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TR Circular E-C058_9th LRT Conference_2003.pdf - Florida ...

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Demery and Higgins 363<br />

passengers (6.1 p/m) based on 76 seated passengers and four standees per square meter. This<br />

loading standard was based on (West) German experience (19).<br />

Levinson and St. Jacques (2) present “suggested bus passenger service volumes for<br />

planning purposes” of 7,500-10,125 phd, requiring 81-135 vhd. These figures, which imply 75-<br />

96 p/v and 6.1-7.9 p/m, are unrealistically high. The authors have found only one case since the<br />

crush-loading years of World War II where published data support an observed PVO exceeding<br />

4.8 p/m for any U.S. or Canadian bus service. This is 5.6 p/m for bus services on Hillside<br />

Avenue, Queens, New York City, circa 1962 (20).<br />

Boyd et al. (21) postulated 576 vhd to provide a “capacity” of 31,600 phd, implying PVO<br />

of 50 p/v. The supply level is nearly 300% greater than the maximum yet offered on any U.S. or<br />

Canadian BRT facility other than the Lincoln Tunnel with its unique CBD terminal. 7 Biehler<br />

(22) assumed PVO levels of 200 p/v for <strong>LRT</strong> and 100 p/v for articulated buses, well above those<br />

suggested by empirical data. Meyer et al. (23) postulated 79 seats per railcar, 50 seats per bus,<br />

and service levels sufficient to provide seats for all passengers. 8 The “no-standee” model<br />

underestimates peak vehicle occupancy, for RRT in particular, and therefore overestimates<br />

supply levels necessary to attract and move given traffic volumes. The capacity of a two-lane<br />

busway, based on observed highway-lane capacity, was projected at 480 vhd. This would require<br />

extraordinary preferential-lane measures involving multiple CBD streets or a large off-street<br />

terminal. RRT capacity figures, 320-720 vhd depending on line and terminal configuration, were<br />

based on theoretical maxima calculated by Lang and Soberman (24), and were not compared<br />

with actual operating experience. Much has been published in the nearly four decades since this<br />

pioneering study, but more recent studies do not include peak service supply and PVO details.<br />

Rubin and Moore (25) overestimate peak service supply and peak vehicle occupancy in<br />

egregious fashion for the El Monte Transitway in Los Angeles. The postulated theoretical<br />

maximum of 194,400 phd was based on 1) three-section double-articulated buses as used in<br />

Curitiba, Brazil; 2) peak service supply of 720 vhd; and 3) PVO of 270 p/v, or 11 p/m. The<br />

service supply level is entirely unrealistic without a large off-street terminal, the PVO level far<br />

exceeds those observed in the U.S. and Canada, and the estimated peak volume far exceeds<br />

levels achieved in actual service, anywhere.<br />

Performance evaluations of existing U.S. fixed-guideway facilities seldom consider<br />

supply issues, focusing exclusively on demand parameters and demand analysis. This curious<br />

and consistent oversight is difficult to explain; only a few examples can be cited here. Hamer<br />

(26) wrote before most projects he considered had been completed. But Webber (27) considered<br />

only the BART system, and was certainly aware of the large peak-capacity shortfall. Hall (28)<br />

could have analyzed the impact of service-supply levels on BART ridership over the initial six<br />

years of operation. But neither addressed service-supply issues.<br />

The critical role of peak service supply in increasing transit use and attracting patronage<br />

from private autos has also been ignored. For example, Hensher (29) states that the failure to<br />

attract significant new patronage to RRT over the past two decades is due largely to lack of<br />

disincentives to automobile use. But San Francisco planners recognized 40 years ago that<br />

diversion of RRT patronage from automobiles would not occur uniformly throughout the day,<br />

but would instead be concentrated into peak commute hours (30). Large-scale diversion of auto<br />

trips to public transit is not likely unless existing and planned systems provide levels of peakperiod<br />

comfort acceptable to consumers and provide this comfort on a scale large enough to<br />

accommodate a significant share of consumers who now use private autos.

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