TR Circular E-C058_9th LRT Conference_2003.pdf - Florida ...

364 Transportation Research Circular E-C058: 9th National Light Rail Transit Conference
Other Analytical Issues
The consumer behavior described above suggests that a much stronger case for rail transit in the
United States and Canada may be made than some previous studies have found. The first
comprehensive analysis, by Meyer et al. (23), could draw on current experience with high traffic
volumes in only one city, New York, and, for historically high traffic, on wartime conditions that
restricted automobile use. LRT systems were few and BRT an early experiment. This led to
overestimates of achievable capacity for BRT, especially for high (hypothetical) traffic volumes,
and underestimates of BRT costs relative to RRT. Overestimation of practical maximum
capacity leads to underestimation of capital and operating costs for a given traffic volume, and to
overstatement of the cost difference between modes. Meyer et al. placed the economic breakeven
point, the traffic level at which RRT has a total cost advantage, at a very high traffic level—
50,000 phd, well above the modal capacities implied by empirical data from the United States
and Canada. Pickrell (31) placed the BRT/HRT break-even point far above the levels that have
ever been achieved, anywhere, over a single lane or track—200,000–340,000 phd for a 10-mi
corridor, depending on HRT capital cost.
Various planning studies for specific corridors contain unrealistic assumptions regarding
supply parameters and the demand-supply-consumption relationship. Examples include
• Adelaide (Australia), Northeast Busway: estimated maximum capacity (32) implied
that tripling of peak service supply (from 60 to 180 vhd) would produce a 39% increase in PVO
(from 72 to 100 p/v). This is unlikely without substantial increases in demand factors (e.g.,
population and employment levels, road congestion, and fuel and CBD parking costs). With
PVO at the (then-) current level, the corresponding maximum volume (about 13,000 phd) would
fall nearly 28% short of the estimate.
• Los Angeles: examples below illustrate chronic overestimation of 1) PVO, and 2) offpeak
and reverse-direction ridership relative to peak-period, peak-direction traffic.
• Blue Line LRT: Parsons Brinckerhoff/Kaiser Engineers (33) assumed 175 p/v (6.4
p/m) to estimate peak capacity. Weekday ridership and maximum peak volume were forecast at
54,702 p/w and 2,668 phd, respectively.
• Eastside HRT (later planned as LRT): Los Angeles County Metropolitan
Transportation Authority (34) used “normal” and “maximum” PVO of 169 p/v (7.4 p/m) and 301
p/v (13.2 p/m) respectively. Weekday ridership and maximum peak volume were forecast at
65,902 p/w and 4,000 phd, respectively.
• Harbor Transitway BRT: peak capacity estimates assumed 66 p/v (5.4 p/m) for
standard and 96 p/v(5.2 p/m) for articulated buses, respectively (35). Implied peak-hour service
supply and passenger volumes were 80-125 vhd and 5,000–12,000 phd. These figures far exceed
the peak service levels, PVO, and passenger volumes carried to date (Table 1). Anticipated PVO
levels were 79% to 86% higher than observed on the El Monte Transitway, and anticipated peak
volumes were two to five times greater than carried by the El Monte facility (Table 1).
• Red Line HRT: in 1983, system capacity was estimated initially at 30,600 phd, based
on 170 p/v (7.4 p/m) (36). Weekday ridership and maximum peak volume were forecast at
376,375 p/w and 30,000 phd, respectively. Such assumptions were carried forward throughout
the planning process.
• New Jersey, Hudson-Bergen LRT: New Jersey Transit (37) forecast a maximum of
8,247 phd during the a.m. peak, carried aboard 30 vhd. This implied 275 p/v [9.8 p/m, given the