Authors Iain Begg | Gabriel Glöckler | Anke Hassel ... - The Europaeum
Authors Iain Begg | Gabriel Glöckler | Anke Hassel ... - The Europaeum Authors Iain Begg | Gabriel Glöckler | Anke Hassel ... - The Europaeum
asis only in the 1990s, and over the last ten years, with the European Employment Strategy and the Lisbon Strategy, the traditional regulatory approach has been abandoned in favour of the soft law of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC). In fact, the focus of Social Europe has shifted dramatically over time: it once stressed regulation as opposed to outcomes, whereas now it focuses on processes as opposed to substance – not surprisingly perhaps, given that all matters of process at 27 are a Herculean task in themselves. The cumulative result of a half-century of Social Europe is a panoply of legal, financial and policy instruments that are perhaps not entirely coherent but certainly not negligible either. Social Europe has many achievements to its credit − from focusing member states on labour market modernisation to establishing common objectives in the field of social inclusion and social protection, to a strong body of antidiscrimination legislation; it is challenged not in theory but in practice, by Polish plumbers and Laval’s Swedish electricians; not by differences over European values but by the starkly different realities of the enlarged Union; not by lack of common financial instruments but by the impact of the crisis on public finances. All these instruments of Social Europe, painstakingly built over 50 years and 6 successful enlargements, are now being put to the test by an unprecedented financial and economic crisis which is slowly turning into an employment and social one. Even if the most optimistic forecasts for recovery come true, unemployment and social exclusion will merit a place at the core of the EU policy and political agenda for years to come. This, at a time when constraints on public spending and therefore on the funding of national and EU policies will sharply increase, while the cost of not investing in the right employment social policies, in human capital and skills, would be dramatic given the key role of people and knowledge in Europe’s future prosperity. The limits of Social Europe Beyond exhortation and declamatory statements, Social Europe has its limits. When it comes to employment and social issues, national policies have greater political legitimacy and wider breadth and depth than the EU. And while the views of member states differ significantly, as the long debate over the Lisbon Treaty comes to an end there seems to be no scope for further transfer of legal and constitutional powers to the EU in the social field. The German Constitutional Court in its recent judgment on the Lisbon Treaty drew a clear line in the sand, stating that the competences 104 After the crisis: A new socio-economic settlement for the EU
of the EU in social matters have been reinforced by the Lisbon Treaty (article 3.3.1. and the new horizontal clause in art. 9 TFEU); that political initiatives and programmes give concrete shape to this legal framework; and(...) that this should be enough: in the future, “(…) the essential decisions in social policy must be made by the German legislative bodies on their own responsibility. In particular the securing of the individual’s livelihood (…) must remain a primary task of the member states (…). This corresponds to the legally and factually limited possibilities of the European Union for shaping structures of a social state”. But policies, not Treaties can address today’s EU challenges: beyond these constitutional limits, any discussion on the future of Social Europe should take into account three obstacles, which make consensus on policy particularly difficult and impose a limit to the social role of the EU. The first obstacle stems from the very nature of social policy. Forging a European approach on, say, energy security requires an analysis of complex economic realities and technical issues, a debate about common goals and a difficult compromise between national interests. Social Europe requires all of that – and still must make room for the expression of strong personal and cultural values, for redistribution and its vested interests, for ideology and political belief. Social policies, national or European, are about politics and well-being: their inherent subjectivity and political nature should not be underestimated. The second obstacle that makes Social Europe so elusive is that, on the one hand, social change is mostly internally driven and follows the patterns of different European welfare regimes; and on the other hand, the crisis and globalisation increase the demand for meaningful EU and international cooperation. For all the emphasis on globalisation, trade openness is neither the source of all happiness nor the cause of all evil, and the main challenges for Social Europe are only indirectly related to globalisation: maturing welfare provisions, low fertility and ageing, changing family structures and technologies. Social structures are changing − yet national social protection policies and public expenditure are still often organised around a stable nuclear family model, ignoring the impact of immigration, new family types, female unpaid work or life-long learning needs. The response of national governments and international organisations to the crisis has fallen short of expectations, not least because nation states remain the dominant players even as governments steadily lose control over information flows, technology, migratory patterns and indeed financial transactions. While EU achievements have been mostly internal, Chapter 7 – Xavier Prats-Monné 105
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asis only in the 1990s, and over the last ten years, with the European<br />
Employment Strategy and the Lisbon Strategy, the traditional regulatory<br />
approach has been abandoned in favour of the soft law of the Open Method<br />
of Coordination (OMC). In fact, the focus of Social Europe has shifted<br />
dramatically over time: it once stressed regulation as opposed to outcomes,<br />
whereas now it focuses on processes as opposed to substance – not<br />
surprisingly perhaps, given that all matters of process at 27 are a Herculean<br />
task in themselves.<br />
<strong>The</strong> cumulative result of a half-century of Social Europe is a panoply of<br />
legal, financial and policy instruments that are perhaps not entirely<br />
coherent but certainly not negligible either. Social Europe has many<br />
achievements to its credit − from focusing member states on labour<br />
market modernisation to establishing common objectives in the field of<br />
social inclusion and social protection, to a strong body of antidiscrimination<br />
legislation; it is challenged not in theory but in practice, by<br />
Polish plumbers and Laval’s Swedish electricians; not by differences over<br />
European values but by the starkly different realities of the enlarged<br />
Union; not by lack of common financial instruments but by the impact of<br />
the crisis on public finances.<br />
All these instruments of Social Europe, painstakingly built over 50 years<br />
and 6 successful enlargements, are now being put to the test by an<br />
unprecedented financial and economic crisis which is slowly turning into<br />
an employment and social one. Even if the most optimistic forecasts for<br />
recovery come true, unemployment and social exclusion will merit a place<br />
at the core of the EU policy and political agenda for years to come. This, at<br />
a time when constraints on public spending and therefore on the funding<br />
of national and EU policies will sharply increase, while the cost of not<br />
investing in the right employment social policies, in human capital and<br />
skills, would be dramatic given the key role of people and knowledge in<br />
Europe’s future prosperity.<br />
<strong>The</strong> limits of Social Europe<br />
Beyond exhortation and declamatory statements, Social Europe has its<br />
limits. When it comes to employment and social issues, national policies<br />
have greater political legitimacy and wider breadth and depth than the<br />
EU. And while the views of member states differ significantly, as the long<br />
debate over the Lisbon Treaty comes to an end there seems to be no scope<br />
for further transfer of legal and constitutional powers to the EU in the<br />
social field. <strong>The</strong> German Constitutional Court in its recent judgment on<br />
the Lisbon Treaty drew a clear line in the sand, stating that the competences<br />
104<br />
After the crisis: A new socio-economic settlement for the EU
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