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[Dec 2007, Volume 4 Quarterly Issue] Pdf File size - The IIPM Think ...

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MORE MARKETS, LESS GOVERNMENT<br />

diversification. Imbs and Wacziarg (2003)<br />

show that in the course of development,<br />

countries first diversify within manufacturing,<br />

producing many things, and then<br />

after a certain level of income, start specializing,<br />

producing fewer things. Technically,<br />

the relationship between the concentration<br />

of value added across<br />

industries (the Gini coefficient or the<br />

Herfindahl index), and income is U-<br />

shaped, with the turning point occurring<br />

at about US$10,000 per capita. Given that<br />

India has more of a presence in skill-intensive<br />

industries, the presumption would<br />

be that it has specialized in more areas<br />

than the typical developing country, and<br />

hence it should exhibit a more diverse<br />

pattern of production. When we examine<br />

the concentration of Indian industry compared<br />

to the average country pattern, we<br />

indeed find that India is significantly<br />

more diversified (less concentrated) in<br />

terms of the distribution of value-added<br />

across industries.<br />

To summarize, compared with countries<br />

at a similar level of development and<br />

<strong>size</strong>, in 1981 India had approximately the<br />

normal share of output and employment<br />

in manufacturing. Output in services was<br />

below the norm, as was employment in<br />

services. Output and employment were<br />

about average in labor intensive manufacturing<br />

industries and above the norm in<br />

skill intensive industries. And finally, Indian<br />

manufacturing was significantly<br />

more diversified both in terms of output<br />

and employment than countries of comparable<br />

income and <strong>size</strong>. <strong>The</strong> paradox of<br />

Indian manufacturing in the early 1980s<br />

is thus that of a labor-rich, capital-poor<br />

economy using too little of the former. 5<br />

<strong>The</strong> reason, most likely, was policy. <strong>The</strong><br />

large investment in tertiary education for<br />

a country of its per capita income resulted<br />

in the plentiful availability of highly<br />

skilled, cheap labor. In addition, labor<br />

laws afforded much less protection to<br />

skilled labor. <strong>The</strong>se factors are likely to<br />

have contributed to India generating<br />

relatively greater value added and employment<br />

in skill-intensive industries as<br />

compared to the typical poor country.<br />

Reforms Of <strong>The</strong> 1980s And 1990s<br />

<strong>The</strong> key features of reforms in the<br />

1980s—characterized as “pro business”<br />

in orientation were (i) the liberalization<br />

of capital goods and intermediate input<br />

imports; (ii) the extension of export incentives<br />

through the tax system, and more<br />

liberal access to credit and foreign exchange;<br />

(iii) the significant relaxation of<br />

industrial licensing requirements through<br />

direct “delicensing” of some industries<br />

and through “broad banding”, which permitted<br />

firms in some industries to switch<br />

production between similar product lines;<br />

(iv) the decontrol of administered prices<br />

of key intermediate inputs.<br />

<strong>The</strong> reforms of the 1990s—characterized<br />

as “pro-market” in orientation—included<br />

(i) the abolition of industrial licensing<br />

and the narrowing of the scope<br />

of public sector monopolies to a much<br />

smaller number of industries; (ii) the liberalization<br />

of inward foreign direct and<br />

portfolio investment; (iii) the sweeping<br />

liberalization of trade which included the<br />

elimination of import licensing and the<br />

progressive reduction of non-tariff barriers;<br />

(iv) financial sector liberalization,<br />

including the removal of controls on capital<br />

issues, freer entry for domestic, and<br />

foreign, private banks and the opening up<br />

Between 1980 and 2002, India’s share of services in<br />

value added exploded from 37 percent to 49 percent. Its<br />

share of manufacturing in value-added remained<br />

broadly unchanged at 16 percent<br />

of the insurance sector; (v) and the liberalization<br />

of investment in important services,<br />

such as telecommunications. Areas<br />

that remained largely untouched by reforms<br />

in the 1990s were the labor market;<br />

small-scale reservations (where there has<br />

been some movement only in the last 4-5<br />

years); privatization both of non-financial<br />

enterprises and of banks; and further agricultural<br />

sector reforms.<br />

Economic Development After<br />

Reforms<br />

How have these twenty years of slow but<br />

steady reforms affected the pattern of<br />

development, if at all? Let us look again<br />

at the variables discussed above—sectoral<br />

shares, factor intensities, and diversification,<br />

between the early 1980s and<br />

early 2000s. <strong>The</strong> traditional perspective<br />

of Kuznets or Chenery would predict a<br />

THE INDIA ECONOMY REVIEW<br />

157

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