[Dec 2007, Volume 4 Quarterly Issue] Pdf File size - The IIPM Think ...
[Dec 2007, Volume 4 Quarterly Issue] Pdf File size - The IIPM Think ...
[Dec 2007, Volume 4 Quarterly Issue] Pdf File size - The IIPM Think ...
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MORE MARKETS, LESS GOVERNMENT<br />
diversification. Imbs and Wacziarg (2003)<br />
show that in the course of development,<br />
countries first diversify within manufacturing,<br />
producing many things, and then<br />
after a certain level of income, start specializing,<br />
producing fewer things. Technically,<br />
the relationship between the concentration<br />
of value added across<br />
industries (the Gini coefficient or the<br />
Herfindahl index), and income is U-<br />
shaped, with the turning point occurring<br />
at about US$10,000 per capita. Given that<br />
India has more of a presence in skill-intensive<br />
industries, the presumption would<br />
be that it has specialized in more areas<br />
than the typical developing country, and<br />
hence it should exhibit a more diverse<br />
pattern of production. When we examine<br />
the concentration of Indian industry compared<br />
to the average country pattern, we<br />
indeed find that India is significantly<br />
more diversified (less concentrated) in<br />
terms of the distribution of value-added<br />
across industries.<br />
To summarize, compared with countries<br />
at a similar level of development and<br />
<strong>size</strong>, in 1981 India had approximately the<br />
normal share of output and employment<br />
in manufacturing. Output in services was<br />
below the norm, as was employment in<br />
services. Output and employment were<br />
about average in labor intensive manufacturing<br />
industries and above the norm in<br />
skill intensive industries. And finally, Indian<br />
manufacturing was significantly<br />
more diversified both in terms of output<br />
and employment than countries of comparable<br />
income and <strong>size</strong>. <strong>The</strong> paradox of<br />
Indian manufacturing in the early 1980s<br />
is thus that of a labor-rich, capital-poor<br />
economy using too little of the former. 5<br />
<strong>The</strong> reason, most likely, was policy. <strong>The</strong><br />
large investment in tertiary education for<br />
a country of its per capita income resulted<br />
in the plentiful availability of highly<br />
skilled, cheap labor. In addition, labor<br />
laws afforded much less protection to<br />
skilled labor. <strong>The</strong>se factors are likely to<br />
have contributed to India generating<br />
relatively greater value added and employment<br />
in skill-intensive industries as<br />
compared to the typical poor country.<br />
Reforms Of <strong>The</strong> 1980s And 1990s<br />
<strong>The</strong> key features of reforms in the<br />
1980s—characterized as “pro business”<br />
in orientation were (i) the liberalization<br />
of capital goods and intermediate input<br />
imports; (ii) the extension of export incentives<br />
through the tax system, and more<br />
liberal access to credit and foreign exchange;<br />
(iii) the significant relaxation of<br />
industrial licensing requirements through<br />
direct “delicensing” of some industries<br />
and through “broad banding”, which permitted<br />
firms in some industries to switch<br />
production between similar product lines;<br />
(iv) the decontrol of administered prices<br />
of key intermediate inputs.<br />
<strong>The</strong> reforms of the 1990s—characterized<br />
as “pro-market” in orientation—included<br />
(i) the abolition of industrial licensing<br />
and the narrowing of the scope<br />
of public sector monopolies to a much<br />
smaller number of industries; (ii) the liberalization<br />
of inward foreign direct and<br />
portfolio investment; (iii) the sweeping<br />
liberalization of trade which included the<br />
elimination of import licensing and the<br />
progressive reduction of non-tariff barriers;<br />
(iv) financial sector liberalization,<br />
including the removal of controls on capital<br />
issues, freer entry for domestic, and<br />
foreign, private banks and the opening up<br />
Between 1980 and 2002, India’s share of services in<br />
value added exploded from 37 percent to 49 percent. Its<br />
share of manufacturing in value-added remained<br />
broadly unchanged at 16 percent<br />
of the insurance sector; (v) and the liberalization<br />
of investment in important services,<br />
such as telecommunications. Areas<br />
that remained largely untouched by reforms<br />
in the 1990s were the labor market;<br />
small-scale reservations (where there has<br />
been some movement only in the last 4-5<br />
years); privatization both of non-financial<br />
enterprises and of banks; and further agricultural<br />
sector reforms.<br />
Economic Development After<br />
Reforms<br />
How have these twenty years of slow but<br />
steady reforms affected the pattern of<br />
development, if at all? Let us look again<br />
at the variables discussed above—sectoral<br />
shares, factor intensities, and diversification,<br />
between the early 1980s and<br />
early 2000s. <strong>The</strong> traditional perspective<br />
of Kuznets or Chenery would predict a<br />
THE INDIA ECONOMY REVIEW<br />
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