TR Circular E-C058_9th LRT Conference_2003.pdf - Florida ...

Demery and Higgins 359
have to be supplied by a BRT alternative. This consumer behavior is not explained by the
following:
• Differences in vehicle size or interior configuration. However, the average railcar is
not 30% to 50% wider than the average bus, and does not have 30% to 50% more net floor space
per unit of vehicle length. This is true in particular of LRT vehicles. Available facts do not
support this hypothesis.
• Differences in service characteristics. U.S. and Canadian BRT operations are
dominated by freeway and HOV express-bus services, where vehicles operate without stopping
between suburban neighborhoods or park and ride lots and CBD destinations. Lower PVO might
be an inherent characteristic of such service, owing to the lack of intermediate stops where
shorter-distance riders willing to travel as standees might board. However, this is not apparent in
Pittsburgh and Ottawa, where local routes serving intermediate stops share facilities with express
routes that pass through intermediate stations. On-site observations do not support this
hypothesis.
• Lower demand in BRT corridors. However, to give just one example, PVO is lower
through the Lincoln Tunnel between New York City and New Jersey than on several recent LRT
systems, but Lincoln Tunnel peak volumes (phd) are much higher. Available data do not support
this hypothesis.
• Calibration of supply to demand by operators. Observed PVO levels may be
established, in effect, by transit agency decisions tailoring supply to demand. If this is true, then
it would also introduce bias to the regression models presented above: higher PVO for RRT
would lead to results suggesting that consumers respond to RRT service changes in greater
numbers than actually occurs. However, this hypothesis is extremely difficult to support. Various
operators have widely different loading standard, and the authors do not know of a single
instance where these were established with consumer input. The hypothesis begs the questions of
how operators are able to maintain such consistent PVO levels nonetheless—and why consumers
tolerate (or why operators subject them to) higher levels of peak-period crowding aboard RRT
vehicles.
Service effectiveness is also an issue. In Los Angeles, El Monte Transitway buses
supplied 66% more service during the busiest hour (mhd) than the LRT Blue Line, but carried
just 8% more peak-hour traffic (phd) (Tables 1–3). The operator charged premium fares for BRT
services (based on freeway or transitway distance) but not for LRT or HRT. 4 Pittsburgh’s East
Busway supplied 2.3 times as much peak-hour service (mhd) than the light-rail system, and
carried nearly twice as much peak-hour traffic. These examples do not support careful calibration
of supply to demand.
Underlying assumptions do not stand up to critical analysis. The hypothesis implies that
operators have the ability to serve all existing demand, and that unserved demand therefore does
not exist. However, various RRT facilities opened from the early 1980s could not accommodate
peak-period volumes of the size implied by preconstruction ridership forecasts. The principal
constraint was vehicle fleet size, although limitations on train length and service frequency are
characteristic of LRT facilities (5). Unserved demand has been demonstrated in two cases, and
probably exists in others.
In sum, on-site observations and available data fail to support this hypothesis.