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279<br />

CHAPTER 12: EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL<br />

12.47 Furtherm<strong>or</strong>e, acc<strong>or</strong>ding to Brennan J, it is <strong>not</strong> enough that the represent<strong>or</strong> ought to have<br />

known that the relying party would act <strong>or</strong> refrain from acting in reliance on the assumption <strong>or</strong><br />

expectation. A contrary view was suggested by Deane J in Commonwealth v Verwayen at CLR 445;<br />

ALR at 356. In relation to the difference of views between Brennan J and Deane J, in New Zealand<br />

Pelt Exp<strong>or</strong>t Company Limited v Trade Indemnity New Zealand Limited [2004] VSCA 163 at [99],<br />

Nettle JA, speaking <strong>f<strong>or</strong></strong> a unanimous Court of Appeal in Vict<strong>or</strong>ia, said:<br />

[I]f it were necessary to make a choice, there are at least three reasons to prefer Deane J’s<br />

<strong>f<strong>or</strong></strong>mulation. In the first place, it is m<strong>or</strong>e consistent with the observations of Mason CJ and Wilson J<br />

in Waltons St<strong>or</strong>es v Maher, that the principle which underlies High Trees estoppel is that the courts<br />

will grant relief to a plaintiff who has acted to his detriment on the basis of a basic assumption in<br />

relation to which the other party has played such a part in the adoption of the assumption that it<br />

would be unfair <strong>or</strong> unjust if left free to ign<strong>or</strong>e it. That view acc<strong>or</strong>ds with the broad general ground<br />

of estoppel that where one of two innocent parties must suffer, the loss should fall on him by<br />

whose indiscretion it was occasioned. Secondly, as the joint judgment of Mason CJ and Wilson J<br />

in Waltons St<strong>or</strong>es v Maher demonstrates, the principle which underlies High Trees estoppel is the<br />

same principle as underlies the kind of estoppel exemplified in Ramsden v Dyson; and the better<br />

view is that in such a case the party to be estopped need <strong>not</strong> know of the full extent of his <strong>or</strong> her<br />

legal rights — it is sufficient that he <strong>or</strong> she ought to have appreciated what they were. Parity of<br />

reasoning suggests that it may be sufficient in a case of High Trees estoppel that the party to be<br />

estopped ought to have known that the other party would be induced by the estopped party’s<br />

conduct to adopt and act on the basis of an assumption <strong>or</strong> expectation. Thirdly, the source of the<br />

idea that actual knowledge is an essential requirement seems to be the judgment of L<strong>or</strong>d Denning<br />

in Crabb v Arun District Council [[1976] Ch 179 at 188], and while his L<strong>or</strong>dship did say in that case<br />

that it was necessary that the party to be estopped know and intend that the other party act on the<br />

basis of the relevant assumption, his L<strong>or</strong>dship based his judgment on the speech of L<strong>or</strong>d Cairns in<br />

Hughes v Metropolitan Railway Co [(1877) 2 App Cas 439 at 448], and L<strong>or</strong>d Cairns did <strong>not</strong> speak<br />

in terms of knowledge <strong>or</strong> intent. The crucial passage of his speech was as follows:<br />

… if parties who have entered into definite and distinct terms involving certain legal<br />

results — certain penalties <strong>or</strong> legal <strong>f<strong>or</strong></strong>feiture — afterwards by their own act <strong>or</strong> with their<br />

own consent enter upon a course of negotiation which has the effect of leading one of the<br />

parties to suppose that the strict rights arising under the contract will <strong>not</strong> be en<strong>f<strong>or</strong></strong>ced,<br />

<strong>or</strong> will be kept in suspense, <strong>or</strong> held in abeyance, the person who otherwise might have<br />

en<strong>f<strong>or</strong></strong>ced those rights will <strong>not</strong> be allowed to en<strong>f<strong>or</strong></strong>ce them where it would be inequitable<br />

having regard to the dealings which have thus taken place between the parties. My L<strong>or</strong>ds,<br />

I repeat that I attribute to the Appellant no intention here to take advantage of, to lay a<br />

trap, but it appears to me that both parties by entering upon the negotiation which they<br />

entered upon, made it an inequitable thing that the exact period of six months dating<br />

from the month of October should afterwards be measured out as against the Respondent<br />

as the period during which the repairs must be executed.<br />

The approach of Nettle JA was end<strong>or</strong>sed by Macaulay J in Leading Synthetics Pty Ltd v Adroit<br />

Insurance Group Pty Ltd [2011] VSC 467 at [69].<br />

Detriment<br />

12.48 The relying party must suffer, <strong>or</strong> stand to suffer, detriment if the assumption made by it is<br />

<strong>not</strong> fulfilled. In Grundt v Great Boulder Pty Gold Mines Ltd at 674–5, Dixon J said:<br />

<strong>Copyright</strong> <strong>LexisNexis</strong>. <strong>Sample</strong> <strong>only</strong>, <strong>not</strong> <strong>f<strong>or</strong></strong> <strong>classroom</strong> <strong>use</strong> <strong>or</strong> distribution.<br />

Spi-Radan & Stewart - Principles of Australian Equity and Trusts 2nd ed. Ch.12.indd 279 10/10/2012 05:22:31<br />

200595

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