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Authors Iain Begg | Gabriel Glöckler | Anke Hassel ... - The Europaeum

Authors Iain Begg | Gabriel Glöckler | Anke Hassel ... - The Europaeum

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Energy and carbon use depend on four components (the so-called Kaya<br />

identity): population, GDP per capita, the energy intensity of GDP and the<br />

carbon intensity of energy use. <strong>The</strong> first component is usually assumed to<br />

be exogenous to policymaking, and it is also salient that the bulk of the<br />

projected population growth in the coming decades will be in low income<br />

countries. If only for this reason, lower per capita growth rates – the<br />

second component of the identity - would imply that the poor of the world<br />

would be condemned to remain in poverty, so that any attempt to curb<br />

growth would be contrary to social justice, not to mention incompatible<br />

with commitments to development in the Millennium Development<br />

Goals.<br />

It is therefore in the energy intensity of GDP and in the carbon intensity of<br />

energy that the scope for change lies. It is well established that energy<br />

consumption and GDP are strongly correlated: as countries grow, so too<br />

does their consumption of energy for transport, production, heating and<br />

cooling, and other quality of life purposes. <strong>The</strong>se rates of consumption<br />

have increased steadily over the last two hundred years, especially for the<br />

countries which have grown most, and, today, the richest countries<br />

consume amounts of energy several times those of the poorer countries.<br />

<strong>The</strong> solution is, again, obvious: the relationship between GDP and energy<br />

used needs to be “decoupled”. <strong>The</strong> trouble, though, is that the countries<br />

which, over the next fifty years, are expected to add most to GDP (above<br />

all the most populous emerging economies in Asia) tend to see economic<br />

development as the primary goal and will be reluctant to forgo growth in<br />

the interests of lower emissions.<br />

Even though demand for energy has proved not to be very responsive to<br />

price changes, rising prices will have some effects, notably on the wellbeing<br />

of low income households. For public policy, the result may be calls<br />

for compensatory social transfers, especially for social groups at risk of<br />

“fuel poverty”. To the extent that rising oil prices create windfall gains for<br />

government revenues, such compensation is affordable. Energy mix is<br />

partly about whether to favour renewables or nuclear power, but can also<br />

refer to using hydrocarbons in ways that emit less. In all of this there are<br />

tricky trade-offs: nuclear safety against the uncertainty of renewables; the<br />

unintended consequence that bio-fuels crowd out food production, raising<br />

the price for basic foodstuffs, and so on.<br />

But it is also clear that sizeable commitments of public resources will be<br />

needed to develop the necessary technologies of the future, such as carbon<br />

capture and sequestration, which will require burden-sharing at the global<br />

156<br />

After the crisis: A new socio-economic settlement for the EU

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