Authors Iain Begg | Gabriel Glöckler | Anke Hassel ... - The Europaeum
Authors Iain Begg | Gabriel Glöckler | Anke Hassel ... - The Europaeum Authors Iain Begg | Gabriel Glöckler | Anke Hassel ... - The Europaeum
in an increasingly global age the “subsidiarity test” cannot be just a choice between national and EU level, but rather between national, European and global action. The third obstacle and perhaps the most important in the long run, is the giant leap from 15 to 27 member states. The current crisis shows that the impact of enlargement on the prospects of European integration, and on Social Europe specifically, has been seriously underplayed. If today’s 27 member states had to start from scratch they would never reach the level of consensus and policy development of the social acquis: the crisis comes as a reminder of the striking resilience and achievements of European integration and welfare regimes, but also of the deep cleavage in political views, and of the radically different starting points and performance of EU economies. The real significance of the German Court ruling on the Lisbon Treaty is not legal but political: it signals the extent to which the biggest EU country is now as assertive of its national interests as any other. As I write this paper, amid increasing signs that the Eurozone is slowly sailing towards lukewarm recovery rather than great depression, some EU economies are thrilled by an earlier-than-expected return to growth, just as others suffer a crippling 20% contraction of their GDP. Some countries struggle to keep their unemployment rates below 5%, others would be very happy to have rates of three times this figure. From the employment rate of women and older workers to school drop-outs, one would struggle to find a relevant social indicator that doesn’t vary radically from country to country. Ignoring the impact of this diversity was probably politically necessary when doubts about the trade-off between EU widening and deepening would have been interpreted as unsubtle obstruction against enlargement; but today it would be disingenuous to assume that EU policies can be deepened no matter how many members join the club, or how diverse they are. The need for Social Europe today Looking at all these obstacles and constraints, one could be forgiven for seeking refuge in the safety of declamatory statements on Social Europe, long on good intentions and short on operational content: as how can Europe speak with one voice in the midst of the deepest economic crisis since its inception, when its 27 national economies, social situations and political realities sing such different tunes? And yet, as it seeks an exit to the crisis, the EU must find a social role, and a stronger one than in the past. 106 After the crisis: A new socio-economic settlement for the EU
The impact of the crisis The sudden arrival of the crisis has settled at least one argument: economics is not a predictive science. So we know little about the longterm impact of the crisis, or to what extent it forebodes a paradigm shift − but if there is one prediction about Europe in the next decade that is likely to come true, it is that elections will still be won and lost over jobs and pensions, and that therefore employment and social issues will still be at the core of public debate, at national and EU level. Ask European citizens from Riga to Athens what they expect from public authorities in these times of crisis, what the biggest challenges of our societies are, what would make Europe and its member states “fit for purpose” − and you know the answer you’re likely to get: keep people in work; raise the poor; and preserve the social services, pension and health systems of our rapidly ageing societies. Surveys consistently show that Europeans are strongly attached to the welfare state, and that the legitimacy of the EU in the eyes of its citizens depends largely on the preservation of the values, of the “social model” Europeans have built over the last 50 years. For EU citizens, if not for specialists, the current crisis sheds new light on the state of the Union, highlighting that, for the last twenty years, inequality in our societies has been steadily growing and that wages have grown more slowly than productivity; that de-regulation and market flexibility have not been sufficient in themselves to promote growth, competitiveness and employment; but also that strong social protection systems do not necessarily reduce individual incentives or the market’s ability to provide jobs: it is surely not a coincidence if the countries that are tackling the employment and social impact of the recession most effectively are also those with the strongest social protection regimes. The downturn has brought the spectre of rising public debt, higher income inequalities, lower labour participation, and increased labour segmentation and structural unemployment. Europe’s future depends on its capacity for reform and modernisation, on its willingness to innovate and embrace change – but none of this will be achieved if critiques of market openness and globalisation are ignored or brushed aside. Globalisation obviously has its losers: its benefits are spread while its costs are concentrated, and fears of globalisation and technological change may be exaggerated but they are nonetheless real and must be addressed, mainly by member states but also by the EU as a key facilitator of trade liberalisation. Chapter 7 – Xavier Prats-Monné 107
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<strong>The</strong> impact of the crisis<br />
<strong>The</strong> sudden arrival of the crisis has settled at least one argument:<br />
economics is not a predictive science. So we know little about the longterm<br />
impact of the crisis, or to what extent it forebodes a paradigm shift<br />
− but if there is one prediction about Europe in the next decade that is<br />
likely to come true, it is that elections will still be won and lost over jobs<br />
and pensions, and that therefore employment and social issues will still be<br />
at the core of public debate, at national and EU level.<br />
Ask European citizens from Riga to Athens what they expect from public<br />
authorities in these times of crisis, what the biggest challenges of our<br />
societies are, what would make Europe and its member states “fit for<br />
purpose” − and you know the answer you’re likely to get: keep people in<br />
work; raise the poor; and preserve the social services, pension and health<br />
systems of our rapidly ageing societies. Surveys consistently show that<br />
Europeans are strongly attached to the welfare state, and that the<br />
legitimacy of the EU in the eyes of its citizens depends largely on the<br />
preservation of the values, of the “social model” Europeans have built over<br />
the last 50 years.<br />
For EU citizens, if not for specialists, the current crisis sheds new light on<br />
the state of the Union, highlighting that, for the last twenty years, inequality<br />
in our societies has been steadily growing and that wages have grown<br />
more slowly than productivity; that de-regulation and market flexibility<br />
have not been sufficient in themselves to promote growth, competitiveness<br />
and employment; but also that strong social protection systems do not<br />
necessarily reduce individual incentives or the market’s ability to provide<br />
jobs: it is surely not a coincidence if the countries that are tackling the<br />
employment and social impact of the recession most effectively are also<br />
those with the strongest social protection regimes.<br />
<strong>The</strong> downturn has brought the spectre of rising public debt, higher income<br />
inequalities, lower labour participation, and increased labour segmentation<br />
and structural unemployment. Europe’s future depends on its capacity for<br />
reform and modernisation, on its willingness to innovate and embrace<br />
change – but none of this will be achieved if critiques of market openness<br />
and globalisation are ignored or brushed aside. Globalisation obviously<br />
has its losers: its benefits are spread while its costs are concentrated, and<br />
fears of globalisation and technological change may be exaggerated but<br />
they are nonetheless real and must be addressed, mainly by member states<br />
but also by the EU as a key facilitator of trade liberalisation.<br />
Chapter 7 – Xavier Prats-Monné 107
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