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[Dec 2007, Volume 4 Quarterly Issue] Pdf File size - The IIPM Think ...

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REIMAGINING INDIA<br />

entry tickets or toll stamps to keep account<br />

of the number of uses. But they buy<br />

it for free, and the bill is paid by the government.<br />

A useful improvement is to allow<br />

a market for these businesses, which<br />

lets an investor sell off, say a toll service,<br />

to a buyer with obligations and rights of<br />

the original contract. This facilitates entry<br />

and exit, allow firms to specialise in<br />

specific services by acquiring similar<br />

business in different places. Can we gain<br />

anything for the political system from<br />

marketisation of these services? Since<br />

these services are not individually demanded,<br />

there is no scope for bribes<br />

from individual buyers and hence no effect<br />

on the political system along the<br />

route discussed earlier. <strong>The</strong>se services<br />

however are a source of significant political<br />

corruption. Public goods are often<br />

gifted to a community before elections.<br />

Secondly when a sanctioned service gets<br />

delayed or stopped on the way it can be<br />

started or re-started only with lobbying.<br />

For urgent service local business or communities<br />

often collectively pay into party<br />

funds as part of lobbying. To stop these<br />

occurrences, of course marketisation<br />

alone is not enough. Whether a project<br />

or a service is taken up will continue to<br />

depend on the political system and hence<br />

on lobbying. But stoppage of work and<br />

allied corruption can be avoided to a<br />

large extent. Economic advantage of<br />

marketisation of these services merits<br />

separate mention. First, to match our<br />

current economic growth investment<br />

needed for infrastructure is beyond the<br />

government’s means. If the government<br />

insists on doing by itself the task will be<br />

either delayed or have to be done by borrowing.<br />

<strong>The</strong> cost of borrowing is raised<br />

from tax payers while in the suggested<br />

alternative it is substituted by toll paying<br />

users. Toll rates can be reduced as much<br />

as possible through competitive bids<br />

Pro-active services are particularly recommended for<br />

delegation to markets. While their impact on the political<br />

system could be marginal, they could help alleviate<br />

deprivation in spite of the political system<br />

from interested firms. Secondly, it is<br />

easier to assure quality of construction<br />

and subsequent maintenance under the<br />

market system. <strong>The</strong>y are to form part of<br />

the deal with the government who should<br />

enforce them strictly with penalty provisions.<br />

Because of the contractual nature<br />

of the obligation, there is no haziness<br />

about accountability when construction<br />

or maintenance is poor. This contrasts<br />

starkly with government provision, where<br />

it is nearly impossible to fi x responsibility<br />

for failure because of multiple agencies,<br />

hierarchical decisions and change<br />

of governments.<br />

Pro-active Services<br />

<strong>The</strong>se tasks are important and urgent<br />

but government organisations do a poor<br />

job. <strong>The</strong> primary reason is that assigned<br />

organisations do not have to face customers<br />

because there are no identifiable<br />

customers. Neither they nor the government<br />

or political parties are subject to<br />

any pressure for quantum, quality or<br />

speed. <strong>The</strong>se services are particularly<br />

recommended for delegation to markets.<br />

While their impact on the political<br />

system could be marginal, they could<br />

help alleviate deprivation in spite of the<br />

political system. At present markets for<br />

these services exist only in an odd, theoretical<br />

way. <strong>The</strong>re are no private buyers<br />

willing to pay. <strong>The</strong> government assumes<br />

a dual personality as both buyer and<br />

producer. It does not help because the<br />

government is only a buying agent, not<br />

a true buyer. It is expected to buy on behalf<br />

of a billion people who do not press<br />

for the services and billions more who<br />

are not even born. <strong>The</strong>re is no economic<br />

or political mechanism to keep the<br />

government interested. <strong>The</strong> result is too<br />

little production and poor quality.<br />

Whatever little is produced is produced<br />

indifferently. Inefficiency of government<br />

services is compounded here because of<br />

buyer apathy.<br />

Inviting private firms creates a group<br />

seriously interested in them--- as hotly<br />

interested as commercial firms are in<br />

their line of business. Firms specialising<br />

in these services take on the job of demand<br />

creation as part of their business<br />

agenda. <strong>The</strong>y produce media campaigns<br />

to generate public awareness of the urgency<br />

of the services and organise special<br />

interest groups that press on the<br />

political system. Some of these services<br />

40 THE <strong>IIPM</strong> THINK TANK

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