodrik, Dani (2008) “The New Development Economics: We Shall Experiment, but How Shall We Learn?”, paper prepared for the Brookings Development Conference, May 29-30, 2008. 28 This section draws heavily on Koutsiaras 2008 and 2010. 29 Begg, Iain (2006) “Lisbon relaunched. What has changed? Is it working better?”, Special CEPS Report, December; Begg, Iain (2007) Lisbon II, Two Years on: An Assessment of the Partnership for Growth and Jobs”, Special CEPS Report, July; and also Commission EC (2007) “Opportunities, access and solidarity: towards a new social vision for the 21st century Europe”, COM (2007) 726 final. 30 Dew-Becker, Ian and Robert Gordon (2008) “The Role of Labour Market Changes in the Slowdown of European Productivity Growth”, CEPR Discussion Paper No 6722. 31 A summary of reforms is briefly taken in Begg, Iain, Juraj Draxler and Jurgen Mortensen (2007) “Can a Global Europe be a Social Europe?”, Draft Final Report, Study for the Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities of the European Commission, CEPS: pp. 94-96 32 Commission EC (2006) Employment in Europe 2006. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities: ch 2. End notes/references 167
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Authors Iain Begg | Gabriel Glöckl
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Published in 2009 by Policy Network
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4 After the crisis: A new socio-eco
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6 After the crisis: A new socio-eco
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Simona Milio is associate director
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Chapter 10 Simona Milio ...........
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Before the crash: the EU as a parti
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liberalisation. The City of London
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of the Financial Services Action Pl
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confidence and world trade, to whic
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following the ECJ’s controversial
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signals are in place to promote a n
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need to be constructed to create ac
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or indeed re-impose, what they rega
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Markets with rules The overall conc
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30 After the crisis: A new socio-ec
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Target financial stability The EMU
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Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemb
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mortgage banks and the insurance se
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financial market rules. The ESFS au
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prudential regulation - though only
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initiatives vis-à-vis ratings agen
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Even if membership in a monetary un
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emained relatively contained to spe
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The second channel of functional sp
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But even so, the depth and intensit
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governance in the EU and the euro a
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in the EU show, authorities at the
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factors will remain prevalent and b
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centralised decision-maker. Similar
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(GNI), the interests of the member
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terms only very slowly and as a per
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policy proposal asks itself what th
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ensure that a ceiling is put on the
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Reform of EU expenditure Spending 4
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The medium-term financial framework
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unanimity. The need to obtain the c
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therefore, was weakening the Europe
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for the signing of the strict and d
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Since then, member states have name
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in the world monetary system. It al
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a Treaty that not only ignores trad
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Firstly, they should include policy
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emanate from demographic trends. Ho
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Furthermore, the Lisbon agenda may
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Strengthening, if not really crafti
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incentives in the welfare schemes a
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security, yet at a lower cost than
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102 After the crisis: A new socio-e
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asis only in the 1990s, and over th
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in an increasingly global age the
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So what kind of social role for the
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effective common policies in areas
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help by ensuring a thorough audit a
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irrespectively of benefit and costs
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Authors Iain Begg | Gabriel GlÃ¶ckler | Anke Hassel ... - The Europaeum

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