Authors Iain Begg | Gabriel Glöckler | Anke Hassel ... - The Europaeum
Authors Iain Begg | Gabriel Glöckler | Anke Hassel ... - The Europaeum Authors Iain Begg | Gabriel Glöckler | Anke Hassel ... - The Europaeum
average job tenure figures in the EU) with universal income protection. If applied to countries with an underdeveloped vocational training system, such policies would lose their “security” dimension and lead to social (and budget) un-sustainability. 23 If applied to CMEs, where high productivity depends also on labour protection from dismissal, such policies could also have the unintended consequence of triggering incentives to pursue cost-cutting strategies in lieu of a quality-competition strategy in mature industrial sectors leading to output and employment losses. The flexicurity experiment could dampen productivity and comparative advantage in sectors characterised by incremental innovation, without generating alternative sources of competitiveness. Upon closer inspection, however, there is little evidence to suggest that Danish labour-market practices are being transferred lock, stock and barrel to other EU member states. For example, Germany has reached increased flexicurity within its economy by flexibilising marginal jobs, mostly concentrated in the non-traded service sectors, and retaining protection at the core. A dual labour market might have detrimental effects on income distribution, 24 but it seems that this form of flexicurity can develop within a CME-type production regime. The Lisbon Strategy’s promotion of flexicurity reforms appears to be promising for a number of related reasons. First, it is an interesting attempt to unite the economic and social strands of economic reform. Second, it resonates with a deeply rooted conception of the European social model as a framework where a well-functioning market economy is combined with a high degree of social protection. Third, it illustrates the potential of the “openness” of the Lisbon Strategy in its capacity to foster policy solutions that coexist with country-specific models of capitalism, and divergent societal preferences (such as preferences for more or less leisure time, and differentiated rates of labour market participation among social cohorts). An overly general innovation policy While mainstreaming flexicurity provides a positive example of the EU’s ability to address socio-economic concerns, a counter-example comes from EU strategy for innovation. In September 2006, following the 2005 re-launch of the Lisbon treaty, the Commission issued a communication on “Putting knowledge into practice: A broad-based innovation strategy for the EU” in order to identifying EU-wide programmes to reach higher innovation rates. For example, the Commission argues that potential for innovation must be fostered by the intervention of public authorities. In 122 After the crisis: A new socio-economic settlement for the EU
particular, “Through the Open Method of Coordination the Commission will help to facilitate the modernisation and restructuring of education systems so that they provide the necessary competences to foster innovation”. 25 There are two ways to interpret this objective. A first interpretation would suggest that the Commission is arguing that the education systems within the EU should keep pace with the rapid technological changes that the world is experiencing, particular in the ITC sector. If this is the case, it is unclear what value added the EU could play apart from dispensing common sense to national policymakers, for example by calling for schools to be provided with computers. On the other hand, if this programme is suggesting that each member state should aim at endowing the population with the same kinds of skills, then this directly clashes with the logic of the VoC, and is likely to result in very little policy learning at all. As recalled earlier, patterns of innovations are one of the key aspects of divergence between LMEs and CMEs. This is not to say that one has more innovation capacity. Rather, because of their different institutional configurations, LMEs tend to favour radical innovation in products and processes, while less dynamic CMEs develop innovation patterns that express themselves in marginal, but steady, increments. 26 To offer stylised EU-focused evidence to corroborate this story, Figure 1 compares four EU countries: Germany and the UK are archetypal Coordinated Market and Liberal Market Economies respectively. Denmark and Sweden are more intermediate cases, with the former leaning towards the LME cluster, and the latter towards the CME cluster. These countries are the overall EU leaders in innovation (together with Finland), 27 and therefore they represent the model that other less dynamic countries should emulate. The bars in each graph show the industrial sectors in which those countries hold a strong comparative advantage. The bars identify the category of goods that are leaders in export performance within each country vis-à-vis all the other countries in the world. 28 The widest difference in comparative advantage is between Germany and the UK. They share a strong comparative advantage only in one category, i.e. power generating machinery and equipment (SITC 71), in which arguably both radical leaps of innovations and incremental small-scale improvements are likely to play a role. For the rest, Germany specialises in the production of goods such as metalworking machinery (SITC code 73), general industrial machinery Chapter 8 – Dermot Hodson and Marco Simoni 123
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average job tenure figures in the EU) with universal income protection. If<br />
applied to countries with an underdeveloped vocational training system,<br />
such policies would lose their “security” dimension and lead to social (and<br />
budget) un-sustainability. 23 If applied to CMEs, where high productivity<br />
depends also on labour protection from dismissal, such policies could<br />
also have the unintended consequence of triggering incentives to pursue<br />
cost-cutting strategies in lieu of a quality-competition strategy in mature<br />
industrial sectors leading to output and employment losses. <strong>The</strong> flexicurity<br />
experiment could dampen productivity and comparative advantage in<br />
sectors characterised by incremental innovation, without generating<br />
alternative sources of competitiveness.<br />
Upon closer inspection, however, there is little evidence to suggest that<br />
Danish labour-market practices are being transferred lock, stock and<br />
barrel to other EU member states. For example, Germany has reached<br />
increased flexicurity within its economy by flexibilising marginal jobs,<br />
mostly concentrated in the non-traded service sectors, and retaining<br />
protection at the core. A dual labour market might have detrimental<br />
effects on income distribution, 24 but it seems that this form of flexicurity<br />
can develop within a CME-type production regime.<br />
<strong>The</strong> Lisbon Strategy’s promotion of flexicurity reforms appears to be<br />
promising for a number of related reasons. First, it is an interesting<br />
attempt to unite the economic and social strands of economic reform.<br />
Second, it resonates with a deeply rooted conception of the European<br />
social model as a framework where a well-functioning market economy is<br />
combined with a high degree of social protection. Third, it illustrates the<br />
potential of the “openness” of the Lisbon Strategy in its capacity to foster<br />
policy solutions that coexist with country-specific models of capitalism,<br />
and divergent societal preferences (such as preferences for more or less<br />
leisure time, and differentiated rates of labour market participation<br />
among social cohorts).<br />
An overly general innovation policy<br />
While mainstreaming flexicurity provides a positive example of the EU’s<br />
ability to address socio-economic concerns, a counter-example comes<br />
from EU strategy for innovation. In September 2006, following the 2005<br />
re-launch of the Lisbon treaty, the Commission issued a communication<br />
on “Putting knowledge into practice: A broad-based innovation strategy<br />
for the EU” in order to identifying EU-wide programmes to reach higher<br />
innovation rates. For example, the Commission argues that potential for<br />
innovation must be fostered by the intervention of public authorities. In<br />
122<br />
After the crisis: A new socio-economic settlement for the EU